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FOREWORD

The tenor of U.S.-China relations for much of the first year of the
administration of President George W. Bush was set by a crisis that
need not have occurred. How the situation was handled and eventually
resolved is instructive. It tells us about a beleaguered communist
leadership in the buildup to major generational transition (scheduled
for late 2002 and early 2003) and the mettle of a democratically
elected U.S. government tested early in its tenure by a series of foreign
policy crises and a carefully coordinated set of devastating terrorist
strikes against the continental United States.
The way the April 2001 crisis on Hainan Island was resolved must be
chalked up as a success for the United States. the key was
Washington’s ability to convince Beijing that holding the air crew was
hurting, and not advancing, Chinese interests. That is something Beijing
seems not to have grasped when, without warning, the EP-3 suddenly
swept down onto the runway in Haikou, bringing a treasure trove of
super-secret electronics and 24 Americans, who looked at first to be
valuable bargaining chips. With the plane and the crew, China seemed
to hold the best cards and behaved accordingly. the top leaders who
Ambassador Joseph Prueher had tried to cultivate did not return his
calls, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, after demanding an apology
from Washington, left for a Latin American tour. Let the Americans
stew in this for awhile, Jiang’s message seemed to be.
But Washington managed to reduce the value of those bargaining
chips. This was done, first, by making clear that no substantive
concessions would be made to secure their release; and, second, by
persuading Beijing that continuing to hold the Americans would bring
real damage to Chinese interests. As indignation mounted in the
United States, economic dangers began to loom on China’s horizon.
The Beijing government, after all, counts on a rising standard of living to
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limit dissent, and even a brief loss of access to the American market
could be damaging. Nor did Asian neighbors rally to support China. They
worry, mostly in private, about Beijing’s growing military strength
and assertiveness. The State Department boycotted Chinese embassy
functions and Secretary of State Colin Powell, while offering regrets
and condolences—even eventually sorrow over the loss of the Chinese
pilot—showed no inclination to consider the apology China
demanded.
The most sensitive nerve in Beijing, however, may have been the
Olympics. Having the games in their capital is a cherished Chinese
aspiration, and when members of Congress began organizing against it
as the crisis developed, the Chinese embassy took the unusual step of
sending rather snippy letters to the offenders. Only releasing the
hostages could possibly remove the very real threat, and even then not
with certainty. Hence Beijing’s decision to send the crew home, which,
once made, began the search for a linguistic formula to explain it.
Washington had not, in fact, apologized, but we could not prevent
Beijing from pulling some of what we had said out of context and
presenting it through state-controlled media as being, in fact, the
apology China’s leaders sought. That, plus the usual “humanitarian
considerations,” provided sufficient cover to end the crisis.
Americans were reminded that the Chinese are not always their
friends. Despite some real economic progress, the regime still often
becomes confrontational with its own people and with other
countries. The United States must treat it with prudence and respect,
hedging against dangers even as it seeks to promote positive
development. By the same token, China has been reminded that
Washington cannot be relied upon to yield when the two states
collide. Our growing economic interests in China and our hopes for a
future positive relationship with China would be negatively affected
if our fundamental American national interests or our commitments
to democratic friends and allies in Asia are challenged by China.
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During the period that the Chinese changed course, from seeking
concessions to seeking an exit, the United States calmly followed
procedures. First the Ambassador, then the Secretary of State—and
briefly the vice President—took the spotlight to deliver an authoritative
“no” to the demand for apology. Skilled State Department
wordsmiths cobbled together a precisely crafted letter that gave
China cover, but no more. President Bush choreographed all of this,
mostly behind the scenes, and earned our applause. President Jiang
seems to have concluded that the matter should be handled expeditiously
with civilians, not the PLA taking the lead in the negotiations. Once the
Hainan Island Incident was resolved and strategic clarity was emphasized
on Taiwan, the U.S. moved swiftly to put economics at the top of our
agenda, and China’s entry into the WTO become the first priority.
This volume, comprised of papers originally presented at a
conference held at Carlisle Barracks in September 2001, helps to put the
Hainan Island incident in the broader context of China’s strategic
aspirations and its growing military capabilities. I am proud to be a
prime initiator of this conference on the People’s Liberation Army,
which has been an annual event for more than a decade. Last year’s
conference’s co-sponsors were the American Enterprise Institute, the
Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College. For the fourth
consecutive year, the War College’s Strategic Studies Institute is
publishing the proceedings. The nine chapters in this volume, all written
by leading experts, cover a diverse set of important topics: East Asian
perspectives on China’s security ambitions, the status of the Chinese
ballistic missile program and regional reactions to U.S. missile
defense initiatives, and China’s ever-improving conventional military
capabilities. I commend China’s Growing military Power to you.
AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY
Senior Fellow
American Enterprise Institute
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CHAPTER 1
CHINA’S RESPONSE TO A FIRMER AMERICA
Andrew Scobell
Larry M. Wortzel
President George W. Bush made it clear as a candidate for office that
U.S. policy toward China “will require tough realism.” Presidential
Candidate Bush’s speech on September 23, 1999, at the Citadel, the
military college of South Carolina, foreshadowed his firm approach to
Beijing.1 In that speech, Candidate Bush recalled for the American people that
“in 1996, after some tension over Taiwan, a Chinese general reminded
America that China possesses the means to incinerate Los Angeles with
nuclear missiles.”2 Bush followed up in a speech in Simi Valley,
California, with the warning to China that it is a “competitor, not a
strategic partner,” that the United States would deny the right of Beijing to
impose their rule on a free people (Taiwan), and that the United States
would help Taiwan defend itself.3 He also made clear early in the
campaign that he would pursue ballistic missile defense for the United
States.4 Thus, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing
had early notice that they would not be dealing with a President
William J. Clinton who considered China to be a “strategic partner” of the
United States.
For Beijing, this was a very different America. Under Clinton, U.S.
foreign policy was generally more solicitous of Beijing. Defense officials
ran off to China with packages of “deliverables” that the Chinese had
come to expect out of meetings in which the United States sought more
dialogue and cooperation between the armed forces of each country.
Clinton responded to China’s march 1996 missile launches off Taiwan with
two American aircraft carrier battle groups.5 However, once the Taiwan
elections were over later that month, Clinton dispatched National Security
1

Council and State Department officials to Taiwan to encourage the leaders
of that island to work harder at getting along with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Thus policy seemed to vacillate between a firm foreign policy
line toward China and one that sought to placate the Chinese leadership when
it complained about the U.S. position.6
Once Bush took office, Beijing dispatched successively higher-level
diplomats to Washington — former ambassadors, foreign ministry
officials, and advisers to Chinese President Jiang Zemin—to gauge the
White House’s position on China and Taiwan. This culminated in the visit
to Washington of vice Premier Qian Qichen on March 20, 2001. The
Chinese were clear on one major point: they worked hard to deliver the
message that the sale of the Aegis-class guided-missile destroyer to Taiwan
by the United States was “unacceptable” and, in Beijing’s eyes, amounted
to the creation of a new alliance among the United States, Taiwan, and
Japan.
The Bush position on Taiwan was clear. he did not back away from his
campaign position that “we’ll help Taiwan defend itself.” The President
and his appointees at the Departments of State and Defense, pointing
to the large-scale buildup of ballistic missiles on the Chinese coast opposite
Taiwan, also made sure that Beijing understood that the United States would
meet its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 98-6)
to provide Taiwan adequate defensive arms and services to respond to the
Chinese threat.
On April 1, 2001, during a mid-air intercept by the Chinese Navy, a
Chinese F-8II fighter aircraft collided with an unarmed American EP-3
reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace in the South
China Sea. The American aircrew was detained by China for 11 days and
subjected to lengthy and unpleasant interrogation. China made
expansive claims about its sovereign territory, insisting that the entire
exclusive economic zone, 200 miles off the Chinese coast, was its own.
The United States insisted that China’s territorial waters and seas
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extended out 12 miles, consistent with international law. This
incident, and the treatment of the aircrew, probably did more to
convince the President and the American people that firmness was the
only way to deal with Beijing than any other action or statement from either
capital. From the perspective of many in the United States, the actions and
rhetoric of the Chinese government were confirmation that Beijing did not
have friendly intentions toward Washington. The release of the crew
and, eventually, the aircraft is seen as the successful outcome of
firmness coupled with flexibility and superb interagency coordination
from the most senior officials in Washington to the members of the actual
negotiating team on Hainan Island. In the face of this, Chinese
truculence gave way to Chinese pragmatism.7
On April 25, 2001, after 100 days in office, President Bush restated
that the United States will help Taiwan defend itself, and in a television
broadcast went further, saying that the United States will “do whatever it
takes” to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Lest any one
misinterpret just how serious President Bush was about that statement, it
was repeated for emphasis. In St. Petersburg, Florida, on March 11,
2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, speaking to an
audience that included Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming,
reiterated Bush’s pledge.
Security Policy.
Under the Clinton administration, military-to-military contacts
between China and the United States were treated as routine matters. In a
number of ways, the “Engagement Policy” of the United States Pacific
Command also treated military contacts with China as more or less
routine, even desirable, despite concerns expressed in the Congress. From
Capitol Hill, many conservatives expressed concerns that such contacts
were only helping the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) learn more about
U.S. defense establishment plans and systems, with no reciprocity from
the Chinese side. That, too, changed with the Bush administration.
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Soon after assuming his post, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld conducted a review of military contacts with China. That
review concluded that the United States should cease pursuing military
contacts or engagement with China as a matter of routine practice.
Instead, future U.S.-China military contacts and exchanges would be
conducted on a case-by-case basis, with decisions in line with U.S.
interests. Contacts should benefit the United States and should not
strengthen the PLA.
Ballistic Missile Defense.
One of Candidate Bush’s strongest foreign policy and defense
positions during his presidential campaign was to call for a ballistic
missile system that would defend forward-deployed American forces,
U.S. allies, and the homeland of the United States. In Simi, California, he said:
“We still, however, need missile defense systems—both theater and
national. If I am commander-in-chief, we will develop and deploy them.”8
Of course, the implicit message in this was that the Anti-Ballistic missile
(ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union had to be reexamined. Two years
later, in December 2001 at the Citadel, President Bush made it explicitly
clear that the United States must move beyond the ABM Treaty.9 Since June
13, 2002, the United States is no longer be constrained by that treaty.
This means that ABM testing can go ahead against warheads of any speed
and with interceptors of full capability. The United States can also work
on cooperative programs with friends and allies as well as conduct testing at
sea; things that were prohibited under the ABM treaty.
China saw this coming, and Beijing’s security planners were not happy
about the turn of events. At a conference on arms control in Beijing, China,
September 14-15, 2000, representatives from China’s arms control community
argued that any attempt at developing a ballistic missile defense system in the
United States “is inherently destabilizing and will foster a world-wide arms
race.”10 The Chinese attendees argued that China was the primary target of
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ballistic missile defenses, and a United States goal was to seek “absolute
security and military superiority.”11 U.S. ballistic missile defenses have never
been “aimed” at another country. They are aimed at incoming missiles.
Nonetheless, from the time that the U.S. Congress directed the Department of
Defense (DoD) to explore ballistic missile defenses in Asia in the Fiscal Year
1998 “Strom Thurmond” Defense Authorization Act, to the time that President
Bush assumed office, Beijing repeated these arguments in nearly every
international and bilateral forum it could. A year after Bush assumed the
presidency, China’s representatives continued to argue that the ABM Treaty
constitutes “the cornerstone of international strategic stability.”12
From the time of the Presidential campaign, the incoming Bush
administration made it clear that its approach to China would differ from
Clinton’s and perhaps even differ from that of Bush’s father, the 41st President
of the United States. After the election, to the surprise of some in China and
the United States, President Bush actually followed through on the principles
he had expounded in his campaign speeches. This surprise was the result of a
failure to recognize the firm commitment to principles on the part of President
Bush and senior members of his administration stemming from their deeplyheld conservative Realpolitik beliefs.13 China’s reaction is the focus of the
chapters in this book.
China’s Reaction.
This book was developed against the backdrop outlined in the first
section of this introduction. The conference organizers sought to
capture the changes in China, not only in terms of rhetoric, but also in
military doctrine, training, and hardware purchases, in response to Bush’s
firmer tone. Of course, we recognize that Beijing had already taken note of
the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of
Taiwan during the 1996 Strait Crisis. But as noted above, this strong
message was soon diluted by more conciliatory moves from the Clinton
administration toward Beijing. As a result, the firmness displayed by
Washington in early 1996 was not perceived as a permanent shift in
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institutionalized approaches to American security policy on China.
Then there was the accident in Belgrade. Despite all of the U.S. apologies,
investigations, and fact-finding commissions, many in Beijing,
particularly in the PLA and the intelligence community, remain
suspicious that the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1998
was not an accident.14
In this volume, some of the best analysts of contemporary China
assess how Beijing has reacted, and can be expected to react, to the changes
in United States foreign policy. The authors examine Chinese perceptions
of the United States, American security and foreign policies in Asia, and
the effects of those policies on the Asia-Pacific region.
In chapter 2, Dr. David Finkelstein, Director of Project Asia at the
Center for Naval Analyses, examines security relations between China
and the United States from the events in Kosovo through America’s
reaction to the attack on the United States by terrorist forces of the alQaeda network. Finkelstein argues that the United States has serious
worries about China’s activities in four vital areas: Taiwan, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, the
intentions of China’s military modernization programs, and whether
China is attempting through diplomacy to push the United States out of
the Asia-Pacific region.
In Finkelstein’s view, although Bush and Jiang were able to
improve U.S.-China relations, and to convey the impression that in the
war on terrorism at least, Washington and Beijing see eye-to-eye, there was
not much substance in the Bush visit to China in October 2001.15 But a
reduction in tension has some value in and of itself, according to
Finkelstein, because increased tensions between the United States and
China complicate such other key U.S. security concerns as stability on the
Korean Peninsula and the prosecution of the war on terrorism.
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Finkelstein concludes that there remains deep-seated mutual distrust
between China and the United States, particularly among members of the
security establishment in both countries. In Beijing, a number of
influential security thinkers appear to have concluded that the ultimate
objective of United States policies is to obstruct China’s rise as a more
rich and powerful nation. Therefore, “U.S. policies in the region are
increasingly filtered through a set of lenses [in Beijing] that are already
calibrated to ensure some distortion.” More and more Chinese security
thinkers are concluding that the United States wants to “change China,”
to “deter China,” and to “collect intelligence on China.” Finkelstein argues
that the depth of this mistrust, which is to a certain extent mutual, is
reason enough to maintain some sort of security dialogue aimed at
dispelling misperceptions and avoiding conflict.
In Chapter 3, Hideaki Kaneda, a retired vice Admiral in Japan’s maritime
Self Defense Forces, addresses China’s growing military power and its
significance for Japan’s national security. Kaneda makes the point that
China has used its own military strength to advance territorial claims,
while ignoring the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other nations in the
East China Sea and South China Sea. He outlines what he characterizes
as a methodical effort by China’s navy to eventually control “biological and
nonbiological resources in China’s peripheral waters.” The resources
Kaneda sees as the object of China’s goals are primarily undersea gas
and petroleum deposits, but also fishing grounds to secure food
supplies.
The major security component of Beijing’s strategy is a “near-water
defense” of the “first island chain” stretching from the Aleutian
Islands, across to the Kuriles, the Japanese Islands, the Ryukyu
Islands, Taiwan, the Philippine Islands, and Borneo. Kaneda notes that
many of China’s territorial claims, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea,
and the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, fall with in
the perimeter of this “first island chain.” He also argues that control of the
waters within this area gives Beijing not only the resources it needs, but
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also the strategic position to bring military power to bear on Taiwan with
reduced fear of outside intervention.
Kaneda believes Japan must call for more transparency in Chinese
defense policy. He also argues that China must be prepared to come to
agreements that permit joint exploitation of undersea resources by the
countries with competing claims. As early confidence-building
measures, Kaneda seeks to involve China in regional efforts to provide for
maritime safety, combat piracy, stop drug transfers, control and end the
trade in persons, and work to control environmental pollution. He takes
a firm position on resisting any expansion by China, and insists that Japan
must be ready to counter any illegal reconnaissance efforts by the Chinese
navy in Japan’s territorial waters. Finally, he calls for a firm U.S.-Japan
alliance as a counter to China’s expansionary tendencies.
In Chapter 4, Anatoly Bolyatko of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies
in Russia discusses how in military doctrine and exercises the PLA has
reacted to the incoming Bush administration. Bolyatko predicts that, as
joint military exercises are conducted between the United States and its
East Asian allies in Korea and Japan, and as the United States moves
forward with a “missile defense shield, ”China will react by producing
thousands of missiles, aircraft, and tanks. He believes that such
production will stress China’s military-industrial base, but that such
stresses can be tolerated by the Chinese economy. His conclusion is
that China will seek to be more effective at force projection and defense
in the Asia-Pacific region and will strengthen its forces against Taiwan,
but will not seek to become a world military power, as was the Soviet Union,
with the capability to conduct military operations outside East Asia.
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stokes of the U.S. Air Force explains
China’s reactions to the Bush administration’s plans for developing a
ballistic missile defense system to protect deployed U.S. military forces,
American friends and allies, and the U.S. Homeland. As Stokes notes in
Chapter 5, China’s campaign against the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972
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ABM Treaty dates to well before the Bush administration took office.
But as a candidate for office, Bush and his security advisers made it clear
that the United States would pursue these defenses. Stokes sees China’s
development and modernization of its own strategic missile forces as “an
integral part of PRC coercive strategies.” Whether discussing China’s
theater-level missile programs, short-range missiles, or intercontinental
missiles, Stokes believes that any American missile defenses, however
modest, are perceived by Beijing as having “serious implications for the
viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of
conventional short and medium range ballistic missiles.”
Beijing’s ballistic missile forces are a political and military “trump
card” intended to stem any moves for more autonomy and international
recognition from Taiwan, and also limit the freedom of action of the
United States to respond to contingencies not only in the Taiwan Strait,
but in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Stokes notes, Beijing fears that,
if viable ballistic missile defenses are deployed, the command and
control architecture for these systems could turn into a “de-facto” alliance
if Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Taiwan integrate their
missile defense programs.
Stokes predicts that Taiwan will adopt a combination of passive
defensive measures to complicate PRC targeting, while Chinese military
planners will develop better plans to absorb and reconstitute forces after
a PRC first strike. America’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on June 13,
2002, hands China’s diplomats a defeat of monumental proportions.
Russia not only accepted the end of the ABM Treaty, but also agreed to
major cuts in the numbers of its offensive weapons. Thus the predictions of
not only China’s arms control community but of the supporters of China’s
position in the United States ring hollow. Indeed, if there is a missile
buildup in reaction to the end of the ABM Treaty, it will come from China,
seeking to maintain what Stokes calls a “trump card.”
In Chapter 6, Eric McVadon, a consultant on Asian security and
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former U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing, explains in great detail the
positions China has taken in reaction to the Bush presidential campaign
statements on missile defense and to the actions taken by the Bush
administration in its first 6 months in office to address China’s
concerns over U.S. ballistic missile defense plans. McVadon outlines the
efforts by the PRC arms control and diplomatic community to so limit any
American defense efforts that they would have no practical effect on China’s
nuclear force. China’s negotiators, according to McVadon, “could not
tolerate” an American missile defense force of 250 interceptor missiles,
but “might be able to tolerate 10 interceptors devoted to the defense of
the American homeland.” According to McVadon, China’s negotiators
argued that one factor forcing Jiang to take a firm position is “public
opinion in China.” McVadon opines that the United States must find ways
to demonstrate that it “will not be hegemonic” and must continue a dialogue
with China on the purpose and extent of any U.S. ballistic missile defense
system.
Asia, too, has reacted to American ballistic missile defense plans,
explains Dr. Taeho Kim, Senior China Analyst at the Korean Institute
for Defense Analyses. In Chapter 7, Kim acknowledges the profound
changes in the strategic environment produced by the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the United States. Kim examines missile defenses as
part of a more comprehensive effort to transform not only the U.S.
military, but also American strategy. He notes that the Bush
administration’s approach to security represents a radical departure from
that of the Clinton administration. Kim predicts an approach that has
nuances in policy and missile defense deployments in East Asia, taking
into account the political sensitivities in Japan, where some are wary of
going beyond the research stage, and in Korea, where the popular focus is
on North Korea and its conventional forces, not on China’s or North
Korea’s ballistic missiles.
Colonel Susan Puska, currently U.S. Army Attaché at the American
Embassy in Beijing, assesses Beijing’s efforts at force projection in Chapter 8.
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She asserts that China is modeling its own military modernization and
efforts to develop advanced capabilities based on the capabilities of the
U.S. military. To increase military capabilities, China is focusing more on
power projection in peripheral areas by its own military, while changing
training methods to increase effectiveness. Puska documents new
scenarios for Chinese military training that focus on meeting what Beijing
sees as its main threat—the forces of the United States. The PLA also
seems to be conscious of its own relative weaknesses in comparison to U.S.
forces. Therefore it is focusing on what it sees is the main vulnerability of
the United States, a dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum for
communication and the exchange of intelligence and threat data.
Beijing is improving management in the PLA, improving the quality of its
own military personnel by better educating them and recruiting more
qualified personnel. The PLA is also increasingly able to coordinate and
use effectively reserve and militia forces. The Central military
Commission, the Chinese Communist Party’s leading military body, is
also trying to reduce corruption and waste. Puska concludes that today
Beijing has a “rough but ready” force projection capability that will improve
over time and create greater risks and costs to any country that seeks to
challenge China on its periphery.
In Chapter 9, Mr. Kenneth Allen, an expert on Chinese security at the
Center for Naval Analyses, examines the changes in the PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) as it modernizes and reforms its logistic systems in order to fight
high-technology wars. In the 1990s the PLAAF began transforming itself
from a force reliant upon single branch deployment to one able to utilize
multiple branches in joint service campaigns, indicating a shift in the focus
of the PLAAF from a primarily positional, defense oriented operation, to a
more mobile, maneuverable, preventative force, able to address local
concerns and strike quickly. Allen analyzes this shift through
examination of the PLAAF operational theory, logistics structure and
theory, and the types of training used to implement these changes. Allen
then addresses the specific changes enacted by the PLAAF in preparation
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for a military confrontation with the United States. Over the last 50 years,
China’s PLAAF has engaged in only three external campaigns, in Korea,
Taiwan Strait (1958) and Vietnam. Given recent military history, the
PLAAF has realized the need for a transregional strike force and has
initiated the training necessary to create one. While it is not yet clear
how effective the PLAAF would be during a real conflict, particularly
if facing anticipated U.S. strategies such as interior airfield
destruction, the PLAAF has made significant strides in improving pilot
proficiency, sortie generation and sustainability, logistical support,
communications, and intelligence. Thus, Allen concludes that, while the
PLAAF may not currently be able to field a rapid strike force of any
threat to the United States, it is making definite progress in this
direction.
Each of the authors has effectively captured the main trends in
regional security in East Asia. The terrorist attacks on the United States,
and the subsequent war on terrorism, only increased American resolve
to deploy a ballistic missile defense. They also brought about the
deployment of American forces on China’s western periphery,
something that was not foreseen in the days before the attack on the
United States. The trends outlined in this book, therefore, have perhaps played
themselves out over a more compressed timeframe. But the assessments by each
author hold up, and provide some framework for understanding how
Beijing may react to the firmer positions taken by the United States.
ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 1
1. George w. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” Charles ton: the
Citadel, September 23, 1999, http://citadel.edu/pao/address/pres_bush.html.
2. The remarks, which have been attributed to General Xiong
Guangkai, were made in a private conversation with a former U.S.
government official, Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, and should not
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carry the weight of an official Chinese statement. Moreover, according to
Freeman, these words were not couched as a threat and should be
evaluated in the context of an extended off-the-record discussion
between himself and the Chinese military official. See Ambassador
Chas. Freeman, ”Did China Threaten to Bomb Los Angeles?”
Proliferation Brief, Vol. 4, March 22, 2001, available at www.ceip.org/files/
publications/proliferationbrief404.asp?from=pubtype; and Allen S. Whiting,
“China’s Use of Force, 1950-1996, and Taiwan,” International Security,
Vol. 26, Fall 2001, pp. 129-130. In Scobell’s view, Xiong’s comments
should be seen as providing important insights into the mindset of
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PART I: PERSPECTIVESONCHINA’S
SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER
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CHAPTER 2
THE VIEW FROM BEIJING:
U.S.-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS
FROM KOSOVO TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
David M. Finkelstein
Introduction.
On October 19, 2001, Presidents George W. Bush of the United States
and Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had their first
face-to-face meeting on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Council (APEC) meeting in Shanghai after almost a year of
increasingly strained bilateral relations. What was originally scheduled
to be a full-blown summit meeting, to include a visit by Bush to Beijing,
was curtailed to a half-day of talks due to the unforeseen and tragic
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11.1
By all accounts, the meetings went well enough. The official Chinese
press characterized the discussions as “constructive and fruitful” and
held in a “friendly and candid atmosphere.”2 In their joint press
conference, Bush readily agreed with Jiang that the discussions were useful
and that the two men had “a very good meeting.”3 Both men agreed to improve
relations. Jiang called for “constructive and cooperative relations,” as did
Bush, who added the word “candid” to the construct.4
The usual “deliverables” that are associated with and often
anticipated as a result of these types of U.S.-China summits were modest.
But given many months of tense relations and the events of September 11,
Bush and Jiang were able to accomplish two key objectives: establish a
baseline dialogue from which to attempt to improve relations, especially
security relations, and publicly present a “united front” on the issue of the
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war on terrorism. In the future, these two threads may become
increasingly interwoven as operations in Afghanistan continue. Indeed,
for both countries, the war against terrorism will only magnify the
importance of placing U.S.-China relations, especially security relations,
on an even keel.
For China, the next few years will witness a significant leaders hip
succession—the accession to power of the “Fourth Generation” of
leaders in 2002. These are the men who will have to grapple with the
increasingly difficult task of pushing forward economic and structural
reforms, while managing the social and political dislocations attendant to
those reforms. They will have to move forward with the development of
China’s western region, tackle the internal problems plaguing the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and manage the issues associated with World
Trade Organization (WTO) entry. All of this will be going on while China
will be increasingly placed under the international microscope in the leadup to the 2008 Olympics. Moreover, the Taiwan issue is becoming more
complex for Chinese leaders as political developments and domestic
politics in Taipei become more complicated. And now that the United States
is actually prosecuting military operations in a country with which
China shares a land border—always a high order Chinese security
concern—Beijing now has a serious stake in not being cut out by
Washington. China simply cannot afford a confrontational relationship with
the United States at this point in time if it can be avoided.
Needless to say, a confrontational relationship with China will not
serve U.S. interests either. Especially because of the campaign in
Afghanistan and the global nature of Washington’s war on terrorism,
stable bilateral relations between the United States and China are a must.
The issue of terrorism notwithstanding, strained security relations with
China serves no ends if it can be avoided.
Increased U.S.-China tensions will only unnerve Washington’s
allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region. An unstable relationship
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could have a deleterious impact on U.S. business and trade interests at a
time of economic uncertainty. Increased tensions could complicate
key U.S. security concerns in East Asia, such as the maintenance of
stability on the Korean Peninsula and especially across the Taiwan Strait.
Overall, worsening bilateral relations with China could become an
unending foreign policy distraction to a Bush white house that needs to
focus its foreign policy energies on the war against terrorists.
At the same time, due to a growing mutual distrust that has evolved with in
the two security establishments over the past few years, security differences
between the two nations will be the most challenging area in which to
repair relations and move them forward.
U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China are well known. For the most part, U.S.
worries on the security front have revolved around the following four key
issues. First, growing concerns that Beijing is prepared to use force to
resolve the Taiwan issue “sooner rather than later,” based on a calculus
that few in the west can claim to understand with any degree of
certainty.5 Second, U.S. concern about Chinese proliferation behavior.
Third, given the lack of defense transparency in China, uncertainties in
the United States as to the intentions behind China’s military
modernization programs—conventional and nuclear. And fourth,
questions in the United States as to whether China would like to see the
U.S. Military pushed out of the Pacific, or at least pulled back.6 All of
these issues are critically important to the regional security interests of
the United States. On a 4-tier scale of national interests—(1) survival, (2)
vital, (3) major, (4) peripheral—they rate in the vital and major categories.
This is not insignificant.
Likewise, in Beijing, the “U.S. factor” in the Chinese national security
calculus appears to have grown even greater than in the past. Over the past
few years, the perceived “challenges” to Chinese national sovereignty and
security interests posed by the security policies of the United States—
real or imagined on their part—are being viewed by a good number of
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Chinese security analysts with increasing alarm. Whereas, one could
argue, U.S. security concerns about China range backwards from
“vital” to “major,” many Chinese see U.S. challenges as ranging upwards
from “major” to “vital” and, in some cases, even “survival.” This trend is
extremely worrisome if true.
Because most American analysts are already well aware of the Chinese
security policies that give pause in the United States, the assignment
given this student by the conference organizers was to identify the
Chinese concerns—which are not always self-evident. The author of this
chapter, therefore, will review the growing uncertainty, concern, and angst
with which Beijing has viewed the United States over the past couple of
years. He will attempt to view the world through Chinese eyes. He will attempt
to convey the Chinese analytic framework vis-à-vis the United States—an
analytic frame of mind, if you will—as well as specific policy concerns.
The best way to do so is to review for readers the serious national
security debates that have taken place in China in the very recent past that,
in many ways, have been driven by Chinese angst about the United States.
The author will present an overview of the very significant national security
debate that took place in China in 1999 in the aftermath of NATO’s Kosovo
intervention.7 he will touch briefly on the April 2001 EP-3 incident, and
address the “America debate” that was unfolding in Beijing as of the summer
of 2001, just prior to September 11. Finally, the author will speculate
about the concerns Chinese analysts might have as they view the security
implications of the American campaign in Afghanistan, and, presumably, the
war against terrorism beyond.
A caveat at the outset is in order. It is important that the Chinese
Weltanschauung be fully understood and explained, especially as it
concerns the United States. However, doing so does not imply agreement.
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1999: Kosovo and the “Great Peace and Development Debate.”
Overview. From March 1999 through the late fall of 1999, a national
security debate took place in China. It was remarkable on two counts.
For the first time since 1985, Deng Xiaoping’s basic assessment of
the state of the international security environment—that “peace and
development” (Heping Yu Fazhan) were the trends of the times—was
seriously questioned and intensely scrutinized. Of key significance, the
efficacy of China’s foreign policies and the validity of China’s national
defense policies were especially subjected to fervid internal debate.
The second reason that this was a remarkable event was that this was
likely the first time since 1949 that Chinese foreign policy and defense policy
were openly discussed and debated in the government-controlled media as
matters of public concern—to include criticisms of government policies by
the general populace.
Judging from the Chinese press, during the height of the debate (the
summer of 1999) almost every literate sector of the China polity was
apparently engaged in a media free-for-all on foreign policy and defense
issues. This included intellectuals, middle class entrepreneurs,
students, and even Chinese government analysts who took to the op-ed
pages, radio call-in shows, and TV roundtables.8
Public discourse revolved about the state of the world, China’s place
in it, the state of Chinese security, as well as what the government in
Beijing should do about these issues and about the United States.
The proximate cause of this debate was NATO’s military intervention
in Kosovo in March 1999. NATO’s errant bombing of the PRC Embassy
in Belgrade in May added fuel to the debate. However, behind these
issues were long-simmering Chinese concerns that the post-Cold war
international order was not unfolding as Chinese international
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relations theorists had predicted. The debate, especially the internal debate,
was also driven by increasing Chinese concerns about U.S. strategic
intentions and policies in the post-Cold war order in general, and
towards China in particular.
At its most fundamental level, the debate that took place in 1999 was
about how the Chinese government should assess the state of the
unfolding international security environment. But most important, it
was about the implications of that assessment for China’s external
security.
The overarching question was simple: had China’s external security
situation fundamentally deteriorated as a result of NATO’s intervention
in Kosovo? This question brought others to the surface: what did other
global and regional security developments portend? And should China adjust
its domestic priorities, its foreign policies, or its defense policies?
On the diplomatic front, for example, questions were raised as to
whether the Chinese government had been placing too much emphasis on
cultivating the “developed world”—especially the United States—
instead of the “developing world,” which it had traditionally emphasized?
Others asked whether the government was becoming involved in
international affairs that were too far removed from China’s traditional,
more narrowly defined national interests. In effect, this question asked
whether the central leadership was walking away from Deng
Xiaoping’s oft-quoted dictum that in foreign affairs” China should keep a
low profile and never take the lead.”
On the issue of national defense modernization, some voiced concerns
that the “U.S.-led” Kosovo intervention was evidence that China could no
longer afford to continue to subjugate defense modernization to
economic development. Indeed, some argued that it was now time to place
equal emphasis on the two.
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As we shall see, it was not just the Kosovo intervention that made this
an issue. Other issues simmering in the background were at work, and it
is important to point out that those who saw a need for enhanced
military defense were not just in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA):
they were as likely to be found in civilian ministries and their affiliated
institutes.
But at the heart of the debate in official circles were questions about
the United States as a world actor in general, Washington’s specific
intentions toward China, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Indeed,
almost all Chinese on every side of the debate were able to agree that any
deleterious changes in the international security environment and any
degradation of China’s own security were a function of the actions and
intentions, real or perceived, of the United States.
By most accounts, the “U.S. question” in particular was the most
contentious issue debated internally by Chinese government analysts and
other officials. As one Chinese put it, “The Chinese reaction to Kosovo
created the political atmosphere that unleashed a debate by those
unsatisfied with PRC policy toward the U.S.” At a certain point in the
discourse, the question of whether confrontation with the United States
was inevitable became the centerpiece of discourse. Other questions
revolved about how to deal with the United States and the tradeoffs
between cooperation and confrontation with Washington.
In the lexicology of Chinese analyses, all of these issues and others
were captured by asking whether “peace and development” was still “the
key note of the times.”
To grasp the significance of the question, one must understand the
implications of questioning the validity of “peace and development” as
the “key note of the times” (shidai zhuti). Doing so requires a step back to
recall Mao Zedong’s assessment and Deng Xiaoping’s reversal of that
assessment. In China these assessments are not mere exercises in
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theoretical discourse: they are the starting point for justifying or
rationalizing specific national policy decisions.9 Therefore, a review of
the differences in domestic, foreign, and military policies justified by the
very different assessments made by Mao and Deng provides a historical
context with which to view the debate of 1999.
The Maoist Line: “War and Revolution.” In the 1960s and 1970s, the Maoist
assessment of the international security environment was commonly stated
as “war and revolution” (zhanzheng yu geming). This was a result of the
perceived military threats to China from the United States and
especially the Soviet Union after the break between Moscow and Beijing. It
was also a function of the ideological lens through which Mao viewed the
world.
As a result of this assessment, China’s security posture and its
domestic policies were characterized by keeping the Chinese nation and
the PLA on a war footing, perpetuating “class struggle” within China, and
pursuing a foreign policy focused on the “socialist camp” and the
revolutionary “Third world.” For the most part, China remained “closed”
to the capitalist world.
As we know, this assessment had a profound impact on the economy
and society. The combined requirements of being on a war footing and
Mao’s ideological imperatives resulted in an autarkic economy; an
emphasis on heavy industries moved inland; the perpetuation of the policies
of the communization of agriculture and industry; and the neardestruction of the national bourgeoisie.
For its part, the PLA was told to expect “early war, major war, and nuclear
war.” This meant maintaining a massive defense establishment, relying
on “People’s war” as a military strategy, and a belief that “superior”
political will could overcome the advanced technologies of potential
opponents. It also perpetuated the highly elevated status of the PLA in the
Chinese polity.
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The Dengist Line: “Peace and Development.” In the late 1970s and early
1980s, Deng Xiaoping began taking China down a path of bold change.
Deng’s reassessment of the “key note of the times” provided a critical
ideological basis for the myriad of sea-change reforms that would ensue. It
also was the justification for a change in national priorities. By 1985 Deng
had reversed the Maoist assessment completely.
Where Mao saw “war and revolution “as the context for international
security, Deng acknowledged the changes in superpower relations and
China’s own prospects. Deng’s reassessment held that “peace and
development” (heping yu fazhan) more correctly described the trends in the
world. The Dengist view held that, in spite of the continuing dangers to
China posed by wars and conflicts, the possibility of a world war was
remote, the chance of a nuclear war between the superpowers was slight,
China did not face the prospect of imminent invasion, and China would enjoy at
least 2 decades of a peaceful international environment.
The policy changes derived from this assessment are well known.
Domestically,” economics as the central task” replaced “class struggle as
the key link.” In foreign relations, China began to seek contact and
good relations with the capitalist world as well as the socialist camp, and
with developed countries as well as developing countries. “Reform and
opening up” (gaige yu kaifeng) became the major thrust.
In the area of defense policy, the PLA was taken off a war footing and
shifted onto a prolonged period of “peacetime army-building,” thus
initiating the reforms of the Chinese military that persist today: namely
moving toward a (relatively) leaner, but more technologically advanced
PLA. Just as importantly, Deng placed military modernization as the last
priority in his “Four modernizations.”
At an enlarged meeting of the Central military Commission in
June 1985, Deng explained his reassessment to his generals. While
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recognizing the dangers that persisted, he asserted that “the world
forces for peace are growing faster than the forces for war.” Deng told his
military leaders to be patient, to place economic construction above all
else, and to wait for at least 20 years. At that time China’s economic
strength would permit a greater emphasis on military modernization.
Fast forward to 1999. Clearly then, the critique of the Dengist
assessment during the Kosovo debate engendered major implications for
the broad sweep of Chinese domestic, foreign, and defense policies. If
“peace and development” were no longer the trend, what was? Did Kosovo
signify the triumph of the “forces for war” over the “forces for peace”?
Should China raise defense modernization at the expense of economic
reform? Should Beijing turn its back on the developed and capitalist
world and focus its foreign policies on the developing world exclusively?
Is conflict with the United States inevitable?
Draconian as these questions may seem, the highly charged
atmosphere in Beijing in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention (and
especially after the errant bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade)
provided a backdrop against which these types of questions could be
asked and debated for the first time in many years as Chinese analysts
attempted to make sense out of a post-Cold war international order
that, from the perspective of some, now seemed to be moving against
Chinese national interests.
The degree of angst in Beijing during this period is partially
explained by comparing China’s successes in the preceding 3 years, 1996-99,
with events in late 1998 and in early 1999.
Prior to 1999: Riding the waves of Self-Confidence. Between 1996 and late
1998, Beijing had every reason to feel newly confident in its place in the
world order, especially in foreign affairs.
• In the wake of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crises, U.S.-China relations
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seemed to be back on track after the two presidential summits in 1997
and 1998. An agreement to seek a “Constructive Strategic
Partnership” was announced, and President William Clinton
publicly stated the “Three No’s” in Shanghai.10
• Nearly 10 years after Tiananmen, almost all foreign economic
sanctions against China had been lifted.
• Between 1996 and 1998, a very proactive foreign policy spearheaded
by Jiang resulted in the establishment of a series of “partnerships”
around the globe with key developed countries.11
• Hong Kong’s retrocession to China was accomplished, and Macao’s was
to be next.
• Human rights issues no longer appeared to be a major impediment to
China’s foreign economic relations. Not only had Europe seemingly
lost interest in this issue but also, for the first time in many years, the
United States in 1998 did not sponsor a resolution condemning China
at the annual meeting of the United Nations (U.N.) Human Rights
Commission in Geneva.
• Beijing was making excellent progress in resolving border disputes
with neighbors, notably Russia and even Vietnam. Moreover, the
“Shanghai Five” arrangement between China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan was well underway.12
• China had received accolades from around the world for “responsible”
behavior during the Asian financial crisis, and for the moment the
focus of regional concern in Asia was on financial recovery, not China’s
rise as a regional power.
• On the Taiwan front, the PRC seemed to be on the move, and Taipei
appeared to be on the defensive. In addition to obtaining the “Three
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No’s” from the U.S. President, China was pressuring Taiwan for
political talks and waging an active diplomatic offensive to woo those
countries that still recognized Taipei. The loss of diplomatic relations
with South Africa in 1998 was a serious blow to Taiwan in this regard.
Domestically, the situation was tolerable. China was able to weather
the Asian financial crisis with out devaluating its currency. Growth
was acceptable, if not as great as desired. The social dislocations
attendant to economic reform seemed manageable, although concerns
about labor unrest persisted.
1999: A Year of Disasters. Juxtaposed against 3 years of relatively
smooth sailing, the close of 1998 and the first months of 1999 brought,
from a Chinese perspective, ominous developments in key areas of
concern: Japan, Taiwan, and relations with the United States. Some of
these events took place before the Kosovo intervention or the Embassy
bombing, others afterwards. The net effect, however, was to raise fears
among many Chinese officials and analysts that security trends were now
turning against China’s interests. These events provided both a context for the
debate of 1999 and, in some cases, new impetus during the debate.
Japan. Through out this period (1998, 1999) developments in Japan
begin to be viewed with increasing apprehension by the Chinese analytic
xitong.
• In December 1998 the Government of Japan announced its decision
to join the United States in co-research of the upper-tier theater
Ballistic missile Defense program.
• In March 1999 the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force fired upon
North Korean vessels—the first shots fired in anger by the Japanese
armed forces since the end of World War II.
• The Japanese Diet ratified the Revised Guidelines for Defense
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Cooperation with the United States in May 1999, refusing to specify for
Beijing whether Taiwan was included in the ambiguous phrase “areas
surrounding Japan.”
• All of this added to concerns about Japan in the wake of Jiang’s less than
successful visit to that country in late November 1998.
Taiwan. In early July 1999 then-President Lee Teng-hui issued his
“Two-State theory,” which resulted in another “mini-crisis” in crossStrait relations. Enough said.
United States. To one degree or another, the United States, during
the debate, began to be viewed by many analysts in Beijing as the root
cause of the negative trends in Japanese and Taiwan affairs in addition to
becoming a problem in its own right. What did Chinese analysts focus on?
• In January 1999 the Clinton administration announced its decision to
move forward on National missile Defense.
• In April 1999 Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington for the expressed purpose
of negotiating Chinese permanent normal trading relations (PNTR)
and WTO membership ended in failure. Indeed, in late March there
had been a “mini-debate” in China as to whether Zhu should have gone at
all, given the inauguration of the NATO air campaign against Serbia and
a lack of consensus within the Chinese bureaucracy about the types of
concessions Beijing could afford to make in those negotiations.
• Through out this period, Chinese analysts began to assess that the socalled "anti-China" voices in the United States were gaining the
upper hand over China policy. Some of the more prominent “data
points” they cited included the “Cox Committee Report” (May) and
the Los Alamos espionage case; the tabling of the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act (April-May); the requirement levied on the
Department of Defense to publish its study on hypothetical theater
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ballistic missile defense (TBMD) architectures in Asia including
Taiwan; the possibility of the sale of TBMD-related radars to Taipei
(June); and the concern over China’s alleged future influence over the
Panama Canal (July).
NATO and Kosovo. Then, of course, there was the issue of Kosovo
itself. Some Chinese security analysts believed it established precedents for
military interventions in the “internal affairs” of sovereign states and
demonstrated the “will” of the United States (as viewed from Beijing)
to use force” to maintain its world dominance.” Kosovo shocked many
Chinese into questioning whether the global trends were in fact away
from war and toward China’s much-touted multipolar world order—
the previous analysis.
The air campaign began in March while Jiang Zemin was in Italy, a
NATO member, as part of a three-nation European visit. In deciding to
intervene with military force, NATO sidestepped the U.N. and
marginalized Security Council members China and Russia. Then, in early
May, the PRC Embassy was inadvertently attacked.
Just as disconcerting to the Chinese were other NATO-related
events. In April, NATO accepted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic as new members. During NATO’s 50th anniversary celebrations
in Washington, a new “Strategic Concept” was declared that included
out-of-area missions. Also around that time (June) was the coining of the
“Clinton Doctrine,” which was interpreted in China as espousing the
legitimacy of military interventions in sovereign nations for humanitarian
purposes. Beijing immediately thought of the implications for Taiwan,
Xinjiang, and Tibet, and carefully watched developments in Chechnya.13
Domestic Concerns. Even on the domestic front, the first half of 1999
presented issues for concern within Zhongnanhai. High-profile
corruption cases continued to embarrass the Party; reforms of the
state-owned enterprises were becoming difficult to carry out; and
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consumer demand at home was slowing. If the Hong Kong press is to be
believed, large-scale and often-violent incidents of labor unrest
continued to plague local governments on the mainland. Even more
unsettling were the rise in the profile of the China Democracy Party
following the Clinton visit to China (1998) and the “shock” of the Falun Gong
phenomenon beginning in April 1999 and continuing today.
Overall then, in just a few months the confidence of Chinese
leaders and their analysts was significantly shaken. They were no longer
so certain of their place in the world order or of their assessment of
world trends as favoring China’s continued rise both at home and
abroad.
The Results of the Debate. At the end of the day, after reams of analysis
and incessant rounds of meetings, the debate re-looked many of these
key issues. And by the time the Beidaihe meetings took place in August 1999,
there was closure on many of them: at least on an official level (if not
intellectually).
That closure came in the form of a new shorthand for the state of the
international security situation referred to as ”The Three No Changes and
the Three New Changes.”
The “Three No Changes” assert the following:
• Peace and development remain the trend in international relations
and the movement toward a multipolar world continues;
• Economic globalization continues to increase; and,
• The major trend is toward the relaxation of international tensions.
But these three points were modified by the “Three New Changes”:
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• Hegemonism and power politics are on the rise;
• The trend toward military interventionism is increasing; and,
• The gap between developed and developing countries is increasing.
Clearly, these two sets of seemingly contradictory assessments
represented a compromise position between those who were relatively
optimistic about long-term trends and those who were very much
focused on and concerned about near-term negative developments.
The “Three No Changes” reaffirmed the basic thrust of Deng’s earlier
analysis. China did not now face “early war, major war, and nuclear
war.” It reaffirmed the analyses by Chinese international relations theorists
since the late 1980s that the world would eventually move toward a
multipolar international order and that China would become one of the
key poles. It also recognized the growing importance of economics in
international relations. So, to a great degree, it accounted for the views of
those who did not see Kosovo and other security-related events of concern
as requiring a major readjustment of the Dengist assessment.
This formulation had direct and immediate implications for Chinese
domestic policies. It reaffirmed the correctness of “economics as the
central task” and provided the continued ideological justification for
the leadership in Beijing to press forward with the next phases of
economic and structural reform, to include the pursuit of WTO
membership. So when Chinese interlocutors say that “nothing changed”
as a result of Kosovo, they are not being disingenuous. There was, in fact,
no decision to reverse the Dengist line and the direction of domestic
reforms.
However, something did change after Kosovo. The “Three New
Changes” added serious caveats to the generally positive long-term
trends cited in the first part of the construct.
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For one thing, the “Three New Changes” was an admission that
previous Chinese government analyses of the near-term trends in the
international security had been much too optimistic about the pace of
global multipolarization and much too quick to dismiss the potentially
destabilizing effects that local wars and world wide military
interventions might have on China’s interests.
Clearly, Beijing’s much-hoped-for multipolar world order was not
around the corner. In addition, the new assessment certainly undercut
the assertion in the 1998 Defense white Paper that “the influence of armed
conflicts and local wars had been remarkably weakened.” In fact, the “Three
New Changes” undercut the entire tenor of the first section of the 1998
Defense white Paper.
The second change implicit in the “Three New Changes” is the Chinese
assessment of the root cause of the problems facing world security and
stability.
Previously, Beijing had seen the United States as one source of some
of the problems plaguing world security, both economic and military. But
there were plenty of other nations and non-national actors viewed as
problematic. In the wake of Kosovo and a host of other events since 1998, the
mix of problems remained the same. But the United States and its policies
were now starting to be viewed as a principal source of these problems,
especially for China. And by most accounts the “Three New Changes” is
about the United States almost exclusively.
Of equal significance, the new assessment, and a reinforced view of
the United States as a superpower “hegemon,” seemed to have put to rest
previous de rigueur internal and academic assessments that the
“comprehensive national power” of the United States was in a slow
decline—an analytic “line” that had been commonplace for at least a
decade.14 The new line seems to be accompanied by an assessment that the
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United States will maintain its status as “sole superpower” for the next 20
years, if not longer.
At the end of the day, then, the degree to which the post-debate
analysis of the international and regional security environment, and the
assessment of the U.S., became an official “line” was reflected in the
formulations in the first section of the October 2000 Defense White
Paper.
The October 2000 Defense White Paper, China’s National Defense
2000, provided a much more sober assessment of the trends in
international and regional security than had been articulated in the July
1998 version. Some of the assessments from the important first section of the
October 2000 Defense White Paper is worth reviewing.15
• “In today’s world factors that may cause instability and uncertainty
have markedly increased.”
• “Hegemonism and power politics still exist and are further developing.”
• “Certain big powers are pursuing neointerventionism, neo-gunboat
diplomacy, and neo-economic colonialism... Which are seriously
damaging the sovereignty, independence, and development interests of
many countries, and threatening world peace and security.”
• “The United Nations’ authority and role in handling international
and regional security affairs... are being seriously challenged.”
• “Local wars and armed conflicts . . . have increased again.”
• “There are . . . new negative developments... in the security of the AsiaPacific region.”
• “The Taiwan Straits situation... is complicated and grim.”
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Finally, to underscore increasing concern over Chinese security, the
Defense White Paper of 2000 announced the following:
. . . in view of the fact that hegemonism and power politics still
exist and are further developing, and in particular, the basis for
the country’s peaceful reunification is seriously imperiled, China
will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty
and security by military means.
The Unique Interests of the PLA. If there was any institution in China
that had a significant corporate stake in the events surrounding Kosovo, it
was the PLA. Needless to say, closely watching and studying NATO’s
campaign against Serbia as it unfolded was a matter of intense
professional interest. But the PLA had an equally large bureaucratic
interest in the internal and public debate triggered by Kosovo. The
debate provided a window of opportunity for China’s military
establishment to argue publicly, and likely behind closed doors as well,
that national defense and military modernization deserved a greater
priority in overall national development than had been accorded hitherto.
The arguments surrounding the need for a greater emphasis on
defense modernization by the PLA (and others) gained momentum as a result
of two events: the May 1999 bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade (in
which a Chinese military attaché was wounded), and Lee Teng-hui’s
espousal of the “Two-State theory” in July 1999. In the past, such arguments
by the top PLA leadership in public fora had been somewhat politically
incorrect, although once in a while a senior PLA leader would make his
case. For example, in 1996 Defense Minister General Chi Haotian wrote a
long article in CCP’s official journal, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), in which he
stated,” The building of national defense... cannot exceed the
limitation of tolerance of economic construction, nor can it be laid aside
until the economy has totally prospered.” 16 For the most part, however, in
public, the top PLA leadership had for years dutifully recited the
Dengist mantra that “defense modernization must remain subordinate
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to economic construction.” Here was a chance to press the case for more
funding.
It should be pointed out, however, that publicly the top PLA
leadership did not challenge this line during the debate. As mentioned
above, having the leadership of the Central Military Commission, for
example, make the case in the press during such a period of
emotionalism and sensationalism was likely still too sensitive from a
domestic political standpoint.17 Nevertheless, there seemed to be plenty
of senior colonels and other field grade officers who were quite willing to
make the arguments. Consequently, during the period of the debate the
PLA ’s official newspaper, Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao),
carried an unending stream of “opinion pieces” from individual
officers that warned the nation of the consequences of ignoring
national defense, hyped the threat posed by the United States to
international peace and stability, and, in some cases, argued that
military modernization should at least be equal to national economic
construction.
In these regards, the timing of Kosovo could not have been better.
For one thing, work on the 10th Five-Year PLAN (2001-05) was already
under way but not yet complete. There was still a chance to press for an
increase in funding. Moreover, just 8 months earlier in July 1998, Jiang had
ordered the PLA to divest itself of its commercial enterprises—the large
corporate empire that it had run for many years which provided the military
with a source of (1) extra-budgetary funds for soldier “quality of life,”
(2) employment for PLA spouses and demobilized officers, (3)
supplemental operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, and (4)
funds for equipment procurement. Not only did the PLA lose many of its
corporate entities, but it did so under a cloud. The decision to have the
military divest was tied to evidence brought to the attention of Jiang of
large-scale smuggling and corruption by some military commercial
entities in the south. Consequently, the Kosovo intervention, and
especially the bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade, gave the PLA
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an opportunity to burnish its image among the general public by riding
the crest of nationalist sentiment as the defenders of Chinese sovereignty.
These particularistic interests aside, NATO’s Kosovo intervention
also drove home to many in the PLA once again just how large a capabilities
gap still existed between their own armed forces and those of the advanced
western nations, especially the United States, even after nearly a
decade of post-Gulf war reform and modernization. The frustration of
some military officers at the relatively low priority of military
modernization in the greater scheme of national development was
articulated by a general line of argument that goes like this: “We were told
that we would have to be patient, that military modernization would have to
await economic modernization. We have been patient for 20 years. How
long must we wait?”
But the PLA rhetoric surrounding Kosovo served another important
purpose. It was used to highlight to the Chinese armed forces the importance
of following through with the wide-ranging programs of reform that had
been underway for the last decade. Many of these reforms—especially
in the areas of force structure downsizing and personnel
administration—had been meeting some resistance below. As Chief of
the General Staff Fu Quanyou had pointed out a year earlier, grassroots
units had to overcome “selfish departmentalism and overemphasis of
local interests” and move forward with change for the greater good of the
PLA.18 Especially in light of the situation on Taiwan, the PLA leadership
used the Kosovo intervention and the debate to lecture its own people
that reform and modernization of the military was a serious undertaking
and not merely a bureaucratic exercise.
While it is clear that military modernization was not going to
supplant economic construction as the national priority, or even be
equal to it in emphasis, some of these arguments by the PLA, or by others
on behalf of the PLA, probably had an impact on the top Chinese
leadership. Clearly, for various internal political reasons, the concerns of
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the PLA could not be totally ignored. Consequently, not long after the
PRC Embassy bombing, rumors abounded that the central government
had provided the military with a large, supplemental lump-sum infusion
of funds.19
Given the call for enhanced national defense by the PLA and others in
the post-Kosovo debate, the demise of many PLA business interests, the
security assessment articulated in the October 2000 Defense White Paper,
and the politics of succession, it was not too much of a surprise when in
December 2000 the Chinese Finance Minister announced an increase of
17.7 percent for defense spending for 2001.
Overall then, the debate of 1999 was an occasion for Beijing to vent,
anguish, and wonder about China’s national security and the future of U.S.China relations.
Interregnum: December 1999 Through April 2001.
At an official level, “the great debate” came to a close in late August
1999 when the Beidaihe leadership meetings promulgated the “Three No
Changes and Three New Changes.” It was not until December, however,
that the public debate in the Chinese media finally came to a close. At this
point in time, the central authorities apparently decided that enough
public debate on the issues of national defense, national security, and
Chinese foreign policy had taken place among the masses. By the end of 1999,
editors of the major newspapers were reportedly no longer accepting op-eds
from their readerships or writing editorials on these issues. There were
other pressing issues with which to grapple: WTO accession, the inception
in February 2000 of the “Go west” campaign, the continuing “Three
Represents Campaign,” and a host of other domestic and foreign policy
issues; not the least of which was the work needed to be done on the 10th
Five-Year PLAN, the beginning of the succession process, and the
preparatory work for the 16th Party Congress.
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By the summer of 2000, however, Chinese foreign policy analysts were
once again running fast to keep up with events in the United States.
Attention was now focused on two issues: the ongoing presidential
election campaign and the perception that American military strategy was
shifting to Asia—a Chinese concern that surfaced even before the Bush
election victory and the subsequently published Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) issued by the Pentagon in September 2001.
The catalyzing event for Chinese analysts wondering about a U.S.
"strategic focus shift” (zhanlue zhongdian zhuanyi) to Asia were news reports
that the U.S. Air Force desired to forward-deploy stockpiles of cruise
missiles to Guam in the summer of 2000. Chinese concerns about a
“strategic shift” linger today, especially given some of the language in the
recent QDR document.
For the most part, however, the Chinese community of America experts
was fully engaged following election politics in the United States and
wondering and speculating about what would be “better for China”—a
Bush or a Gore election victory. The only people likely more frustrated than
the American public at the time it took finally to decide the election winner
was the corps of Chinese America experts who were probably under
tremendous pressure to explain what was going on, and what the
implications of a Bush or Gore victory or defeat meant for China. And
many a Chinese institute wasted its funds in having delegations go to the
United States in late November 2000 for post-election fact-finding,
only to arrive without an election decision made.
After the Bush election was confirmed, arguments went back and forth
in China as to the implications. Cautious optimists pointed to Bush’s
father, “Lao Bushe,” as a probable force for ameliorating the Republican
Party campaign rhetoric. Especially disconcerting to Beijing was the
excoriation of the Clinton-Jiang “Constructive Strategic Partnership”
construct and the substitution of the “Strategic Competitor” label. They
pointed out as well that, sooner rather than later, economic realities would
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triumph, and the U.S. business community would eventually weigh in.
After all, Bush and some of his principal deputies were from corporate
America. They argued as well that all administrations start out
“tough” on China, and they recalled the Clinton campaign slogan
about “coddling dictators.” Those on the other side of the argument
dismissed these lines of analysis as delusion. The trend, they argued, was
already clear: the United States is bent on confronting China on all fronts,
and the Bush victory means the ascendance of the “anti-China” elements.
At the end of the day, they argued, the United States was still determined
to pursue a strategic objective of “westernizing and splitting” China.
When the EP-3 incident occurred on April 1, 2001, these arguments were
far from resolved, but for the moment they were held in check as the PRC
Government tried to decide what to do about a situation that could quickly
deteriorate. It is far too early to even attempt to understand (if we ever can)
the calculus by which Beijing acted vis-à-vis the United States during the 11
days the American aircrew was detained on Hainan Island. But for this
student, at least, it was clear at the time and remains clear today that domestic
politics in China were paramount.
Jiang and the senior party leadership had learned some important lessons
as a result of the errant NATO attack on the PRC Embassy in Belgrade in
May 1999. Most of these lessons had to do with the domestic scene, not
international relations or U.S.-China relations. It was clear at the time of the
EP-3 incident in April 2001, that Jiang would not countenance a
repetition of the situation that took place after the bombing almost 2
years earlier.
There were three very clear indicators of this. First, Jiang and the central
leadership came out “tough” on the United States from the start. There
would be no room allowed for accusations from any quarter in China
that the Party and government was unwilling or incapable of defending
Chinese sovereignty and dignity as was the case, some had argued, after the
Belgrade bombing.

42

Second, there would be no students marching through the streets or
gathering at or besieging the U.S. Embassy as in May 1999. This, one
suspects, was not so much out of concern for the Americans as out of
concern about stability on the streets of Beijing and beyond. The sensitive
“May 4th” period was much too close at hand, as was the anniversary of
the death of Hu Yaobang (April 15, 1989), a significant event for the student
movement in the spring of 1989. And, of course, the Falun Gong problem
had yet to be completely resolved.
Third, unlike the immediate period after the bombing in May 1999,
there would be no media “free for all,” no great and public debates
about national security policy, no criticisms of the government, and no reopening of the “peace and development” question. All things considered,
during the EP-3 incident, the PRC Government demonstrated once
again how capably it is able to reign-in the media when it chooses to do
so.20 Relatively speaking, there was no radical editorializing that could
undercut PRC Government positions or serve to reopen debates that had
already been resolved “officially.”21 Any bile that needed to be vented in
the press could be done at the expense of the United States this time
around.
In other words, and overall, in the wake of the EP-3 incident, the Party
this time stayed ahead of Chinese nationalism and popular indignation and
was not chasing after it, as was the case after the embassy bombing in 1999.
Post EP-3 and the Summer of 2001: Is China the U.S.’s New Enemy?
The EP-3 incident did not reopen debate on the prospects for “peace
and development” or the state of the international security situation.
But it did reopen the portion of the “Great Debate of 1999” that was the
most contentious and upon which there was the least consensus at the time:
the future of U.S.-China relations.
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Before the U.S. EP-3 was returned, and before Secretary of State Colin
Powell even confirmed his visit to Beijing, a new debate was underway
among the Chinese America-watching community. Since at least May
2001 they had apparently been engaged in another round of intense
debates, seminars, meetings, and conferences at which the issue of U.S.
policy toward China was being discussed.
The EP-3 incident was the proximate cause of the new round of
meetings and discussions. But it was not the sole cause. Like the
unprecedented debate in 1999, the debate that began after the April 2001
incident dredged up a growing list of concerns that were awaiting
evaluation.
But there was one aspect of the EP-3 incident that clearly had a very
profound impact upon analysts and the general public in China (and,
incidentally, upon the American public as well). Specifically, the intense
news coverage of the event in the west and in China made very public for
probably the first time just how much “cat and mouse” activity was going
on between the U.S. and Chinese militaries.
So as of the summer of 2001, the following questions were being
explored in Chinese analytic circles once again:
• How should China assess the current state of U.S.-China relations?
• What “China policy” will the Bush administration adopt? and,
• What are the prospects for future relations?
Central to these other questions was “Had the United States decided
that China is the enemy and that this will drive U.S. policy toward China
and the U.S. larger security strategy in Asia?”
As was the case during the debate in 1999, a wide range of views among
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Chinese security analysts on these questions was allegedly held. Moreover,
as was also the case in 1999, analysts of like-minded opinion could be
found crossing institutional and bureaucratic boundaries. Some
observers offered that the PRC Government “learned its lesson” from the
debate of 1999: although the debate was “active and intense,” it was
conducted in a “cool-headed and analytic fashion “and mostly kept out of
the media.
No conclusions are known to have been reached. Many Chinese analysts
believed that it was still too early to make any conclusions about U.S.
policies or intentions toward China. At the same time, many Chinese
analysts were said to agree with a general assessment that the trends in U.S.
policies and actions toward China in the last few months had been
“negative.” There was along list of data points that many Chinese cited as
indicating a negative trend in “Bush administration” China policy. (Again,
listing these points does not indicate concurrence.) These included:
• The Bush campaign rhetoric portraying China as a “strategic
competitor,” not a “strategic partner”;
• Bush administration plans to move ahead with BMD (perceived to be
directed partially at China);
• The strengthening of U.S.-Japan military relations (also perceived to be
directed at China);
• The “loud anti-China voices” that openly point to Beijing as the next
enemy, and research monographs by some U.S. think tanks (wrongly
perceived to represent U.S. Government policy) that propose a U.S.
China policy option termed “congagement”;
• The perception that the focus of the new U.S. military strategy is shifting
from Europe to Asia and that this shift is directed against China;
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• The U.S. desire to move closer to India;
• Bush’s April 2001 remarks about the defense of Taiwan;
• Increasing arms sales to Taiwan and especially expanding military
contacts with Taiwan (some Chinese analysts argue the United States
is moving toward a de facto military alliance with Taipei);
• The recent U.S. visit by Lee Teng-hui;
• The belief of some Chinese analysts that the United States “pressured”
Tokyo to allow Lee Teng-hui to visit Japan;
• The U.S. Transit of Chen Shui-bian;
• The “attitude” of the Pentagon toward military relations with China
since the EP-3 episode;
• The U.S. “attack” on human rights in China in Geneva;
• The appointment of a State Department coordinator for Tibetan affairs
and the Dalai Lama visit; and,
• The general “anti-China” attitudes of some officials appointed to the
new administration.
Clearly, there were some Chinese analysts who were already
convinced that the United States had designated China as its next
enemy. Others believed that the United States had already decided upon a
“two-track” China policy that combines “economic engagement and
military containment.” Still others argued that Bush’s China policy had yet
to be decided.
Not all were convinced that the future of relations was as dire as recent
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events would suggest. These individuals tended to argue that
Beijing’s and Washington’s mutual interest in stable relations for
reasons of strictly selfish national interests were so strong that the
“negative trend” would be arrested “at some point,” that pragmatism
in Washington “would eventually prevail,” and that relations would
eventually improve.
For example, in late May 2001 the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) held a forum on U.S.-China relations to
which various experts were invited to present their views. In
summarizing the results of the conference in their journal, CICIR editors
pointed out many of the challenges from Washington. But the conference
summary in the journal ended on a relatively optimistic note:
Most of the participants to the forum traced the current state of
affairs to policy guidelines of President Bush in designating
Beijing a “strategic competitor” and its tilt to the Taiwan
authorities in support of elements advocating “Taiwan
independence.” China has clearly been the target of
Washington’s current endeavor at strengthening ties with its
allies and pushing ahead with its NMD program. But all this does
not signify the last word in the Bush team’s China policy because
external and internal restraints would make the Bush
administration return to a relatively rational course after a
period of reassessments. Based on the above analysis, most
participants believe that there is no need for pessimism about the
future of the China-US relationship. Unavoidable
contradictions and frictions do not necessarily spell loss of
control because the prices for conflicts would be prohibitively
high for both parties.22
It is difficult to say with any certainty that the above “optimistic”
assessment (“hopeful” might be a better word) was representative of a
majority of PRC security analysts or that it represented a commonly held view
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point. Some of the actual papers that were presented at the CICIR conference
seemed, on the whole, less optimistic than reported above.23
Operation “ENDURING FREEDOM”—
Speculating About PRC Security Concerns.
Obviously, the events of September 11 changed the entire context of
the Bush-Jiang Summit. Although the Bush visit to China was much
curtailed, the fact that the American President went to Shanghai to attend
APEC and meet with Jiang under the circumstances was clearly a
decision with positive impact both in China and throughout the region. The
meeting clearly provided both leaders the ability to move back on a track
toward more stable relations. And to the degree that both men have been
constrained somewhat by domestic politics in their approach to bilateral ties,
their professed common cause in the war against terrorism enhanced the
arguments for engagement on a strategic level.
At the same time, how the United States and the coalition campaign
against the Taliban—and the greater war against terrorism—unfolds will
be watched with great care by the corps of Chinese security analysts. One
can speculate that the Chinese will be very wary of the potential negative
collateral impact of the post-September 11 world order for Chinese security
concerns in general and specific key Chinese national security interests in
particular. In this final section, permit a bit of speculation about the
negative impact Chinese security analysts might see in what has transpired
since September 11.
Impact on Pakistan: A Key Security Partner. China claims that it has no
military alliances, and in the technical sense that is quite true. But for many
years Pakistan and China have been very close security partners. Their
common cause is based on shared distrust of an enduring mutual
antagonist—India. But China’s interests in Pakistan transcend that
shared animosity.
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For Beijing, Pakistan is one of many key Islamic states that it
cultivates in order to achieve some leverage in the Moslem world,
owing to concerns about its own restive north west province of
Xinjiang. Pakistan’s importance to China has been on the rise since January
2001. China has nervously watched as the Bush administration has relooked at previous U.S. allegations that China continues to transfer
missile technologies to Islamabad, and Beijing analysts have evinced
concerns watching the new impetus in the United States for rapprochement
with India.
In the blink of an eye the events of September 11 have witnessed an
amazingly quick U.S. return to engagement with Pakistan. Forced to
“choose” between the United States and the Taliban regime it had
hitherto supported, Islamabad made its choice, and Chinese security
analysts cannot but wonder about the long-term implications of the
reemergence of U.S.-Pakistani security relations for its own equities
there. Moreover, should the government in Pakistan undergo its own
internal dislocations as a result of its support for Washington, Chinese
interests will be open to question. Having moved from proliferating pariah
to active partner in the U.S. War in Afghanistan, a long-time and very close
Chinese security partner now has a foot in both camps.
Impact on Sino-Russian Relations. Rapprochement with Russia is likely the
greatest Chinese foreign policy success of the post-Cold War (1991)
period. Geostrategically, the end of Sino-Russian animosity has resulted in
China having today the most secure land borders it has ever enjoyed. In
July 2001, capping 10 years of steadily improved relations, Presidents Jiang
and Vladimir Putin signed a major treaty aimed at institutionalizing their
“Cooperative Strategic Partnership.”
While Beijing and Moscow have their own historical reasons to look
askance at each other, events of the last few years have drawn them closer
together politically. Both nations are fundamentally dissatisfied with
how the post-Cold war world order has unfolded. In short, the global
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political, economic, and military prowess of the United States has been
an unhappy state of affairs for each. Both nations want global power
diffused—with at least some power accruing to them—in a muchtheorized multi-polar world order.
The convergence of political views between Beijing and Moscow has
been manifold: opposition to the expansion of NATO and Partnership for
Peace; common cause against the strengthening of military alliances in
the Pacific (read U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-ROK); opposition to
the U.S. National missile Defense program; mutual support for their
respective claims to sovereignty in Chechnya and Taiwan; conjoined
opposition to external military interventions under the “pretext” of
humanitarianism; a new-found belief in the sanctity of the U.N.;
mutual concerns about instability in Central Asia, and a security
arrangement of convenience in which Beijing procures military weapons
and technologies unavailable to it elsewhere in return for propping up
Russia’s failing defense industrial complex with those purchases.
In October 2001, less than 3 months after inking the much-heralded
treaty, Russia seemed to be throwing its tacit support behind the U.S.
Military operations against Afghanistan by not standing in the way of
American forces staging in former Soviet clients in Central Asia, and,
reportedly, Moscow began to step up its arms shipments to the opposition
Northern Alliance forces.
But probably much more disconcerting from a Chinese perspective,
Putin began transmitting what appeared to be serious “feelers” about
actually joining NATO under certain conditions of change in that
organization. Russia seemed to realize that the tragic events of
September 11 might actually be an opportunity finally to align itself in a
serious way, with dignity, as an equal partner with the west after almost
10 years of Russian foreign policy limbo. It may just be that Putin realized
this was Moscow’s opportune moment to do so in a way that could ultimately
resuscitate Russia’s faltering economy and at the same time enhance its
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international prestige. Indeed, the Bush-Putin meeting on the fringes of
APEC in October 2001 seemed to be reported in the western press as much
more robust than the meetings with Jiang in the latter’s own country. The
prospects of Russia “leaning to the west” cannot be a comfortable
thought in Beijing, even though revived Russian relations with the west
would certainly not be at the expense of China in the sense that such
alignments were played out during the Cold war.
Impact on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If rapprochement with
Russia is likely the greatest Chinese foreign policy success of the post-Cold
war period, then Beijing’s second is achieving membership in the WTO.
Beijing’s third major foreign policy success, although less well known, was
serving as the motive force behind the creation of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001.
Originally known as the “Shanghai Five,” China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgizstan had been working together since 1996 to
resolve their border disputes, enhance military confidence-building
measures among their armed forces, and coordinate security work against
the so-called “three evils” of “terrorism, separatism, and fanaticism” in
Central Asia. In short, the SCO represents one of the post-Cold war world’s
first new regional security architectures. And to the degree that China has
been the motive force behind it, it is claimed as a success.
In June 2001 the “Shanghai Five” transformed itself into the “Shanghai
Cooperation Organization,” added Uzbekistan as a sixth member, and
formalized its intentions to pursue military security in the border
regions in a multilateral fashion, to include establishing a
counterterrorism center in Bishkek and even holding out the prospects
for combined military exercises in the future. The importance of these
initiatives to China’s security interests in Central Asia is underscored by
the fact that this is the first time ever that the PRC has been a formal
signatory to a multinational security architecture. Moreover, should
combined military exercises ever take place, it will be the first time ever that
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the PLA has trained or exercised with any foreign military in anything
other than the role of “advisors” or trainers—this is simply
unprecedented for China.
Enter the events pursuant to September 11. Where China and Russia
enjoyed dominance of presence in this critical region, there is now the
obvious presence of the U.S. military—not merely as trainers or as
participants in combined exercises such as CENTRAZBAT-97—but in force
and prosecuting a joint, and likely combined, military offensive. To the
degree that the SCO served the collateral Chinese interest of keeping U.S.
Military forces from achieving a foothold in Central Asia, that objective has
been undermined in a clear, significant, and profound way. To what
degree the de facto presence of U.S. Military forces in the region, and the
obvious political and economic presence in the region that will persist
post-combat, will change the viability or nature of the SCO as an
organization is a question that must be getting asked in Chinese
analytic circles. At a minimum, a U.S. presence in Uzebekistan in a
post-Taliban Afghanistan is a real possibility, given the security
assurances Tashkent has reportedly asked of Washington in return for its
very active support.
Impact on Japan. Tokyo’s decision to be proactive in offering the
United States logistic support by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces in
the vicinity of the Indian Ocean is not going to assuage Beijing’s
concerns about Japan’s “real security aspirations” in the region—in spite
of Prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s assertion that Jiang expressed
his “understanding” of the rationale behind it during their meeting in
Beijing in early October 2001.
Always on the alert for any indication of Japan’s potential for an
expanded military presence in Asia, Chinese analysts will likely view
Tokyo’s support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as a codicil under
which the Japanese will continue what the Chinese believe is the inexorable
march away from Article 9 of the “Peace Constitution.” (And it may just
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be that Beijing’s concerns on this account will be buttressed by likeminded thinking emanating from Seoul.) Japan’s actions in support of the
United States will be seen through the lens of a continuum that includes
perceived Japanese support for Taiwan independence, concerns about
the Revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation—especially the
nebulous phrase “areas surrounding Japan,” and Tokyo’s co-research
with Washington on upper-tier sea-based TBMD.
Impact on Border Security. Clearly, the most obvious deleterious effect
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM for China is the very fact that it is
taking place in a country with which China shares a border. Stability and
security in the 14 nations with which China shares common borders—not
to mention maintaining good relations with those countries—is a
priority-one security issue for Beijing.
Controlling events on its periphery, stability on its periphery, and
ensuring there is no spillover from instability on its periphery are
ongoing and historical Chinese concerns. One might point out that since
1949, China has consistently viewed instability on its periphery as a serious
threat, and most of its military interventions, overt or otherwise, have
been the result of the perceived need to shape wars along its border,
preempt possible aggression, or assert sovereignty along those borders.24
The immediate Chinese concern will be the potential for refugees to
stream across the small border it shares with Afghanistan. China’s second
concern will be the potential for “blow back” in Xinjiang Province by
non-Han Turkic Uighurs who oppose Chinese rule. The third tier of Chinese
concerns will be longer term—how long will the U.S. campaign last,
what type of government will replace the Taliban, and how long will U.S.
Military forces remain in the region after the collapse of the Taliban? And,
of course, as mentioned already, the impact of all of the above on the
viability of the Musharaf regime in Islamabad. Overall, from a Chinese
point of view, it is unlikely the current U.S. campaign will be viewed as a
“good thing.”
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Impact on National missile Defense. China’s objections to the U.S.
National missile Defense Program are well known by now and need no
explanation. Suffice it to say that Beijing will be concerned that the attack
on the United States will accelerate the nuclear missile defense (NMD)
program, not inhibit it. The best indicator of Chinese concerns along
these lines is the analytic argument one could read in the PRC press
post-September 11 declaring that the terrorist attack on the United States
“proved” that the greatest threat to the United States is not a so-called
“rogue state” with a missile, but low-tech weapons used by nonstate
actors.
The efficacy of this argument aside, there will be concern that in the
wake of September 11 previous disagreements over NMD with certain
European allies will fall by the wayside in an ongoing show of support
for Washington. Also, there will be Chinese concern that the voices in the
United States citing the September 11 events as “proof positive” of the
need for NMD will prevail—especially now that the specter of biological
weapons is no longer hypothetical. But most disconcerting, from a
Chinese perspective, will be the possibility that Russian resolve on the issue
of the anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty will start to weaken.
Overall then, while the events of September 11 and the Bush-Jiang
summit have served a critical Chinese (and U.S.) security objective—
namely stabilizing bilateral relations—it is not entirely clear, based
quite admittedly on my own speculation, that the overarching prosecution
of the war against terrorism waged by the United States and the potential
collateral changes in the international security milieu will be seen as
positive for China across the board. By the time this volume is published, the
international security environment may well have changed and turned over
once again, and the Chinese calculus might be quite different in ways
that at time of writing are impossible to speculate about.
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Concluding Comments.
One constant in the U.S.-China relationship that will persist and that
will transcend current events, is simply this: there is ample reason in both
Washington and Beijing to seek and secure mutually beneficial bilateral
relations—especially security relations.
However, there is a deep-seated mutual distrust between the
respective security establishments on both sides of the Pacific that will
not go away very soon, regardless of the pragmatic steps each nation
takes on the road to better relations. This chapter, by assignment, has
focused on Chinese concerns. The United States has its own set of
misgivings.
If the trend in Chinese security analyses presented in this chapter is
even close to being on the mark, then it will be very difficult to change
attitudes in Beijing. Chinese concerns about U.S. intentions are beginning
to transcend specific policies in contention, transcending perhaps even the
issue of Taiwan. In China, analytic momentum has been building over the past
few years that argues that the United States is inherently hostile to China
and that the strategic objective of the United States toward China is
nothing less than the obstruction of China’s rise as a more rich and powerful
nation—despite statements by Bush and Powell to the contrary.
Consequently, U.S. policies in the region or toward China itself will be
increasingly filtered through a set of lenses that are already calibrated
to ensure some distortion. The phrase, “Seeing the acorn but imagining the
oak tree” comes to mind.25
Relations with the United States more and more present the Chinese
leadership with a growing dilemma. On one hand, a stable relationship
with the United States is increasingly viewed by Beijing as one
prerequisite for the success of the all-important reform agenda that
faces Zhongnanhai at home. And to the degree that successful
continuing reform at home is the key to the longevity of the CCP, the “U.S.

55

factor” plays as well, even if indirectly.26
At the same time, perceived challenges by the United States to Chinese
national interests—especially those viewed as challenges to sovereignty—
cannot be ignored by the Chinese leadership. One hears and reads more
and more in the Chinese press about the need to up hold “the dignity” of the
Chinese people, not just the sanctity of Chinese sovereignty.
The summit of October 2001 augurs a hopeful beginning for the two
nations to renew serious strategic dialogue on the spectrum of issues that
have been addressed in this chapter. But amid the pledges by the two
presidents to establish new mechanisms for strategic dialogue, amid the
rededication to continue mutually beneficial economic cooperation, in
the midst of presenting a united stand in dealing with global
terrorism, there was one summit “basket” that was conspicuous by its
absence—a statement about future military-to-military relations.
Since at least 1989 the military dimension of bilateral relations has
become one of the most contentious and difficult aspects of U.S.-China
ties. It has become a domestic political issue in both Beijing and Washington.
Even in the best of times, finding a mutually satisfying military
dimension to bilateral ties has been a frustrating endeavor for both parties
due to growing mutual suspicion, institutional asymmetries, and
competing objectives. In times of bilateral duress, military relations are
the first links to be suspended. In the best of times, they are the last to be put
into place.
Some in the United States have argued that, with the demise of the
Soviet Union, there is no longer a “strategic rationale” for the United
States to engage the PLA. In Beijing, some Chinese have also argued
that the “rise of American hegemonism” has likewise undermined a Chinese
rationale for engagement with the U.S. Department of Defense. Detractors
of military relations in the United States have complained that the PLA
does not “reciprocate” U.S. openness and that “the PLA gets more out
of the relationship than does the United States.” For their part, some
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Chinese argue that the objectives of U.S. military ties and U.S. “openness”
are inherently” hostile.” The United States wants “to change China,” to
“deter (scare) China,” and “collect intelligence” on China by using the
military relationship.27
All of these arguments may very well be true of the past. But it is not
correct for either side to argue that there is no longer a strategic rationale
for a military relationship. The fact of the matter may be that at long last, for
the first time since the end of the Cold war, there finally is a strategic
rationale for military-to-military contacts. And it is simply this: conflict
avoidance.
It is clear that the military forces of the United States and of China
will increasingly be operating in proximity to each other. This was shown
most graphically on April 1, 2001, and the subsequent EP-3 incident. It is
also clear that there is a growing distrust between the two military
establishments. It is clear as well that both sides acknowledge
(sometimes quietly, sometimes publicly) the possibility of an unwanted
confrontation over Taiwan. These points alone are the most pressing
arguments for the resumption of military contacts, the enhancement of venues
in which discussion of differences can take place, and new venues aimed at
dispelling misperceptions.
Hopefully, as the months go on, as political dialogue increases and
the benefits of stable relations are seen to outweigh mutual suspicions,
then wise men and sober thinkers on both sides will start searching
for new and realistic ways to manage differences, and conclude that
both the U.S. Armed Forces and the PLA will have a constructive role to play.
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CHAPTER 3
A VIEW FROM TOKYO:
CHINA’S GROWING MILITARY POWER
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR JAPAN’S
NATIONAL SECURITY
Hideaki Kaneda

CHINA’S AMBITION
China’s Maritime Advance.
China has pursued a national strategy of consistent and active
advancement toward peripheral waters. China’s activity patterns, as they
did in the 1970s to the South China Sea and in the 1980s to the East China Sea,
have been to advance to such areas using force, while ignoring the
sovereign rights and jurisdiction rights of neighboring nations. Finding
little or weak resistance from these countries, China strengthened
presence there by creating a fait accompli, ultimately leading to the
practical control of these areas. What is the objective of China’s maritime
advance? The answer is the key to designing Japan’s deterrent strategy
against China.
First is the economic aspect involved. China aims to develop and utilize
biological and nonbiological resources in its peripheral waters, especially
seabed oil resources. In addition, China’s food and energy supply
situation is rapidly deteriorating as a result of its remarkable economic
growth since the adaptation of policies for economic revolution and the
opening of China’s market to the world, combined with its drastic
population growth. In particular, China’s energy situation is so severe that
the world’s seventh largest oil producing nation can hardly keep up
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with the growing demand, and today China the oil producer has become an
oil-importing consumer.
For further economic development, China must continue to secure food
and energy supplies. Therefore, it becomes extremely important for China
to procure fishing grounds in the peripheral waters and adjacent seas, to
acquire good quality seabed oil resources, and to secure sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) for oil imports from the middle East.
Dependence on the seas is a logical consequence for China in order to
maintain continuous economic growth.
Second is the issue of national security. In China, naval and air forces
have been built and operated as supporting forces to assist the army.
However, they learned from the historical experience of the Qing Dynasty
when, because of China’s lack of awareness of the importance of sea power
and maritime rights, foreign powers usurped their sovereign and
territorial rights. Based on these experiences, China adopted a clear
military strategy of “near water defense,” with the so-called “First Island
Chain Defense Line” being China’s sea defense line, connecting the
Aleutian Islands, Kuril Islands, Japanese Islands, Ryukyu Islands,
Taiwan, Philippine Islands, and Borneo. The Senkaku Islands, claimed by
Japan, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands, over which several South-East
Asian countries claim territorial rights, are included in this First Island
Chain Defense Line. Taiwan also has claims on some of these islands, an issue
which China calls a domestic matter. In other words, China’s near water
defense strategy includes military force deployments to attack Taiwan
and prevent counterattacks. One must not forget that the military
forces that are capable of crossing the water to attack Taiwan and
preventing counterattacks can certainly be used against the Senkaku,
Spratly, and Paracel Islands.
With the end of the Cold war, China’s negotiations on national
border issues and military withdrawal from borders with Russia and
former Soviet Union countries in Central Asia have progressed smoothly and
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the opportunity for negotiation with India to solve border issues has arisen.
China can feel secure for the moment regarding its land borders to the
north and west and can reduce its army forces drastically, thereby
generating enough reserves to shift their interests and redistribute
resources to focus on their east and southern “oceans.”
Third is the shift of China’s military strategy. By 1985, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) had already attempted the strategic shift from a
“global war” to a “local war” orientation, and after the end of the Cold
war, shifted from a mere “general local war” to a “local war under hitech conditions” based on what they learned from the Gulf war. Through
such strategic shifts, then General Secretary Jiang Zemin started to
emphasize the “defense of maritime interests” along with the defense
of sovereign rights of territorial lands, air space, and seas.
By October 2000, China had conducted large-scale exercises of “all
army exchange activities to demonstrate the result of scientifictechnological training” incorporating the “new three attacks and three
defenses” (attacks by stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, and armed
helicopters, and defense by precision weapons, electronic interference,
and reconnaissance surveillance), which involved learning from the
Kosovo air-raids as well as from “scientific-technological military
training.” At that time, it was noted that the exercises were “attack”
oriented with the oceans as the main stage, rather than conventional
“defense” oriented maneuvers.
Fourth is an intention to improve China’s position in the international
community. China’s view toward international relationships is to
break away from the situation of “one superpower and several
powers” dominated by the United States and to work toward” multipolarization,” with China itself sharing the position of one of the powerful
pole leaders. China recognizes that the unstable situation of the
international community will persist longer because of tensions between
the major countries, China’s own conflicts in securing its sphere of
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interests, and increased incidents of regional conflicts. However, China
assumes that such a situation is merely the transition toward the establishment
of a new international order, and will eventually lead to the collapse of
U.S. single-country dominance and the emergence of a multi-polar
world with China, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and
Japan as the poles. At any time in history, the China-U.S. relationship has
had a mix of stability and instability factors, but in purely military
terms, they are basically in a contentious relationship. From China’s
point of view, the path toward multi-polarization must go through the
point of rivalry and contention with American military power.
The tone of logic in China that stands out these days is that the power
that controls the ocean is the one that earns the right of survival and
development. Moreover, there is much evidence of the importance of
comprehensive marine power and that the 21st century will be the “Century
of Oceans.” The search to grow from “near water” to “open ocean”
operations is already underway in the PLA. In a situation of increased
confidence in the economy and limited elements of instability in
national security, China’s ultimate ambition appears to be preparing to
step beyond the basic strategy of near water defense to secure
domination over the Pacific Ocean, which is adjacent to its peripheral
waters.
Japan’s “Defense white Paper” of 2001 reported the recent striking
build-up of China’s military preparedness in the quality and quantity of
both its navy and air force. What is their ultimate objective? To speak in
extremes, is it not possible to put forth a hypothesis that China uses the excuse
of capturing Taiwan to hide China’s true and ultimate objective of
winning a war against the United States? We, the Japanese people, must
ascertain China’s future intentions.
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China Takes a Serious Step toward “MultiPolarization”—Establishment
of the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”
On June 14 and 15, 2001, the “Shanghai Five” countries of China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and Tajikistan, with the newly-added
Uzbekistan, established the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” A
“Shanghai Five” summit has been held yearly since 1996, originally for the
purpose of resolving border tensions between China and the Central Asian
countries that had newly arisen after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
with China leading the discussion. Since they successfully agreed
upon the reduction of military forces deployed to border areas, the
focus has shifted toward cooperation in the control of Islamic
extremists, which has been the major problem of the Central Asian countries.
Moreover, in recent years, China has used the Shanghai Five forum as a
means to check the United States, as demonstrated in its appeal for ties
between Russia and China, especially on international security and
disarmament issues, and against the U.S. Monopolistic control of
global political, economic, and military affairs.
The significance of this organization for China is, on the surface, multinational regional cooperation to control expanding Islam extremists.
In reality, it is a way to deal with the threat of Xinjiang separatism, which
is like a snake in China’s bosom, the stability of Xinjiang being essential
for the realization of China’s national project of the Great west
Development. Reading even deeper into China’s intentions, however, one
can find the possibility of China’s desire to transform this organization
into an alliance against the United States and its set of bilateral alliances
with regional countries, which will have a greater significance for
China in the future.
Originally, China was eager to improve bilateral relationships with
their continental neighboring countries. In June 2001, China concluded
the Treaty of Good and Friendly Relationship with Russia. They also
concluded bilateral agreements with each Central Asian country as the

67

fruit of the Shanghai Five process. Among major continental neighboring
countries, only India has not entered into a bilateral agreement with
China. However, China is attempting to improve its relationship with India,
as evidenced by the re-opening of a Sino-Indian dialogue that had been
halted since India’s nuclear test in 1998, probably in response to the recent
U.S. approach toward India.
The “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” is the first multilateral
organization begun under China’s initiative. Some moderates believe
this organization will develop into a moderate Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN)-type regional forum. Others consider that the
current member countries of this organization aim to “promote
multipolarism of the world” and other countries such as Pakistan,
Mongolia, and Iran will seek the opportunity to join the organization,
while North Korea and Vietnam are said to show interest in it.
Through this organization or its advanced form in the future, China
possibly will attempt to extend its influence over a vast land and water area
extending from the Asia-Pacific region to South west Asia and the
Middle East, with continental China and Central Asia as the central force.
In addition, China is likely to use this forum to counter perceived
U.S. containment against China, and in the future to confront the existing
web of alliances centered on the United States, while hiding the potential
to develop it into an organization similar to the Warsaw Pact at the time of
the Cold War. For the moment China will use it as a platform to eliminate
U.S. influence by expressing opposition to the missile defense
initiative and international and regional talks led by the United States, as
well as to express China’s persistent claim that Taiwan, which is under
the influence of the United States, is an inseparable part of Chinese
territory. In this sense, how China will react to the U.S. response against the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be significant.
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China Aims to Become a Regional Superpower—Preparedness on the
Continent and Advancement Toward the Oceans.
What is the meaning of China’s advancement toward the oceans, and
improved relationships with its continental neighbors? Originally
described as “ships in the South and horses up North,” China is a
country that has two faces: "Continental China “ and “Oceanic China.”
Despite having some domestic problems, China seems to realize that it has
successfully created an unprecedented stable situation in diplomatic
and military relationships with neighboring countries. Moreover,
China has grown from being a regional political power to becoming a
regional superpower, both in name and actuality, in all political,
military, economic, and industrial aspects, and is about to secure a
position as one of the world superpowers (and the strongest in Asia),
capable of threatening the U.S. Monopoly. To achieve such an objective,
China cannot afford to limit its interests to the continent and must have
the strong maritime capability of an “Oceanic China.”
In view of the Chinese Communist Party’s position in a one-party-ruled
country, it is impossible for China to allow the United States to remain the
“one ultra-superpower” indefinitely. At least, China wishes to gain the power
of “not losing,” if not winning, over the United States in every spectrum.
Thus, China, starting with stability on the continent, steadily will
promote a drive for the attainment of its secret ambition to fulfill the
supreme proposition of “confrontation in the ocean” with the United
States and its allied countries, within China’s unique time scale,
regardless of their targeted year.
Certainly, China never makes the mistake of mentioning the
possibility of direct confrontation at sea with U.S. military power.
There is no need, for it has an appropriate and convenient excuse called
Taiwan. At every opportunity, China sends out a strong warning to U.S.
forces against intervention in relation to the Taiwan issue. Moreover, China
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stresses that it will not hesitate to confront U.S. forces if anything
happens in Taiwan. However, this is not likely to be China’s true intention.
Though I used the word “hypothesis” earlier, China’s real intention is
confrontation beyond Taiwan, not with Japan, Korea, the ASEAN
countries, or Australia, but with the United States.
To find proof of this, one only needs to look into the nature of
Chinese military forces. If China seriously considers taking over Taiwan
at present, what is the significance of the limited capability of the Chinese
navy to transport troops across oceans? Undoubtedly, they have troops
and equipment with a certain capability, so China might venture attacks
on Taiwan, should the political necessity arise. Yet in view of Taiwan’s
defense capability, it would be difficult for China to send troops to Taiwan’s
main island. The natural interpretation is that China’s capability is only
sufficient for a very limited attack, such as ballistic missile attacks
against part of the main island for intimidation purposes, or the attacks
on Quemoy Island and Matsu Island, which China could complete
before the United States could intervene.
On the other hand, viewing the recent direction of naval and air force
modernization of the Chinese armed forces, one can easily notice that
these efforts cannot be described in terms of quality, let alone quantity,
as the rational development of equipment and systems purely to capture
Taiwan or defend the neighboring seas. Wouldn’t aircraft carriers, fleet
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with sea-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) with shiplaunched cruise missiles (SLCMs) under development by the armed forces
be better suited for confrontation with U.S. forces? Also, what does
China’s oceanic advancement into the Pacific Ocean, including Japan’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), mean? Isn’t it logical to interpret these
moves as China’s efforts to steadily prepare to confront the United States
by building up a maritime operational capability and assuming the
United States and its allies are potential enemies?
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Chinese Way of war—“Beyond Limited War” (Irregular and Asymmetric
Tactics).
We can also see China’s future prospects for the direct confrontation
with the United States in its concrete military strategy and tactics. The
book, Beyond Limited war—Concept of War and Tactics for the Times of
Globalization written in 1999 by two Air Force colonels in active service of
the PLA, is drawing attention in China and the United States.” Beyond
limited war” means “a war that transcends any limitation” or a “war
without any norms and regulations.” In other words, it can be called a
“forbidden strategy.” The authors recommended that China implement such a
strategy to confront the United States. They say “modern war is a hi-tech
war, and China cannot win over the United States, which has overwhelming
power, unless it confronts with them through this beyond-limited-war.”
The book recommends seeking “irregular” war tactics that go beyond
the nation, territories, methods, and war scales, including so-called
“illegal” tactics. The authors themselves claim, “For the weaker to confront
the stronger, the weaker does not need to follow the rules set by the
stronger.” Among the items of consideration in Beyond Limited war, we
need to note ”asymmetric tactics.” U.S. military forces are troubled
with the Chinese forces’ inclination to regard asymmetric tactics as
important. A former U.S. Ambassador to China indicated,” China
regularly adopts a unique strategy to make up for its own weakness and
to display its strength.” This concept has a common thread with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America.
This book is said to have been written without any instruction
from the Chinese leadership. Some observe, however, that the book has
won strong support from Chinese political and military leaders.
As stated above, China has learned numerous lessons from the largescale conflicts involving the United States in the post-Cold war era: the Gulf
war and Kosovo conflicts, and China has proceeded with a great strategic
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conversion to “improvement of defensive combat capability under the
high-tech conditions,” while exerting efforts to eliminate functional
shortcomings and avoiding any significant technological and operational
gap. In other words, China is exerting efforts to avoid showing any decisive
weakness of its own, while consistently being conscious of the possibility
of war against the United States.
However, such a strategy does not provide any opportunity to win
against overwhelming U.S. military power. Therefore, China pursues its
own areas of superiority over U.S. Weaknesses and will try to strike the
weak spots of the United States. Such strategies are “irregular tactics”
and “asymmetric tactics.” China’s recent emphasis on cyber wars, for which it
has made little effort to hide its intentions, is an example. By taking such
dual stances, China seems to be looking for an opportunity to ensure
future victory over the United States.

JAPAN’S DETERRENT STRATEGY AGAINST CHINA
China’s Strategy Against Japan.
Now, how must Japan build its deterrent power against China? First, let
the United States investigate China’s strategy against Japan based on an
analysis of China’s political and military ambitions discussed in the
previous section.
In China, there is a group that perceives the Japan-China
relationship merely as a part of the power balance in the Asia-Pacific
region. Also, it wishes to let Japan remain an economic giant only. To
have Japan as a political superpower or military giant is hardly acceptable
for China, as its greatest wish is to be the only superpower in Asia.
China’s ultimate objective is to become the “unitary superpower” in
the region. In Northeast Asia, four political poles consist of Russia, China,
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Japan and the United States. The Soviet Union used to be the threatening
power during the Cold War but it collapsed, and its successor, Russia,
maintains friendly relations with China as they share the basic policy of
taking a hard-line against the United States. Concerning Japan, China
anticipates Japan’s contribution to China’s economic growth as a
economic and technology superpower, yet tries to prevent Japan from
becoming a political and military superpower. For the United States,
China is likely to maintain a friendly “engagement” relationship as
long as the United States approves of China’s economic development,
which is key for China’s promotion of its national power while
recognizing potential rivalries in every political, economic, and military
aspect.
For China’s ambition, to become the only superpower in the region, the
greatest barrier will be the stable and strong alliance between the United
States, the world’s unitary superpower, and Japan, a strong regional pole.
Considering a future confrontation with the United States, it will be
preferable for China to minimize the number of powerful countries
allied with the United States. China is likely to take every opportunity
to break up any Japan-U.S. alliance and to attempt the alienation of these
two countries. China can use several methods for this purpose, and the one
with the highest probability of success is China’s special tactic of “to win
without fighting,” that is “beyond limited war.” First, China will try to
weaken or lessen U.S. sentiment and consciousness to support and
cooperate with Japan, then to undermine Japan’s capability and intention
to support the United States. Next, China will campaign in Japan and the
United States for the alienation of the Japan-U.S. relationship. In
addition, China can make “beyond limited war” more effective by
building a capability to fight an information technology (IT) war, such as
cyber war, toward which China is directing its efforts. This is not the talk
of something to come. Such a fight has already begun.
Even if Japan and the United States successfully maintain their
alliance, it is most convenient for China when Japan has as many
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restrictions on defense cooperation with the United States as possible, like
those imposed in Japan today. The greater the number of restrictive
measures in Japan’s defense cooperation with the United States, the
higher the appreciation in China. What China would like to see is for Japan
to maintain its exclusively defense framework, not to change its
constitution including collective self-defense rights, not to proceed
with wartime or national emergency legislation, and not to loosen the
actual restrictions under “the law concerning measures to ensure peace
and security of Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan.”

Basic Strategy against China.
Then what strategy should Japan take against China? The best approach
is a strategy of building a very practical and mutually beneficial economic
relationship, while avoiding political aspects as much as possible. China is
a country that can maintain close economic ties even with Taiwan. It
cannot ignore Japan’s economic and technological strengths, which far
exceed those of Taiwan. In turn, Japan finds sufficient appeal in the
enormous scope of China’s ever-growing market. In other words, for Japan
as well as for China, a mutual close economic relationship is essential.
From the military view point, China does not actually seem to consider
Japan’s defense power as a true threat, contrary to its political propaganda
claims, which at every opportunity refer to “Japan’s tendency of
militarization.” It is feasible to assume that China has already factored
into its strategy all the shortcomings in Japan’s defense functions:
imperfection in defense-related legislation; independent defense
policies; defects in equipment; restrictions on various operations
defects from such policies; less awareness of the Japanese people and
government in defense matters; and the lack of fundamental strength to
sustain wars, such as a basically weak defense industry and defense
logistics system. Therefore, one must not ignore the possibility that China
may maneuver Japan into some conflicts over, for example, the Senkaku
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Islands and other territorial and EEZ conflicts if a situation can be
generated in which the United States will not (or cannot) intervene. Japan
must deter such possibilities by itself and establish a system that can
respond to crises effectively. It must stop being a nation without any
sense or preparation for emergencies as described above, and
establish its own national security system to respond against China.
Otherwise, such a time will come some day.
Securing U.S. and Japan Alliance as an Axle.
For Japan, the best possible option in national security adaptable to
the various future prospects is a secure Japan-U.S. alliance. No other
option is conceivable. In the environment of the geo-political situation of
Northeast Asia, Japan is certainly free to consider other options such as
nonalliance, bilateral alliance with a country (even China) other than
the United States, or a multilateral alliance including Russia, China,
and the United States. Some debates and propositions about such
options have taken place in and out of Japan. However, these options are
either implausible, or lack future prospects. Certainly after the end of the
Cold War, the aspect of a peace dividend was emphasized, and some
even questioned whether a Japan-U.S. alliance would be needed any
longer. The joint declaration of Japan and the United States in 1997
redefined the alliance and identified a clear direction toward an even
stronger relationship.
For the United States, the significance of a Japan-U.S. alliance is, first
of all, providing regional deterrent effect through the presence of U.S.
forces in Japan, mainly navy, Air Force, and marines. The second
significance is developing acceptable support mechanisms that can satisfy the
U.S. standard in terms of every thing from supply and repair to medical
services. From a different view point, the United States is well aware
that its military withdrawal from Japan would provide Japan with a good
motive to fortify its military power. Moreover, the United States
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realizes that the alliance serves to deter any possible conflicts between
a unified Korea, China, and Japan in the future.
Whether such U.S. aims are involved or not, it is preferable for the
region for the United States and Japan to maintain a solid alliance and to
retain a mutually complementary relationship, while the alliance remains
as a linch pin for regional security, including Japan’s security. China and
North Korea do not welcome such an alliance. Russia is no longer like
the Soviet Union of the old days. North Korea does not have sufficient
power to confront the United States. Only China occasionally has
shown a willingness to confront the United States in military power, and it
is the only country that has the potential to do so. Thus the only option for
Japan is to maintain and solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance, which not only
provides the stability necessary for favorable regional development, but
also is important for the safety and security of Japan. At the same time the
alliance is anticipated to function as a deterrent against China.
The Bush administration considers Japan as the most important U.S.
ally in Asia. An Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Special
Report,1 which is said to be the fundamental statement of the
administration’s Japan policy, expresses, with carefully selected phrasing
to avoid the impression of pressuring Japan, the strong wish to secure and
further solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance through Japan’s efforts to solve the
problem of the right of collective self-defense.
China will take every opportunity to disrupt the relationship
between Japan and the United States. Japan must not be influenced by
such a move, and must exert every effort to solidify the Japan-U.S.
alliance, while perseveringly eliminating any elements that might alienate
Japan and the United States.
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Creation and Maintenance of Defense Power without Functional
Deficiencies.
What will happen if Japan develops effective military deterrents against
China? Because of its national policy, at least, Japan will not become a
military superpower. Its basic strategy is to rely on the deterrent effect
of U.S. support based on the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, some future
argument may develop as to whether the role sharing in the Japan-U.S.
alliance must be limited to Japan providing the shield and the United
States providing the sword.
The United States is currently studying a new defense strategy
incorporating the missile defense initiative. Preceding this, a new
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was announced on October 1, 2001. The
new QDR, strongly reflecting the shocks of the September 11 terrorist attacks
on America, abandoned the conventional two major theater war (2MTW)
strategy and identified a policy of securing new U.S. bases, stations, and
facilities for temporary uses, while reconfirming the importance of
forward deployed forces. Inevitably it will become more difficult to
operate U.S. armed forces abroad, and, in some cases, the situation of
reduced military capability may continue semipermanently or
temporarily.
Under such a situation, Japan needs to create defense forces that are
fully functional qualitatively, if not quantitatively, to sustain the
deterrent power against China that previously has been maintained
through the Japan-U.S. alliance. Such a move will inevitably bring
changes in role-sharing in the Japan-U.S. alliance, but at the same time will
enable Japan to take on the role of a deterrent against China
independently. Assuming the case of U.S. hesitation to exercise the articles of
the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, for example, in the case of
intimidation attacks related to the Japan-China territorial dispute area
over the Senkaku Islands or mid-range ballistic missile attacks on
nearby U.S. bases in Japan using conventional warheads, Japan must
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effectively and independently deter or defend against such intimidation
or actual attacks by China and thwart China’s intention. For this, it is
necessary for Japan to build sufficient defense forces in every spectrum,
including capabilities for ballistic missile defense, swift amphibious
operations against islands by marines, paratroop landings, and assault
landings by heliborne troops. Furthermore, possessing the capability to
attack enemy strategic centers by anti-surface cruising missiles will
become the next issue. To develop such defense forces, Japan needs not
only to have domestic discussions, but also to make adjustments with the
United States concerning its share of military functions.

Developing Political and Military Diplomacy against China, with Both
hard-line and moderate Stances.
Japan must take a stance that is both hard-line and moderate against
China’s political and military diplomacy, which is based on China’s
unique view of nations and values.
First, Japan needs to ask China to be “an open country” in military
aspects as well as in others. China recently stressed that its military forces are
purely defensive. China published its “White Paper on National
Defense,” but China’s transparency is still far below that of neighboring
countries. In Europe, there is rapid and significant promotion of
confidence-building measures embracing former West and East
countries, with developments to ensure transparency. Recognition of
China as a country that complies with the world’s standards is wide-spread
in economic and cultural aspects, as exemplified by China’s World Trade
Organization (WTO) membership and winning the bid for the 2008
Olympics in Beijing, despite domestic human rights problems which have not
been fully corrected. Japan must take every opportunity to ask China to act as
a more open country in the aspect of confidence-building, and to try to
improve military transparency.

78

Second, Japan must ask China to take a more positive stance toward
regional dialogue. China used to be inactive in regional councils, but today
there is a striking change in China’s posture. China has begun to participate
actively in regional councils, especially on political and economic issues.
However, China’s participation is extremely limited in security-related
matters, probably because China finds it disadvantageous in many cases, or
it has less awareness of the need for transparency.
In terms of maritime issues, regional-wide SLOCs are the property not
only of Japan or China but are also common to the region, and to secure
their safety is a common task shared by regional countries. For regional
development, it is important that SLOC safety be ensured through the joint
efforts of regional countries and not be left under the control of any
particular country. We need to let China realize that the region as a whole
must share such recognition.
In recent days, the focus of attention has been piracy at the converging
points of international sea routes such as the Malacca Strait. It may be
important for Japan to take the initiative to create an environment in which
China can participate, starting from the easy-to-address issues of safety,
environment, and human rights cooperation, and as a part of regional efforts
to deal with common issues like piracy, drug sales, the slave trade, and
environmental pollution, ultimately and gradually stepping up to national
security issues.
Regarding such pending problems between Japan and China as the midline between them in the East China Sea, an issue related to EEZs, Japan
must abandon its obscure attitude and initiate a serious discussion to
establish a temporary border for the true Japan-China mid-line.
Moreover, where both countries claim territorial rights, the two countries
need to agree to temporary joint control of these regions and to
establish a council to control them while immediately establishing
guidelines for Japan-China joint control over the regions.
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Simultaneous to such negotiations, Japan must prevent any illegal
activities performed by naval vessels and survey ships that clearly infringe
upon Japan’s jurisdiction in its territories and EEZ. Japan must declare that
it will take necessary and decisive actions against any illegal activities and
adopt effective measures. As long as Japan leaves such territorial issues
pending, China will undoubtedly proceed with one act after another to
promote its effective control over the East China Sea, as it did in the South
China Sea.
The Japanese government needs to implement these actions
methodically, meticulously, and vigorously based on a grand strategy.
For this, we must remember how U.S. diplomatic strength in international
negotiation has been supported by “brains” consisting of and organized
by international law researchers, think-tanks and relevant authorities
and experts in various fields represented by the Department of State or the
Department of Defense.
China’s oceanic expansion is somehow reminiscent of U.S. actions.
or Japan to win over international competition, it must aggregate the
wisdom of not only the bureaucrats, but also of the private sector, and
develop a strong spirit to launch a national strategy. Thus, it is strongly
anticipated that Japan will pursue its national interests jointly by public
and private sectors under the strong leadership of Prime minister
Junichiro Koizumi.

ENDNOTE-CHAPTER 3
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October 2000.
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CHAPTER 4
A VIEW FROM MOSCOW:
CHINA’S GROWING MILITARY POWER
Anatoly V. Bolyatko
China’s military doctrine is an outgrowth of Beijing’s strategic
concept of national security, their perception of external threats, and
their estimation of the likelihood of war. This military doctrine includes
positions not only on the training of the armed forces, but their
composition and role. The leadership of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) sees national security as a process of eliminating internal and
external threats, and as a way to achieve regional and global objectives
by escalating what China’s strategists call “the comprehensive power of a
state.” A well-developed economy, a high level of science and engineering achievement, internal political stability, and a strong defense are
considered as main components of the comprehensive power of a state.
In China, military threats are seen in connection with potential
challenges in the economic and socio-political spheres. Judging from
Chinese publications, Beijing still sees economic growth as its main
priority. Another significant domestic concern is the maintenance of
the social-political order and “national unity.” This includes opposing
what Beijing sees as the tendencies of minorities, and Taiwan, to separate
from the Chinese state. Based on Beijing’s assessment of the contemporary
international situation at the regional and global levels, the maintenance of
military security ranks third among the major national priorities of China.
The PRC leadership, meaning the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Central
Military Commission (CMC), and the Politburo Standing Committee, believes
that the prospects for an outbreak of a world war are low. Therefore, the
process of building the Chinese military can be carried out methodically
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under conditions that depend on long-term peace matched with the
nation’s economic development. Thus, the requirement for the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) is to increase strength according to military and
civil developments.1
In the international sphere, Chinese leaders foresee a return to a multipolar world because of several regional conflicts, albeit with different
duration and varying intensity, and the increasing occurrence of civil
wars.
In China’s view, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is
stable, although there are some negative developments:
• The increased military presence of the U.S. in areas close to China’s
borders;
• The scheduled deployment of the theater missile defense (TMD) system
in East Asia;
• The development of a base of support in Japan for a relaxation of
restrictions on military action in a zone surrounding Japan;
• Increase in the scope of joint military exercises, especially between
the United States and its allies; and,
• Instability on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia and territorial
disputes in the South China Sea.2
Taiwan is a special concern of the Chinese leadership. Weakened by a
bitterly divided political leadership, Taiwan is further subject to the
influence of external forces, easing the way for eventual reunification
with the motherland. In China’s opinion, certain factors are inimical to
their interests in Taiwan:
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• Activities of those who harbor separatist aspirations among Taiwan’s
leaders;
• Military aid from the United States, which includes weapon sales,
with the likelihood of future increases if the American Congress passes
the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act;
• The possible inclusion of Taiwan into the U.S.-led theater missile
defense system; and,
• The presence of U.S. Troops in Japan, which enables the United States
to intervene in a possible military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.3
In resolving the problem of Taiwan, the Chinese government
adheres to the principles of peaceful reunification and “one country,
two systems.” It has put forward some proposals on developing crossstrait relations, with the eventual goal of peaceful reunification. China
considers the Taiwan question wholly an internal affair and insists that it
will do every thing in its power to achieve peaceful reunification. However, if events result in a separation of Taiwan from China under any slogan,
China is willing to use force to protect its sovereignty and its territorial
integrity.4
With this as its impetus, China has upgraded its military capability,
retrofitting its armed forces in an effort to transform them into a
powerful, modern army. Ideally, the PLA should be able to protect China
against external threats, maintain internal stability, and—if necessary—
guarantee Taiwan unification with the motherland.
In order to achieve its goals, China seeks to boost its tactical
capabilities, including battlefield management, particularly during
radical shifts in conditions, as well as usage of modern technology. Thus,
China has paid special attention to improving the battle efficiency of its
troops, shifting the focus to quality rather than quantity. This recent
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trend of military improvements came from a operational analysis of
Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. This is reflected in the solutions proposed by the CCP’s Central Committee in September 1995 and in the directives of the PRC Perspective Development Program until 2010, which the
National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee approved in March
1996.5
At the end of 1998, China’s CMC approved a schedule of defense
modernization as well as a new military strategy and doctrine. In its new
military strategy, the PLA is directed to train for waging battle in
peripheral regions of China, small in scale and short in duration, but nonetheless intensive. The preparation for such a war differs radically from its
previous strategy which focused on waging wars of attrition, which was
the focus during its period of confrontation with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR).6
China’s military strategy foresees five main types of local wars:
• Small scale wars within the territorial boundaries of China;
• War to control adjacent water areas and islands;
• Sudden air attack on strategic resources within Chinese territory;
• Defensive operations against deliberate invasions of restricted areas of
China; and,
• Counteroffensive against an opponent’s territory in retaliation for
aggression and to protect national sovereignty.7
Common to all those listed above is the pursuit of limited political ends
achievable with the help of a military ready for immediate deployment
and capable of routing the opponent. The main prerequisite for achieving
such an outcome is the effective use of military force. Thus, Beijing consid-
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ers the readiness to wage local wars an indispensable tool for achieving
limited political ends, and this should include effective intimidation and
the ability to escalate to a full-scale war.8
The strategic concepts of reassessing the sources of military threats
and targeting the political and military leadership to create a new military
paradigm was approved in the doctrine of China. China’s military
reorganization would allow for a sufficiently constrained military
during peacetime and the deployment of a large armed force during war.
The armed forces of China should correspond to its economic capabilities,
ensure socio-political unity, and not violate the integrity of the country.
Within the framework of possible military conflicts, the nuclear forces of
the PRC are invoked to deter aggression against China and the
conventional forces are intended to manage local wars.9
The modern Chinese nuclear strategy is characterized by the
following two positions. During peacetime, nuclear forces are intended to
deter potential adversaries from unleashing nuclear war against China
and to guarantee that China is free to exercise an independent foreign
policy. The purpose of nuclear forces during wartime is to prevent China’s
enemies from turning a conventional war into a nuclear war.
China has several hundred warheads, including several inter-continental
ballistic missiles, some of which are deployed on tactical aircraft.
Apparently, China has no intention of achieving nuclear parity with the
United States and Russia. It has found a philosophy, adopted in the 1980s,
of “restricted nuclear counter attack with the purposes of selfdefense.” This concept not only takes into consideration the limited
financial resources of the country, but also recognizes that the United
States and Russia plan to retrofit existing systems or deploy new
defensive systems that will neutralize any achievable Chinese
strategic nuclear buildup. The calculation demonstrates that Chinese
delivery vehicles are not capable of overcoming prospective anti-ballistic
missile systems and air defense systems; consequently, they will lose the
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ability to prevent the United States from interfering in China’s political
affairs. This is one of the main potential threats China faces at the global
level.10
China’s leaders have openly declared that they will not use nuclear
weapons first. Furthermore, China’s strategic nuclear forces operate on a
three-component structure: strategic missile forces, strategic aviation,
and nuclear submarines. This compact structure of forces is necessary to
deter wars against the China, to execute combat missions in response to
various international scenarios, and to intimidate the smaller
hegemonists in the Asia-Pacific region.11
It is necessary to identify the inconsistency between China’s
political declarations regarding its no first-use policy and its
technological capabilities. Only about a dozen of China’s strategic nuclear
delivery systems are located in protected silo launchers. Hence, in terms of
the theory of mutually assured destruction, China’s existing nuclear forces
have neither a first strike capability nor is China capable of unleashing a
massive retaliatory strike to wipe out an aggressor. This reality is
mentioned in the military doctrine of China.
However, it does allow China to avoid participation in nuclear
weapons reduction agreements, such as the strategic arms reduction
treaties. In 2000, this author asked Sha Zukang, Director-General of the
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign
ministry, what China’s role was in the U.S.-Russian arms reduction initiatives. He believes that China would participate in such treaties when
Russia and the United States reduce their existing arsenal to one-fifth
of their current levels. It is difficult to imagine Moscow and Washington taking this step.
Chinese battle training and strategic nuclear-missile exercises are
contingent on properly maintained rocket systems. The Chinese rockets
are technologically similar to the Soviet R-5 and R-7. These rockets were
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designed in the late 1950s—a period of cooperation between nuclearmissile specialists in the USSR and China. The extent of the RussianChinese exchange should not be over-estimated. Far from the quoted
level of $20 billion, a realistic amount lies in the region of $5-7 billion
per year of which only $1 billion consists of military equipment. An
amount this small will have little significance in increasing military
modernization. At the same time, the relationship between Russia and
China should not be underestimated. It takes time and effort to build a
partnership in which the sharing of information—especially related to
weapons—is done willingly. In addition to Russia, China has received
limited military aid from other countries and broad economic assistance from western powers—both types of aid are efficiently incorporated into the Chinese plan for national modernization.
It is unlikely that the Chinese arsenal will perform well in educational
and combat-trainer tests, due to the small volume of production and
limited early testing. China’s technological lag behind the U.S. Missile
program bolsters doubts of any successful missile firings.
On July 12, 2001, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
submitted a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee
describing the unsuccessful test launch of American Thor (4 of 5), Atlas
(5 of 8), and Polaris (66 of 123) strategic missiles.12 Soviet missile testing
during the 1960s yielded similar results. Apparently, China’s missile
experimentation has met with the same outcome. Though government and
industry forces want more extensive testing of China’s arsenal to
eliminate design flaws, the high cost of failure has frustrated further
efforts. A missile system must be tested periodically to ensure immediate
response in a combat situation. The lack of testing on a large scale poses
two major problems for the reliability of China’s arsenal: first, the current
stock may have flaws, and second, the probability of a flawed launch
increases the longer a missile sits idle and unmaintained.
The Chinese rely on lessons from past conflicts to shape their view of
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building general-purpose forces and deploying them into battle. Of
particular importance in this respect has been the Gulf War in which
technological superiority was used to quickly defeat the opponent. Thus,
China’s strategy has evolved from the traditional “grand army” model
in favor of concepts like “fast reaction” and “local warfare.” These
concepts mandate that joint state and military institutions be able to
quickly and effectively mobilize in the face of combat situations and that
the armed forces be prepared to immediately wage war in one or several
theaters.
The new ideal of “fast reaction” has fostered considerable change in
battle training, unit organization and unit formation as the
modernization of the PLA advances. The creation and content of the PLA
battle component structure (“alert forces” and “fast-reacting forces”
capable of quick decisions on emerging issues) has been recognized as
indispensable.
The PLA military command is well-trained and has equipped
battalions and brigades to be used as impact units capable of quick,
retaliatory action. These units are trained to execute the following primary
objectives:
• Breakthrough,
• Shock missions on the base camps of enemy military,
• Massive retaliations with the purpose of defeating opposition
strongholds, and
• Tactics by which PLA troops flank the opponent.13
Units intended to execute these mission objectives are currently
trained in each military district. The changing international situation, in
connection with the end of the Cold war and economic concerns, has
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induced China to reduce the ranks of the PLA in the short term. The army
will drop to 2.5 million members (from more than 4 million) and embark on
a vigorous modernization effort. This effort will close a number of bases
and reduce the number of military divisions and regiments. However, the
problem of updating the army to modern levels has not been addressed. The
present condition of the PLA is characterized by a lack of materials
used by more developed countries and a great deal of obsolete equipment
and weaponry.
The traditional military doctrine of China since Mao Zedong held that
people were indispensable to develop a modern army. Currently,
though, this view has been tempered with doctrines of expediency and
capability—concepts that surfaced after China’s civil wars and conflict with
Japan. In addition to their own experience, the Chinese also
“steadfastly keep track of strategic situations in the world and combine
the best tactics from foreign countries with national experience.”14 In
the end, the doctrine of “People’s war under modern Conditions” was
adopted. This doctrine recognizes the increasing importance of
technology in warfare and envisions an army with a balance between
weaponry and troops that effectively functions in five dimensions: air,
land, sea, space, and technology. In addition, the plan calls for the
updating of already existing military-industrial operations.
Special attention is paid to the preparation of armed forces in peacetime
to allow for immediate response in case of conflict. Additionally,
however, plans are made to efficiently transform the national
economy, civil air defense, and national transportation defense from a
peaceful state to one of wartime operations. Legislation has been passed so
that, if the state so decrees, all state bodies, political parties, firms,
institutes, and citizens are obligated to mobilize according to enacted
guidelines 15.
During the last 2 years, fundamental changes have taken place in the
field of defense education. The state has transformed the curriculum to

89

target all citizens by training in broader and more general areas. Defense
education now consists of regular, intensive training combined with
correspondence and daytime classes.16
It will be difficult for the Chinese to combine the traditional
military practice of mass infantry and simple tactical operations with
the usage of new, high-precision weaponry and aerospace technology.
Undoubtedly, the transformation will demand severe modifications to the
existing military infrastructure.
The most serious impediments to China’s military development are
its aging military bases and centers of production. In contrast to the way
in which former Cold war period installations were funded, the current
administration recognizes the need for a solid national economy and
the importance of coordinating economic and military building efforts.
Chinese propaganda works to create a unified economic system in
which production can serve both civil and military uses—the former
during times of peace and the latter during times of conflict. Creating the
system, however, will be problematic due to China’s current level of technical
expertise.
At present, military research and development is largely ineffective
due, in part, to poor state financing. China’s bureaucracy also has a
hand in the slow pace of military R&D. The rigid chain of command
often stifles scientific ideas before they can reach decisionmakers. In
addition to poor organization, negative public reactions hamper
progress when news of military development leaks out to the public.
Small gains have been realized by studying Russian military
equipment like submarines, destroyers, aircraft and air defense systems;
the knowledge gained, however, is minimal.
The modernization of the PLA often proceeds at the whim of
officials; even then, it moves at a slow pace due to the limited defense
budget and obsolete equipment. The sectors of the military slated to
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advance most rapidly are nuclear operations and rapid deployment-type
land troops. Import purchases are forgone to boost spending on military
transport planes as well as air-defense troops. Chinese naval vessels
with high performance ratings are entered into service.
In the short term, prospects for military development will rest on
China’s continued economic growth—currently 8 percent per year.
However, the current administration has recently assigned a low
probability to future, external military threats; this places military
spending near the end of the line for budget increases. At this point, it appears
as if the bulk of government spending will focus on retrofitting a research
complex, creating new arms with Chinese-produced elements, and
laying the financial groundwork for a military technology base.17
The process of developing market mechanisms in the country and
obtaining the experience of commercial activity led to similar developments in the PLA. Special attention was paid to maintaining scientific
and technological development in areas pertaining to defense building
and raising the standards of engineering to modern requirements.
China has conducted structural reforms to create a new, high-performance science of defense systems, engineering, and industries. Among these
was the creation of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense in March 1998. This commission operates as a leading
department of the State Council and enacts policies, laws, rules,
schedules, and standards in areas of military influence. In July 1999, five
military organizations that specialize in nuclear weapons, spacecraft,
aircraft, naval vessels, and weapons manufacturing were reorganized
into ten corporations.18
With the help of the national defense science, engineering, and
industry reforms, competition was introduced into the military
production sector. The war industry’s structure was improved, its ability
to transition between peace and war streamlined, and plans were made for
the creation of a new open system of military production.19
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The current style of battle training focuses on making individual
soldiers part of a cohesive unit. On the regiment and division scale,
officer drilling through computer simulation has largely replaced the
expensive, live ammunition training practiced earlier. The combined
tactical training base system provides a versatile training ground by
providing networked tactical, weapon, and service simulation models.
An interactive command and control simulation, new equipment
operation simulation, and computer-aided training systems have been
widely applied.20
Poor military financing, the inability to incorporate technologically
advanced equipment with current troops and the evolving model of
small-scale operations troops have forced PLA officials to create a
number of “elite” brigades and battalions, specially trained for
immediate mobilization. These divisions receive the larger part of
allotted funds and are thus better equipped with arms and equipment,
which enhances their training.
The majority of the PLA, PLA reserve units, the Chinese People’s Armed
Police Force, and the militia are provided with few resources for
training exercises. For example, an ordinary PLAAF pilot typically trains
in a Soviet prototype jet designed in the early 1950s. He only spends 80 hours
per year in the air—not enough time to master the complex skills of
piloting, let alone grasp the handling of high-tech weaponry used in
combat planes.
The gap between current military doctrine about modern war and
the actual practices of the armed forces has resulted in a deficit of experience
among Chinese soldiers.
Though political rhetoric promotes extensive training and
increased usage of technology in combat operations, the bulk of the
military has no modern equipment with which to train. The situation became
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so pronounced in 1998 that the PRC CMC decided to train cadres abroad
and recruit foreign specialists to train various elements of the PLA.
Though many Chinese soldiers trained in the Soviet Union during the 1950s,
this is no longer the case. The decreased desire to learn Russian has
contributed to the decrease in numbers, while schools that offer English
have become more popular. Although the Chinese still hold conferences
with the Russian military, they are mostly restricted to the general
headquarters and district level. The military leaders feel that the
impact of foreigners will raise technological knowledge through out the
PLA. The participants in this new initiative will be officers of high and
middle rank, those who received a broad education, or those possessing
specialized military knowledge. President Jiang Zemin himself stated that
“it is better to let the professionals wait for weapons than for the weapons
to wait for professionals.”21
The practice of training troops for battle looks imposing, even on paper.
The quantity of required exercises, maneuvers, and officer drillings
testifies to the challenging studies of the PLA. With the advent of military
reform, the number of exercises was increased, but the subject content
became broader and displayed a deeper understanding of geopolitics and
military structure. After 1980 combined arms exercises became more
commonplace. Strategies of encirclement, disembarkation from marine
and air-vehicles, and usage of weapons of mass destruction were discussed
from both offensive and defensive positions. As early as 1984, 27
divisions, 269 regiments, and over 200,000 servicemen were trained in the
Shenyang and Lanzhou districts alone. Involved in exercises were 3,600
artillery pieces, over 1,000 tanks and other armored vehicles, 13 ships, and
10,000 automobiles. The number of aircraft missions completed was 508.
The military districts of Shenyang, Jinan, and Wuhan saw an increase of
battalion scale exercises (1,726), regiment scale exercises (596), and
division scale exercises (67). Strategic operations exercises were run with
the participation of tens and even hundreds of thousands of servicemen.22
Each of the seven military districts of the PLA carries out annual
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independent staff and field exercises in preparation for local war. Joint
operations in retaliation for border skirmishes and other local incidents are
regularly carried out. Increased hostilities along border regions
fostered the desire that such exercises should create a military zone
where independent operations could be carried out during certain times.
The commander in chief of a military district becomes the head of an
integrated command. Orders to all attached land, air, and, when
necessary, naval troops are sent from a central command facility in a
seaside zone.23 Also contributing to peaceful borders is the Friendship
and Cooperation Treaty between the Russian Federation and the PRC.
Although the treaty contains many military-support sounding references
like “concerning guards of state unity and territorial integrity,” the
agreement is effectively a statement of mutual support for policy concerns;
it falls far short of a military alliance.
Until the end of the 1980s, the majority of large-scale operations were
conducted in northern military districts based on the supposition that
conflict would arise between China and the Soviet Union. In addition,
the Guangzhou region also hosted large-scale exercises with Vietnam as
the potential opponent. Special attention was paid to these later exercises,
though, for two reasons. First was the need to carry out the defense of
coastal territories, especially those along the South China Sea, with as
much efficiency as possible. Second was the comprehensive nature—
divisions from all branches of the PLA were used—of the training
missions. of special import was the commander of the coastal district, who
also had control of naval operations. The skills of this leader could
easily be transferred to battle in other countries. PRC Naval Command
wants to increase the battle capabilities of the Chinese fleet to a zone of
operations of 400 miles and enable independent operations of the fleet.24
In the 1990s, specialized exercises commenced with the use of high-tech
armament and equipment. The development of electronic warfare, such
as implanting viruses into enemy computer systems, is considered the
primary goal of these simulations. The military district of Sheyang hosted
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these specialized exercises, which included Chinese specialists in electronic
technology.25
During the last few years, the military districts of Lanzhou, Jinan,
Nanjing, and Guangzhou hosted training missions incorporating multiple
branches of the armed forces.26
Chinese military specialists have been able to acquaint themselves with
the expertise of other countries. Combining foreign learning with their
knowledge of historic conflict, they modify and shape military strategy
and doctrine as it relates to tactical operations and troop preparation.
A similar trend was seen in Soviet forces during the 1970s and 1980s.
During this time, Russian preparation for nuclear world war was
completed, and included the amassing of thousands of rockets and tens of
thousands of nuclear warheads. The central research base of the country
provided a huge variety of Russian and foreign designed armaments. In
the advent of another world war, a massive nuclear strike against the
opponent could be guaranteed.
The situation became more complicated when the United States
and NATO—followed by the USSR and countries of the Warsaw
Pact—began preparations for conventional warfare in addition to
nuclear war. This preparation resulted from the change in perspective
called the “antinuclear revolution in military affairs.” It appeared, though,
as if the mindset had changed without a result in actual practice. New
ideas became widespread, such as the use of missiles, artillery and air
forces to guarantee success; multi-point observation of opponents; and
usage of a division—or even an army—to flank an adversary. In view of
the great advances in military engineering, all of these things seemed
possible. In training simulations, the speed of an offensive was established at
50 or even 100 kilometers per day. When questioned on how the
necessary ammunition, fuels, lubricant oils, means of operation, and
battle maintenance would come to be, the common answer was that in a
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short time these “necessaries” would be invented. Samples of arms
had already been created, and there were promises of spreading them
through out the armed forces. On paper, the revolution had already
encompassed all aspects of military art. The reality of the situation,
however, was quite different. The Soviet army simply did not have the
proper formations and number of troops to carry out the tactical plans
they had.
The problem of possible transition to the use of nuclear weapons was
solved by diagramming hundreds of potential nuclear strikes on cards. Each
drew the appropriate impact zone and estimated the consequences of
using nuclear weaponry. Included in the plans were 2-3 days to allow the
effects of a nuclear attack to clear. This period, however, was not included
in field training exercises. There is also a decided lack of skill, even in the
elite units, relating to material support, logistics, and even the use of some
forms of weaponry.
It is believed that the gap between PLA ideals like “high-tech local
warfare” and “revolution in military affairs” and the actual practices of
military units is even more pronounced than in the Soviet Army. Although
the PLA is linked to the concept of “people’s war” through weapons and
equipment designed in the 1950-60s, its target of territorial defense creates a
foundation of reliable security for China. The 1960-70s were a difficult
time for the PLA as the administration did not allow military spending
on updating weapons and engineering. They waited while other
countries went through 2-3 generations of armaments. Even now, there
is not enough support in the Chinese leadership to fund a full scale
modernization of the PLA. I believe that the Chinese will continue
applying existing weapons to their military theories for quite some time.
One area in which the PLA has attained a high degree of success is in
the creation of a courageous officer and executive soldier class. These
servicemen are willing to wage war in the name of their country despite the
army’s aging equipment and untrained troops.
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The author’s above representation of Chinese military doctrine was
only in brief. The question then arises as to whether China’s military
policy has recently changed due to warming relations with the United
States. The answer is, of course, negative. The doctrine and practice of
battle training are staples of the Chinese military structure and require
tremendous impetus before alteration.
The U.S. hardening policy towards China is expressed first in
intentions, second in political steps, and, finally, in military action. It
will be interesting to discover how the George W. Bush administration’s
new foreign policy initiatives will be met by the PRC—both politically
and militarily.
In China, as in other countries of the world, the latest steps of the
United States in the international arena are perceived as America’s
attempt to assert itself as the last superpower and disrupt the present
world order in the field of international security.
The developments of such a policy include:
• A power diktat and the use of force without international approval;
• The departure from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty and the
organization of a national ABM and theater missile defense (TMD)
system which upset the strategic balance and fractured the system of
agreements regarding the limitation and reduction of offensive forces
and nuclear arms; and,
• The expansion to the East.
The developments in U.S. foreign policy have little direct impact on the
Asia Pacific region in which China is situated. There has been, however, a
buildup of smaller incidents like the bombing of the PRC embassy in
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Belgrade and the collision of the Chinese fighter with the American EP-3
off the island of Hainan. Furthermore, the Bush administration’s support
of Taiwan could substantially complicate the political and military
situation in the region.
This is, of course, not a full list of the events instigated by the United
States to overtly restrain the concerns of the PRC. If continued, these
events may lead to complex operating measures in both political and
military spheres between the two countries.
The PRC leadership strongly reacted to the events in Yugoslavia—
to the extension of NATO and the creation of an anti-missile defense
system. Its reactions are of a political and diplomatic nature: statement,
demonstration, consulting and coordination with like-minded
countries. There are also, however, cases of military reaction as
evidenced by the illegal airspace infringement of the EP-3.
The PRC has put forth a schedule of transformation that lasts into the
middle of the 21st Century. This plan consists of 3 parts: first, economic
growth and an increased living standard for the Chinese people; second, the
socio-political stability of the country; and third, the guarantee of military
security and the territorial integrity of the country.
The first part of China’s strategy allows little room to decisively act
in the international arena. Moreover, any Chinese plans of military
expansion will severely damage its foreign economic relations and slow
its national economic growth.
The second part of the Chinese plan is connected to the active
extraction of government forces from the economy. One of the functions
of China’s armed forces has traditionally been to assist in natural
disaster relief projects and to rebuild damaged houses. Natural disasters
seem to plague the country and so distract the PLA from training
objectives. Furthermore, with the significant reduction in the army (from
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4 to 2.5 million) and the continuing call for disaster relief, China may
hasten the removal of the PLA from the economy.
The third part of the Chinese plan relies on its military potential and the
modernization of the PLA. The pattern has been the gradual
destruction of obsolete items (including tanks, artillery systems,
aircraft, etc.) and the purchase and dissemination of new equipment
throughout the army. This process is not threatening to other countries and
does not change the balance of power on regional or strategic levels.
It should be noted that, when laying out its national goals, the
Chinese leadership traditionally thinks in large categories, in large time
periods, and exhibits significant patience. China never entered an arms
race by massing its field troops or by buying expensive modern
weapons systems. Since the 1950-60s, the PRC has based its strength on
ground troops, although it has received and created samples of nuclear
weapons, missiles, aircraft and marine vessels. Subsequently, China did
not conduct broad retrofits of its existing weaponry, though it was
considerably outdated. It has only done the minimum to ensure military
security during the difficult times of the 1960-80s during which minor
confrontations occurred with the Soviet Union and the United States.
Currently, the international situation is more favorable for Chinese
security. Using the concept of “people’s war,” the PLA reliably guards the
country’s borders. China’s nuclear arms serve only as a deterrent to
potential aggressors.
China is not prepared for major conflicts outside of its own territory,
and there have been no rumors of plans in this direction. Even the
statements of Chinese leaders regarding the possibility of forcing Taiwan
to rejoin the country should be dismissed as no more than a political
show. Now, and in the near future, an assault on Taiwan is outside of
China’s capability.
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This situation can be changed by large international political and
military events such as:
• Obstacles on the path of reunification with Taiwan, international
support of the Taiwanese government, or careless political and
military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait;
• Allowing the PRC to build a nuclear arsenal unrestrained; and,
• Dramatic changes in the political or military situation in the Asia Pacific
Region or in the world as a whole.
Developments of this nature may force the leadership of the PRC to
revise its military strategy and pursue an accelerated modernization of
the armed forces. The rapid economic growth of China and its
increasing military potential—combined with its active and firm military
policy towards its opponents, including the United States—may result in
an unexpectedly large threat, should China be forced to think outside
of its borders.
Should these events occur, China will have to overcome considerable
difficulties, including:
• A weak technical and technological base;
• A vulnerable economy if a drastic increase in military consumption
and research and development (R&D) demands occurs; and,
• Decreasing economic relations with other nations.
The path to war is fraught with economic and sociopolitical
difficulties for China, thus there is slight chance the country will pursue it.
It has as an example the Soviet Union, which could not balance the arms
race with its overstrained economy. At the same time, however, foreign
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powers should not expect China to take a passive stand in military
operations. At a minimum, the PRC can engage in military action within
its borders.
If the Chinese tendencies manifested over the last 15-20 years persist, the
PLA will only have the potential to defend the PRC. It is difficult to imagine
a scenario in which China would pose a real threat to the continental
United States or even to American military bases in East Asia.
For this reason, the international situation over the next 15-20 years will
be determined largely by U.S. policy. If America shows restraint, does
not excessively increase its military, does not promote unilateral
expansion plans in foreign regions, does not destroy the present
system of strategic stability, does not engage in an arms race (under
the pretext of deployment of ABM systems, for example) and does not
proliferate nuclear and conventional armaments, then China will have
no incentive to increase its own military capacity. Rivalry between
China and the United States will then originate only from economic and
political sources.
If the United States and its allies dictate politically or militarily to
other countries, it may place the United States and China on the road to a
new Cold War. We are now witnessing the destruction of a series of
international agreements regarding the reduction and limitation of
nuclear armaments. The United States has terminated its participation in
the ABM Treaty of 1972. U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice
recently compared the present system of agreements to the geocentric
concept of the universe; the future system of the world to the
heliocentric system. Copernicus, though, had to formulate his concept of the
cosmos and demonstrate its consistency with fact before he received the
recognition of the world.27
Russia is often charged with giving China the modern air, anti-aircraft,
and marine arms that helped increase the military potential of the country.
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Making this statement, however, requires the following suppositions:
1. Russian arms shipments to China were meant as defensive tools
to protect the nation’s borders.
2. China does not itself possess the capacity to manufacture its
entire spectrum of military equipment. It also testifies to the reluctance of
the Chinese leadership to enter an arms race and, in so doing, to become
dependent on the military-industrial complex.
Former President Dwight Eisenhower spoke of the relationship
between a country’s leadership and its arms producers in his farewell
address. He warned of a military-industrial complex that dictates both
defense and economic policies.
Neither the United States nor the USSR could avoid such a situation,
however. The United States has not experienced the consequences,
though, for two reasons: (1) high general economic potential, and (2)
military-industrial corporations producing diversified commodities,
selling both to the military and to civilians. In the Soviet Union, though,
a diktat of the producers of military equipment resulted in the economic
weakness of the country’s private sector, a redundancy of production, and
that production’s low quality.
It is plausible to view the national ABM system proposed by the Bush
administration as a concession to the military-industrial complex of
America, which stands to profit substantially from the undertaking.
They prefer not to speak about the battle effectiveness of the system, but
rather to point at the nonexistent threat of North Korean nuclear weapons.
China, though, perceives the creation of the American national anti-missile
shield very differently.
The military policy of the United States will shape that of China. If
momentum is given to the missile shield, it will provoke the Chinese to
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institute a full-scale military-industrial complex capable of producing
thousands of rockets, aircraft, and tanks. Should this occur, it will
heavily stress China’s economic base, yet the transformation is possible.
In the early 1980s, the author studied t the military Academy of General
Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Here he learned the three major strategic
ones of the globe: the west, the South, and the East. The Soviet Armed Forces
had the resources and capabilities necessary for such operations. The
PLA, on the other hand, does not have the capability to think of theaters
outside of the Asia Pacific Region. I do not think that the United States
and its allies should view the PLA as having such capabilities—a fact
that should be taken into account before hardening foreign policy against
China.
The transformation of Chinese military doctrine and the combat
training of their armed forces characterize a country trying to reach a
higher level of conventional military capabilities. It is obviously
necessary for China to react against aggressors, but not always through
military operations. The fundamentals of strategy and deception are
with good reason the bases of “people’s war” at the strategic level.
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MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES
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CHAPTER 5
CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
IN THE AGEOF GLOBALMISSILEDEFENSE:
CHALLENGESAND RESPONSES
Mark A. Stokes
INTRODUCTION
Since the days of Sunzi and beyond, nations have pursued defenses
against offensive weapons. Naturally, sparked by the advent of the first
ballistic missiles in World War II, interest in defending against ballistic
missiles over the past several decades has increased significantly. Today,
strategic and conventional ballistic missiles pose challenges to the United
States and to its national interests around the world. Weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery place significant portions
of the U.S. population at risk. These systems, in the hands of
governments that are hostile to U.S. national interests, challenge the security
of allies and friends. No system exists today that is capable of defending
U.S. territory and only a limited capability exists to protect allies and
friends, as well as U.S. forces deployed overseas.
To address the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD,
President George W. Bush has set out on a path to field ballistic missile
defenses to protect the United States, its forces overseas, and allies and
friends. At the same time, the United States seeks to reduce its nuclear
arsenal to the “lowest possible number of nuclear weapons.” U.S. Missile
defense programs are designed to counter the existing and growing short,
medium, and intermediate range missile threats to our allies and friends
and deployed forces; as well as the long-range threat to American cities
that is just over the horizon.
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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is concerned about U.S. plans to
deploy a global missile defense architecture. From Beijing’s perspective,
even a modest missile defense system could have serious implications for
the viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of
conventional short and medium range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and
MRBMs). Beijing’s anxiety over maintaining its nuclear deterrent is not
new. Development of missile defense countermeasures dates back at
least to the mid-1980s, when a series of responses to the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative (SD I) were contemplated. These responses included
plans for a significant expansion of China’s nuclear intercontinental
ballistic missile force.
The author of this chapter examines the PRC’s strategic and theater
ballistic missile development and the growing role of ballistic missiles as an
integral component of PRC coercive strategy. U.S. Missile defense
programs are outlined in order to provide the necessary context for
subsequent discussion of the wide range of PRC technical responses that
are underway. These countermeasures are intended to undercut the
political and military utility of U.S. Missile defense programs.
In addressing PRC technical responses to U.S. Missile defenses, three
caveats are in order. First, this discussion does not necessarily imply that
U.S. Missile defense programs are motivated by a perceived Chinese threat
to the U.S. Homeland. U.S. Missile defense programs are driven by
rogue nations equipped with limited numbers of relatively
unsophisticated ballistic missiles, as well the prospects of an accidental
Russian or Chinese launch. While missile defenses are not necessarily
driven by a perceived PRC threat, Beijing’s track record of proliferating
ballistic missile-related technology to rogue states—to include
countermeasures—is a legitimate concern.
Secondly, defense against ballistic missiles, particularly the shorterrange threats, requires an integrated approach consisting of survivable
command, control, communications, and battle management systems;
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passive defense such as hardening and rapid recovery measures; active
ballistic missile defenses that destroy missiles in the boost, mid-course,
and terminal phases of flight; and attack operations intended to suppress
the use of ballistic missile forces at their source. This chapter focuses only
on the active component of missile defense.
Finally, China’s opposition to missile defenses often is viewed
through the cognitive prism of Taiwan. Therefore, special attention is
placed on the relationship between the development of missile defenses and
their potential use in a Taiwan Strait conflict, since it is within this
context that Beijing perceives U.S. development of missile defense. The
PRC’s growing arsenal of strategic ballistic missiles and increasingly
accurate and lethal theater ballistic missiles threatens to disrupt the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait and limit U.S. freedom of action
should the PRC resort to the use of force to resolve differences with
Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has an
expanding inventory of conventional ballistic missiles, linked with other
forms of coercive airpower, which could give Beijing a decisive edge in
any future conflict with Taiwan. From a political and military
perspective, missile defenses threaten to undermine the PRC’s ballistic
missile “trump card.”
PRC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
The PRC relies heavily upon its ballistic missile forces—the PLA
Second Artillery Corps—for deterrence, coercion, and warfighting. With
some foreign assistance, Beijing is expanding and modernizing its
limited inventory of nuclear ballistic missiles and is continuing to
deploy increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballistic missiles
opposite Taiwan. Its small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force
provides a modicum of assured retaliation should China suffer
nuclear attack. The second Artillery’s conventional ballistic missile
force is be coming not only an important instrument of psychological
intimidation, but also a potentially devastating force of military utility.
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The nuclear and conventional missile buildup is taking place
regardless of the scale of any future U.S. Missile defense architecture or
the provision of missile defenses to Taiwan. A 1998 U.S. Department of
Defense report asserted that China’s space and missile industry probably
will have the capacity to produce as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles in the
next decade.1
The PRC’s strategic nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of limited
deterrence—the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy in a
retaliatory strike. China’s nuclear forces generally are believed to follow
a countervalue strategy that targets population centers. China has
sufficient nuclear weapons to hold approximately 15-20 million U.S. citizens
at risk, or about 5-10 percent of the total U.S. population.2
China’s primary organization for ballistic missile research,
development, and production is the China Aerospace Corporation’s
First Academy. The First Academy, also known as the China Academy
of Launch Technology (CALT), consists of an overall design and
systems integration department, 13 research institutes, and 7 factories
which are responsible for engines, control technology, inertial systems,
warheads, materials, testing, and launchers. With more than 27,000
personnel, the First Academy is the largest research and development
(R&D) organization within the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC). In
its work on solid systems, the First Academy is dependent upon the Fourth
Academy in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, for its solid motors. CALT is also
supported by institutes and factories subordinated to various bases deep
inside China. One of these bases, the Sanjiang Space Group (066 Base) in
Hubei province, has developed its own complete ballistic missile system,
the 300-kilometer DF-11 and its 600 kilometer variant, the DF-11A.
Today, the First Academy’s research and development resources are
devoted to ensuring its nuclear ballistic missile force remains a viable
deterrent in the face of missile defenses. CALT and the 066 Base in Hubei
province are leveraging foreign technology in order to achieve
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tremendous advances in accuracy. At the same time, they are diversifying
the payloads of their ballistic missiles to increase their lethality. CALT
and the PLA are also examining a wide range of countermeasures to
ensure their ballistic missile force remains effective as missile defenses
are introduced in to the Asia-Pacific region. Key organizations
responsible for technical countermeasures include CALT’s 4th planning
Department (systems design); the 14th
Research
Institute
(warhead/payload development); and the 703rd Research Institute
(materials). CALT and the 066 Base are working on no less than six
research and development programs that will increase the range, size,
mobility, accuracy, and survivability of the second Artillery’s
inventory of ballistic missiles. Many of these programs have been placed
on an accelerated R&D schedule since May 1999.3
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The PRC’s existing ICBM force consists of liquid-fueled DF-5 (CSS-4)
and DF-4 (CSS-3) systems. Mobile, solid fueled ICBMs will augment these
older systems over the next 5 years. The second Artillery currently
possesses approximately 20 DF-5 ICBMs that are capable of targeting any
location in the United States. This figure is expected to grow to 24 over
the next few years. CALT is working on an improved version of the DF-5
that could incorporate multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV)
technology. Deployment of at least twelve 6,000-kilometer range DF-4 (CSS-3)
ICBMs began in the mid-1970s. Western sources indicate that these two stage,
liquid fueled missiles are distributed among three brigades under the 54
Base in Henan province, 55 Base in western Hunan province, and 56 Base in
Qinghai province.4
China’s liquid fueled ICBM force will be augmented by mobile, solid
fueled systems within the next 5 years. At least one source alleges that China
could deploy up to 100 new land or sea-launched ICBMs over the next 15
years. These new systems include the DF-31, an extended range DF-31, and
a sea-based version of the DF-31, the JL-2.5 The DF-31 is a solid-fueled, three
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stage nuclear missile with an 8,000-kilometer range, sufficient to strike
targets in Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and some portions of northwestern
United States. Two successful DF-31 flight tests were conducted in
1999 and 2000. Slated for deployment before 2005, the DF-31 eventually
will replace the DF-4 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBMs). The
DF-31 is estimated to carry a single warhead and could incorporate
penetration aids, including decoys and chaff. At least 10-20 DF-31 missiles
can be expected to enter the force over the next 5 years, sufficient to outfit
one brigade with a notional structure of 9-16 launchers as signed to
three or four battalions.6
Two variants of the DF-31 also are under development. First is an
extended range version of the DF-31 with a range of at least 12,000
kilometers. This longer range missile, known as the DF-31A, likely will be
tested within the next several years and will be targeted primarily against
the United States. Japanese observers note that the DF-31A is in some
respects more advanced than some Russian systems, such as the TopolM. As many as 10 DF-31A ICBMs could be fielded by 2010. Another
variant of the DF-31—the JL-2—will be launched from submarines. The JL2 missile was successfully tested in early 2001. A modified Type 94
submarine that will be equipped with 16 tubes allegedly will carry the JL-2.
Projected for deployment by 2005, the 8,000-kilometer range missile
would be able to strike targets in Alaska, Hawaii, and the western part of
the United States when operating in Chinese coastal waters.7 Indications
exist that the timeline to field the DF-31, its longer range variant, and the
JL-2 was accelerated in May 1999.8
DF-21 MRBM System.
The PRC’s principal MRBM is the solid fueled DF-21 (CSS-5).
Research and development on the DF-21 began in 1967 and the missile was
first tested in 1985. Assembled at the 307 Factory in Nanjing, the initial
introduction of the missile into an experimental regiment took place as
early as 1991. With a 600-kilogram warhead and an estimated CEP of 700
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meters, the 2,100 kilometer range DF-21 is currently equipped for nuclear
missions only. A longer range version of the DF-21, the 2,500 kilometer
range DF-21 Mod 2, is reportedly under development. Both the DF-21 Mod
1 and Mod 2 likely have missile defense countermeasures, including
endoatmospheric decoys that were tested in 1995 and 1996.9
There are indications that a conventionally armed variant of the
DF-21—the DF-21C—has been underway since at least 1995. This
system may adopt a terminal guidance package that uses on-board
computers to correlate stored images with land marks and that
theoretically could achieve a circular error probability (CEP)of 50 meters
or better.10 Such a capability naturally would require a maneuverable
reentry vehicle. The reentry speed of the DF-21C is likely to be fast
enough to preclude engagement by lower-tier missile defense systems,
such as the PAC-3. Equipped with a conventional warhead as large as
1,500 kilograms, the DF-21C could force defenders on Taiwan to move
toward mid-course or upper terminal phase missile defenses, such as the
theater high Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and sea-based midcourse interceptors. As many as two conventional DF-21 brigades could
be in operation before 2010.11
Because of its warhead size and the limited ability of lower tier missile
defense systems to engage longer-range MRBMs, incorporation of a
terminal guidance system could have significant military implications.
The high reentry speed significantly reduces the footprint of the area that
is defended by terminal interceptors, such the PAC-3. A high reentry
speed, combined with a penetrator warhead, also could be effective
against hardened targets, such as intelligence facilities and
strategic/operational command centers. The DF-21C could also range
U.S. bases in the region. In addition, a terminally guided system with
a maneuvering payload could complicate the U.S. carrier operations in
the western Pacific.12
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SRBMs.
The deployment of the first conventional SRBM brigade opposite Taiwan
in 1994 marked a significant departure from the traditional role and
mission of the second Artillery. Conventionally armed SRBMs have become
a key tool of PRC statecraft. The PRC’s expanding SRBM inventory is
intended to deter or coerce neighbors such as Taiwan. Should Beijing
resort to the use of force, conventionally armed ballistic missiles,
operating jointly with the PLA Air Force and other armed services,
could serve as critical enablers in gaining information dominance and air
and naval superiority. Second Artillery conventional doctrine stresses
surprise and disarming first strikes to gain the initiative in the opening
phase of a conflict.13
The second Artillery is said to be currently equipped with 350
conventional SRBMs distributed among three brigades opposite Taiwan.
One source indicates that during annual meetings at Beidaihe in August
1999, China’s senior leadership decided to accelerate the production and
deployment of enough ballistic missiles to outfit four SRBM brigades by
2002.14 western sources believe the PLA may deploy as many as 650 SRBMs
opposite Taiwan over the next several years, while Taiwan’s ministry of
National Defense statements indicate that as many as 800 SRBMs could be
deployed by 2006.15 These missiles would be distributed into as many as
seven brigades in the 2005-2010 timeframe.16 Chinese writings indicate that
after an initial salvo, launchers would move to new pre-surveyed launch
sites within that brigade’s assigned area of operations.17 Should the
PRC decide to use force, the PLA intends to carry out synchronized
launches from a wide range of azimuths in order to stress active missile
defenses and associated battle management systems.18
To be politically and militarily effective, the PLA’s conventionally
armed ballistic missiles must survive any attempt to intercept the missile
in flight; and impact within a set radius that will damage the intended target.
The PLA is seeking to maximize the lethal radius with more effective
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warheads and minimize its CEP with improved guidance systems. Such a
development strategy is intended to reduce the number of ballistic missiles
required per target and perhaps minimize collateral damage. Until
CEPs reach 50-100 meters, it is difficult to hit a single point. Therefore, the
PLA would require expending a considerable number of missiles per
each target. As a general rule, two ballistic missiles would be required for
a 50 percent probability of hit if they have a 50 meter CEP; three with a 100 meter
CEP; and nine with a 300 meter CEP.
In a future contingency in the Asia-Pacific region, PLA writings
indicate intent to use highly accurate SRBMs, MRBMs, and land attack
cruise missiles against U.S. assets, to include key bases in Japan and
aircraft carriers operating in the western Pacific. Chinese researchers have
conducted extensive feasibility studies of the use of theater ballistic
missiles against aircraft carriers. Analysts have noted how such a capability
would require four components: ocean surveillance; mid-course
guidance; terminal guidance; and applicable control systems to maneuver
the reentry vehicle to the target. Proponents advocate use of a global
positioning system (GPS) for mid-course inertial corrections and the
use of a millimeter wave seeker for terminal guidance.19 Aware of the
vulnerability of millimeter wave seekers to jamming, PLA engineers are
surveying electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques to
ensure effectiveness of terminally guided ballistic missiles.20 In
addition to aircraft carriers, Chinese writings indicate other targets
would include regional airbases, naval facilities, and key C4I and
logistical nodes.21
DF-15 (CSS-6).
The DF-15 is a solid-fueled, 600 kilometer SRBM. Manufactured by
CALT, the DF-15’s payload reportedly has an attitude control mechanism
that permits steering corrections from separation to impact.22 the
detachable warhead offers a much smaller target than a surface-tosurface missile system (SCUD), and its potential maneuverability would
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complicate missile defense radar tracking, computations, and
interception. Assuming a nominal trajectory at a range of 500 kilometers,
the DF-15 would reach an altitude of about 120 kilometers, achieve a
reentry speed of about two kilometers per second, and have a flight time of
only 6 or 7 minutes.23 Some reporting indicates the DF-15 currently has
a 100-meter CEP.24 However, there are indications that the DF-15 has been
flight tested to an accuracy of better than 50 meters.25
To diversify its theater ballistic missile inventory, the PRC is said to
be developing a 1,000 to 1,200 kilometer range version of the DF-15.26
Strong incentives likely exist to develop an extended range version of
the DF-15. An extended range DF-15 would significantly reduce the
defended area or “footprint” of land-and sea-based lower tier missile
defense systems due to its reentry speed. Deployment of a longer range
DF-15 in Southeast China would eliminate the requirement to transport
missile assets nearer Taiwan, permit the targeting of Okinawa from sites
along the East China Sea, and, if mated with a terminally guided
payload, potentially force carrier battle groups(CVBGs) operating east
of Taiwan to move further away from the area of operations.
DF-11 (CSS-7).
The DF-11—better known by its export designator, the M-11 (CSS-7)—is
a solid propellant, road-mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300 km.
The main advantage of the DF-11 over the DF-15 is its ability to carry a
larger payload. Some sources credit the 300-kilometer version with an
800-kilogram warhead and a 150-meter CEP.27 the DF-11 is manufactured by
the CASC’s 066 Base, also known as the Sanjiang space Corporation, based
in Hubei province. The DF-11’s 300-kilometer range presents
challenges for active missile defenses due to its brief flight time of 3
minutes. Because its flight would remain within the atmosphere, upper tier
systems would be unable to engage the 300-kilometer DF-11.28
Deployment of a 600 kilometer extended range version of the DF-11, the DF11A (CSS-7 Mod 2), is reportedly underway as well.29
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U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Beijing views U.S. plans for a limited missile defense capability as a
threat to the viability of its growing inventory of increasingly accurate
and lethal ballistic missiles. While U.S. missile defense programs are
not necessarily driven by a perceived PRC threat, Beijing’s ballistic
missile development and export of technologies to rogue states has
increased regional interest in missile defenses. The key driver for U.S.
investments in missile defenses is a potential missile attack by rogue
nations such as North Korea, Iraq, or Iran. A limited national defense
is also needed to defend against an accidental or unauthorized Russian or
Chinese missile launch, which might involve only one or a few warheads.
Ballistic missile defense requires layered, active defenses that can
intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight: (1) the boost phase,
(2) mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase.
Boost phase.
Boost phase begins at launch and lasts up to 5 minutes for a primitive
liquid-fuel ICBM or 3 minutes for solid fueled systems. Intercept during
the boost phase engages the missile when it is at its most vulnerable stage
of flight. Boost phase intercept enables destruction of the missile before it
is able to deploy countermeasures and can reduce the number of
targets that mid-course and terminal systems must engage. The key
boost phase system under development is the Airborne Laser (ABL).
Experimental space-based systems are under development as well. Chinese
sources note that the ABL system, slated for initial demonstration as early as
2003 and initial fielding in 2008, could be deployed to the theater of
operations in a matter of hours. The PRC believes that at least one
operational concept is for a pair of Boeing 747-400F ABL aircraft to orbit over
friendly territory above the clouds at 40,000 feet, 90 kilometers off the
enemy coast, scanning the horizon for the plume of missiles rising above
enemy territory. With a maximum laser range of several hundred
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kilometers and mission time of 12-18 hours, each aircraft carries enough
fuel for 200 laser shots against missiles in the boost phase when the
missile offers a bright, slow target under high aero dynamic stress.30
The space Based Laser (SBL) flight experiment is a demonstration
effort to explore the feasibility of destroying ballistic targets with a high
powered laser. According to Chinese sources, at least one architecture
under consideration includes 30 satellites, a constellation of five rings
with six satellites each at 40 degree inclinations, and an altitude of 1,300
kilometers. The 30 satellite constellation can counter more than a 100
SRBMs in a 2-minute period. Such a system provides a 24-hour
intercept capability and would neutralize ballistic missile strikes before
implementation of countermeasures, to include early release
submunitions and decoys. The Chinese note that the SBL also is highly
effective against direct ascent anti-satellite systems. An experimental SBL
could be tested early next decade.31 In addition, there are experiments
underway that examine the feasibility of space based kinetic interceptors.32
Mid-Course.
During the midcourse phase of flight, the warhead travels freely through
space outside the atmosphere. For an ICBM, this stage lasts about 20
minutes, making the mid-course the longest phase of missile flight.
Engaging ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase offers several
advantages for the defense. Mid-course intercept solutions offer greater
time for higher level decisionmaking to be integrated in the command
and control system. Multiple shoot-look-shoot opportunities become
possible. Midcourse defenses may be based farther away from the
country launching the missile, possibly reducing system vulnerability.
There are at least two systems under development that will be able to
engage missiles during the mid-course phase of flight: (1)land-based
exoatmospheric kill vehicles to counter longer range ICBMs; and (2) a
sea-based mid-course system to counter medium- and short-range
ballistic missiles.
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Land Based mid-Course. The Land Band mid-Course system is the
principal mid-course intercept system for defense of the United States.
Its mission is to intercept incoming ballistic missile warheads outside
the earth’s atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and destroy them by force of the
impact. During flight, the interceptor receives information from a battle
management, command, control, and communications (BMC3) system to
update the location of the incoming ballistic missile, enabling the kill
vehicle’s onboard sensor system to identify and home in on the target.
The land based interceptor would consist of a multi-stage solid
propellant booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). Three options
are being examined for the booster: the Minuteman III ICBM; a
combination of other existing solid-rocket systems; and an entirely
new booster. Until booster development is complete, EKV flight tests will
be flown on the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV), which is a booster
consisting of a Minuteman II second and third stage.33
The EKV would use a highly capable infrared seeker to acquire and
track targets, and to discriminate between the intended target (i.e., the
reentry vehicle) and other objects, such as tank fragments or decoys.
This enables the interceptor to be launched against a cluster of objects
and subsequently identify and intercept the targeted reentry vehicle.
The seeker will be able to discriminate penetration aids and warheads,
though it would require assistance from ground-based radar systems or
space-based sensors to address more complex and sophisticated targets.
The EKV would receive one or more in-flight target updates from other
ground and space-based sensors in order to enhance the probability of
intercepting the target. Based on this data and its own sensors, the kill
vehicle uses small on-board rockets to maneuver so as to collide with the
target.34
In a previous concept, an initial architecture for defense of all 50
United States, known as “Capability 1” (C1), would have included
deployment of 20 interceptors in the middle of Alaska.35 An additional 80
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interceptors could be added (100 interceptors total) to form a “Capability
2” (C-2) architecture.36 An even more advanced architecture (C-3) would
have added and spread interceptors between two or more sites.37 Today,
however, this growth plan is under review. The ultimate scope or
architecture of a U.S. Missile defense system has yet to be determined and
will be based on the existing or projected threat at the time a decision is
made.
Sea-Based mid-Course. The sea-Based mid-Course missile defense
system builds upon the Navy theater wide (NTW) program and the
cancelled Navy Area Defense program. Sea-Based mid-Course will
use a hit-to-kill interceptor—the SM-3 Light Exo-Atmospheric Projectile—
instead of the proximity fused SM-2 Block IVA that was developed for
the Navy Area Defense system until that program was cancelled in
December 2001. The Sea-Based Mid-Course missile defense program is
unique in that Aegis destroyers equipped with the SM-3 missile can
patrol a large area to intercept ballistic missiles without the need to be
collocated with the defended asset. The ships can be positioned
forward of the defended area allowing for exoatmospheric mid-course
or even ascent phase engagements after the missile departs the atmosphere.
In doing so, a single Sea-Based Mid-Course platform can defend an
area or footprint that is tens of thousands of square kilometers. Like
the THAAD system and the GBI, the SM-3 interceptor is a hit-to-kill
system that uses an infrared seeker and miniature thrusters. Due to
speed limitations (4-5 km /sec), the SM-3 is intended to counter
primarily medium range ballistic missiles. An initial NTW capability
should be available by the 2005-2010 timeframe.38
Lower Tier.
Lower tier missile defense systems intercept ballistic missiles in the
terminal phase of flight, within the atmosphere at an altitude below 100
kilometers, during the last 1 or 2 minutes of flight, depending upon the range
of the missile. The warhead, along with any decoys or chaff, reenters the
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atmosphere. Aerodynamic drag then produces different behavior for light
as opposed to heavy objects. Decoys decelerate significantly and may
burn up, but the warhead does neither. Thus at reentry the defense can
discriminate the warhead. At least two lower tier systems are intended to
counter short range threats during the terminal stage of flight: 1)
THAAD; and 2) the PAC-3 missile.39
THAAD. The THAAD system will be able to engage longer range
theater ballistic missile threats (i.e., less than 3,500 kilometers) during the
upper terminal phases of flight. As an essential component of a family of
systems, THAAD can reduce the number of missiles that other
terminal defense systems must engage. Using hit-to-kill technology to
destroy its target, THAAD can operate autonomously, but is required to
be interoperable with other lower tier defenses and external sensors.
An important feature of the THAAD weapon system is its shoot-lookshoot capability. Kill assessment will determine if a warhead is destroyed,
and, if necessary, a second interceptor should be launched. The THAAD
system uses a mobile X-band ground based radar with a detection range of
up to 1,000 kilometers. The interceptor uses a staring infrared seeker
assembly, including an indium-antimonide focal plane array; cryogenic
cooler assembly; signal processing electronics; and an electro-optical
telescope. THAAD will operate in the upper tier to 150 km and in the
intermediate tier down to around 40 km.40 Chinese sources estimate the
THAAD probability of kill against a 3,500-kilometer ballistic missile
using a single interceptor at 85 percent, and 97.7 percent if two
interceptors are used.41
The ultimate plan is to equip two THAAD battalions to support two
major regional conflicts. Each THAAD battalion includes four
subordinate fire units each with a Battle management Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (BMC3I) element, one radar, nine
launchers and 144 missiles. Design parameters call for each THAAD
system to be transportable by land, rail or road, sea and air (by C-141 or
larger aircraft).42 The May 1999 DoD Report to Congress on TMD
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Architecture Options in the Asia-Pacific Region notes that only one
THAAD fire unit would be needed to provide complete coverage of
Taiwan.
PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3). The missile defense system
slated for nearest term deployment is the PAC-3 missile. Scheduled for
introduction before the end of 2001, many in the Asia-Pacific region,
including Taiwan, are expected to procure the PAC-3 missile over the
next several years.43 Taiwan currently is equipped with PAC-3 ground
systems (radar, trucks, command and control) and the Guidance
Enhanced Missile (GEM), which has some missile defense capability.44
Procurement of the PAC-3 missile will complete the PAC-3 Growth plan
that began with the initial deployment of PAC-3 ground equipment in 1997.
One prominent Taiwan journal, Defense Technology, posits that Taiwan
eventually may procure enough PAC-3 missiles and additional PAC-3
ground equipment to outfit between 9 to 12 fire units.45 The PAC-3 is a
much more capable derivative of the GEM system in terms of both
coverage and lethality. The PAC-3 has a new interceptor missile with a
different kill mechanism—rather than having an exploding warhead, it is
a hit-to-kill system. The PAC-3 missile is an evolutionary outgrowth of the
Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT). The canister is the same size as a GEM
canister, but contains four missiles and tubes instead of a single
round. Selected Patriot launching stations will be modified to accept
PAC-3 canisters. Each launcher may be loaded with four GEM Rounds or 16
PAC-3 missile rounds if the launchers are modified to accommodate the
PAC-3 missile.46
PLA affiliated sources assert the PATRIOT GEM (PAC-2+) will only
be able to intercept 10-20 percent of incoming missiles. Taiwan sources
claim that two GEM interceptors will have an 80 percent success rate
against PLA short range ballistic missiles.47 with the PATRIOTs only
deployed around Taipei, other critical targets around the island are
unprotected. There are indications, however, that the military intends to
provide some coverage for Taichung and Kaohsiung.48
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Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.
Missile defense systems are reliant upon a steady stream of space- and
ground-based command, control, communications, and intelligence
systems. Current and future sensors include: (1) Defense Support
Program satellites; (2) Space-Based Infrared System-High; (3) SpaceBased Infrared System-Low; (4) Upgraded Early warning Radars; and (5)
X-B and Radars.
Defense Support Program Satellites. The U.S. existing missile defenses
rely on Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and 1970s vintage radar
systems for early warning purposes. The U.S. DSP satellites can detect
a launch 50-60 seconds after launch and then relay warning information
about 90 seconds after launch. In clear weather, these satellites can detect
a missile launch within 10 seconds of launch. Cueing a ground based
radar from space based sensor data can greatly reduce the airspace that
must be searched to find the theater missiles. Such data can cue ballistic
missile defense assets to search a specific area, allowing radar acquisition
at the maximum range.49
Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High). The SBIRS-High satellites
will begin to augment the DSP satellites as early as 2002. The first
SBIRS-High will be placed into a highly elliptical orbit for coverage of
polar regions. Of the seven satellites being procured, four will be placed
into geosynchronous orbit above the equator and the other two will be in the
highly elliptical orbits. SBIRS-High offers numerous advantages over the
DSP system. It will have a revisit rate of once every few seconds thus
enabling establishment of a track on the missile flight based on more
numerous plots of the missile’s location. The SBIRS system will have a larger
focal plane array, providing a launch point prediction of less than one
kilometer. The system also will provide continuous coverage of the polar
regions. SBIRS-High will have a “stare” capability that will allow them to
continuously observe a designated sector of the earth. This technology
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can be particularly useful in countering fast burn boosters that limit the
time available to determine the missile’s flight path.50
Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low). An outgrowth of the SDI,
SBIRS-Low will provide precise mid-course missile tracking and target
discrimination. The SBIRS-Low program is a low earth orbit satellite
constellation that could observe the deployment of reentry vehicles and
penetration aids immediately following burnout of the booster. Projected
for initial deployment during the latter part of the decade, 24 SBIRS-Low
satellites, operating in a low earth orbit of about 1000 kilometers, will be
equipped with two independent sensors. First is an optical system that can
track the booster and reentry vehicle throughout all phases of flight. The
second are infrared sensors that can detect heat signatures in various
portions of the frequency spectrum—shortwave infrared that can detect
targets in the boost phase; and medium and long wave infrared that are
able to detect reentry vehicles in the mid-course phase of flight. Once a
target is acquired, information on the target will be forwarded to a
telescope that would be able to track the missile after booster
burnout.51
Because penetration aids deploy differently than reentry vehicles, it
is easier to identify those objects that must be attacked if the deployment is
observed. SBIRS-Low will also be able to provide missile defense operators
with sufficient tracking data to enable interceptors to be launched soon
after booster burn-out and well before the early warning radar detects
the incoming reentry vehicles. SBIRS-Low offers first generation
processing capabilities to interpret a target object map that was derived from
another infrared sensor rather than a radar.52
SBIRS-Low is considered to be a critical factor in any future decision to
adapt the AEGIS-based mid-course interceptors for use against longer
range ICBMs. AEGIS radar—the SPY-1D—has limitations that prohibit it
from being used in an autonomous mode. For example, its range is
limited to approximately 500 kilometers, depending on the size of the
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target and the frequency at which it operates (S-Band: 2-4 GHZ). The SPY1D does not provide as much resolution as the X-B and radar system.
AEGIS requires some type of external cueing to engage an ICBM in
mid-course.53
Upgraded Early warning Radars. The current U.S. early warning
network relies on ultra-high frequency (UHF) radars (430 MHZ range), as
well as one L-Band radar based in Shemya, Alaska. These systems were
designed to provide warning of an incoming attack, permitting
sufficient time to launch our bomber force and facilitate movement of
key government officials. They were not designed to supply fire
control quality data of sufficient precision to guide interceptors and
discriminate individual objects within an incoming target array.54
However, the United States intends to upgrade existing radars in order to
provide more precise and timely data that can be used to anticipate a
future intercept area. This will allow an interceptor to be launched and
begin its flight—the earlier the fly out, the larger the defended area or
footprint. These Upgraded Early warning Radars (UEWRs) would be able to
discriminate between dozens or hundreds of objects that could be in a
target cluster and eliminate objects that do not fit the characteristics of a
reentry vehicle.55
X-Band Radars. While UEWR systems will provide a greater degree
of accuracy, they still will not be able to provide the detailed data
needed to discriminate the right objects in a target array that must be
destroyed in flight. The degree of precision requires a radar that operates in
the X-B and (8-12 et array, including calculating the amount of nose
wobble motion that would be characteristic of a reentry vehicle,
measuring the diameter and length of objects within the target array, as
well as the spin rate, velocity, and position of objects.56 Because X-B and
radar systems will operate within a fairly broad band width, they are
considered difficult to jam.57
One concept is for one X-B and radar to be deployed to Alaska.
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However, a single radar based at this location likely will not be able to
provide radar coverage of all potential threats to the United States.
Additional radar systems would be needed. X-B and radar systems should
be able to detect an incoming target array at a range of about 4,000
kilometers, although discrimination will not be possible until the target
array is at a distance of around 2000 kilometers.
CHINESE RESPONSES
From Beijing’s perspective, U.S. ballistic missile defense programs
threaten to undercut the political and military utility of the PRC’s
growing inventory of strategic and conventional ballistic missiles. The
PRC places a premium on ensuring its ballistic missile force would be
able to penetrate any future missile defense architecture. Defense
industry analysts are examining a range of sophisticated missile
defense countermeasures in order to reduce the effectiveness of active
missile defense systems. PRC collection of information that would support
development of effective missile defense countermeasures has a relatively
high priority. With a limited force consisting of only a couple dozen ICBMs,
Chinese analysts believe that even a limited American missile defense system
with 20 interceptors (i.e., the previous “C1” architecture) could reduce
or negate China’s minimal nuclear deterrent. PRC military planners have
been contemplating a worst-case scenario in which the U.S. could launch a
first-strike destroying most of the Chinese ICBMs on the ground because
these missiles require several hours to fuel, arm, and launch. In the
aftermath, a limited U.S. Missile defense system could engage the
remnants of China’s second-strike missile force.58
Background
Beijing’s interest in countering ballistic missile defenses dates back to
the 1960s. In response to U.S. Missile defense programs in the 1960s, Beijing
began to examine means to ensure the viability of its incipient missile force,
and, at the same time, develop the basic technologies that would be needed
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to field an indigenous strategic missile defense system. This effort,
known as the 640 Program, was cancelled in the 1970s.59
Interest in missile defense countermeasures reemerged in the wake of
President Ronald Reagan’s march 1983 SDI. The Chinese ministry of
foreign Affairs drafted an initial study to assess the implications of SDI
in 1984. In late 1984 or early 1985, the central leadership tasked several
ministries and research institutes to develop a detailed examination of
the SDI and its implications for China. During 1985, the defense
industrial complex sponsored a series of conferences on SDI, and a
consensus was developed that Soviet and U.S. development of ballistic
missile defense systems had significant implications for China’s nuclear
deterrent. By 1986, Chinese experts generally agreed there were three
potential responses: expansion of offensive forces; development of
technical countermeasures, such as hardening and spinning of ballistic
missiles, to penetrate missile defense systems; and deployment of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to destroy space-based systems.60
The Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND) played a key role in formulating Beijing’s
response to the “global technical revolution” prompted by the U.S. Missile
defense initiative. In September 1984, COSTIND delivered a proposal to the
Central Military Commission (CMC) suggesting that relevant PLA
branches develop defense science and technology game plans out to the
year 2000. Working in conjunction with the State Council, COSTIND
formulated a defense technology strategy that focused on key
technologies and presented it at a November 1985 meeting with the CMC
leadership. Afterwards, in February 1986, COSTIND, with CMC support,
commissioned a long term development program that included the
formation of 18 study groups to focus on designated critical technologies.61
However, some within the defense S&T community believed
COSTIND’s plan was not sufficient to meet the technical challenges
posed by U.S. Missile defense programs. In March 1986, four of China’s

127

most prominent defense engineers presented a petition to the Central
Committee calling for establishment of a “High technology Research and
Development plan Outline.” The plan, referred to as the 863 Program,
was implemented in parallel to COSTIND’s Long Range plan to Year
2000 and was jointly managed by COSTIND and the State Science and
Technology Commission. The 863 program, still a guide and funding
source for numerous preliminary R&D projects, focuses on some of the
same technologies included in the SDI and Europe’s answer to SDI, the
Eureka program, including space systems, high powered lasers,
microelectronics, and automated control systems.62
Technical.
With studies and research conducted in the 1980s providing the
foundation, Beijing has embarked upon a far-reaching and multifaceted program to ensure the viability of its ballistic missile force.
These programs include technical countermeasures, an expansion of
its missile force, as well as asymmetrical measures, such as anti-satellite
operations. The PRC is investing significant resources into countering
missile defense through the development of technical penetration aids.
Contemporary Chinese literature on technical countermeasures is focused
on “two categories and eight major penetration technologies”
(liangdalei, badatufang jishu): these include countersurveillance (electronic
countermeasures, stealth, decoys, and fast burn motors) and
counterintercept (multiple warheads, maneuvering reentry vehicles,
hardening, and saturation).
Countersurveillance. One technical strategy is focused on denying
U.S. sensors the ability to properly detect and discriminate ballistic missiles
and their payloads. Chinese research and development into
countersurveillance (fanzhencha) systems is centered on four areas: 1)
electronic countermeasures; 2) stealth; 3) decoys; and 4) fast burn
motors.
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1. Electronic Countermeasures. From China’s perspective, passive
and active electronic countermeasures are a fundamental yet effective
means of ensuring ballistic missiles are able to reach their targets. Chinese
literature cites use of passive electronic countermeasures, such as chaff, to
confuse enemy radar systems, such as the X-B and UEWR systems.
Chinese testing has demonstrated that ballistic missiles can carry a
significant amount of chaff that can affect a large volume of space.
Development is focused in part on production of metallic strips that are 1.5
centimeters in length that can target radar systems that operate at 10 GHZ
(i.e., X-band radars).63
Research also is underway on radio frequency and infrared
countermeasures. CASC has conducted tests on active jammers that can
broadcast a signal designed to interfere with a radar’s ability to detect the
target object or corrupt the signal in such a way as to cause the radar to
receive a false echo.64 National University of Defense Technology
analysts have examined electronic countermeasure packages on board
theater ballistic missiles as a means to counter millimeter wave amplifiers
used on the PAC-3 missile and infrared seekers on GBI, THAAD, and
Sea-Based mid-Course interceptors.65 The PRC also is investing
significantly into ground and air based jammers that could effect radar
systems supporting missile defenses deployed around its periphery.66
2. Stealth. In addition to active and passive electronic
countermeasures, PRC engineers are working to reduce the ability of
early warning and tracking radar systems to detect ballistic missiles in
the mid-course and terminal phase of their flight. The intent is to
decrease available reaction time and thus reduce the probability of kill
and footprint of missile defense systems. One of the most effective and
readily implemented countermeasures is to reduce the radar cross
section (RCS) of the reentry vehicle. CASC designers already have taken
simple steps, such as shaping their reentry vehicles by bringing the nose
to a sharp point and rounding the backed GES. The DF-11 and the DF-15
have shaped warheads that separate from the remainder of the missile
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body. Chinese researchers also have experimented with complex reentry
vehicle surfaces that use radar absorbent materials that can counter X-band
radar systems used by THAAD and the GBI. Engineers have taken note
of an advanced Russian stealth technology, a plasma (denglizi) coating
that does not affect flight dynamics and can significantly reduce the
ability of radar systems to detect the reentry vehicle.67
PRC missile engineers also are lowering the infrared signature of their
reentry vehicles. Engineers have analyzed in detail the types of infrared
focal plane arrays that are intended for use on the land- and sea-based
mid-course systems and THAAD.68 Experiments have been conducted using
“coldscreen” (lengpeng) technology that thermally shrouds the reentry
vehicle. An aluminum alloy is used to encase the warhead and liquid
nitrogen is placed in between the aluminum shell and the warhead. In
one experiment, engineers noted that systems, such as the Land- and
Sea-Based mid-Course and THAAD, normally could acquire a reentry
vehicle with a five micron infrared signature at a range of 3,000 kilometers.
Equipped with the cold screen, detection range of the reentry vehicle
would be reduced to three meters.69
3. Decoys. Chinese engineers note two basic decoy (you’er)
measures: 1) saturation; and 2) deception. Saturation (baohe) measures
include the use of metallic balloons or other objects that simulate the
reentry vehicle in the mid-course or terminal phase of flight. Engineers
highlight the relative ease of this technology as well as its low cost. In 1995
and 1996, the Chinese allegedly tested DF-21 endoatmospheric decoys.70
Deception measures under evaluation include electronic decoys or
transponder jammers that transmit a radar return similar to that of the true
reentry vehicle.71
4. Fast-Burn motors. Chinese engineers have demonstrated concern
over potential deployment of U.S. airborne and space-based lasers. Another
method under consideration as an explicit countermeasure to boost phase
interceptors is a fastburn booster (suran zhutui) for China’s next
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generation of solid fueled strategic ballistic missiles. Chinese engineers
caution designers about potential quality control problems related to
stage separation and accuracy, and suggest this technology should be
divided into three stages based on the pace of foreign missile defense
developments.72
Boost Phase Maneuvering. One other countermeasure that Chinese
observers have noted is a boost phase maneuver designed to fool U.S. DSP
satellites. By changing directions during the ascent phase of flight, the
ballistic missile can complicate the defense’s efforts to predict its flight
trajectory. While no hard evidence exists that the Chinese have an active
program to develop a boost phase maneuver, there is potential for
cooperation between Russia and PRC missile engineers on technology
used on the Russian Topol-M program (SS-27).73
Counterintercept (fanlanzai).
The second major category of countermeasures seeks to deny missile
defense interceptors the ability to properly engage their targets. These
include: (1) multiple warheads, (2) maneuvering reentry vehicles, and
(3) hardening/spinning of ballistic missiles.
1. Multiple Warheads. China has had the capability to develop and
deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including a
MIRV system. As of January 1996, CALT was in the midst of developing
multiple warhead payloads, each with its own guidance system and
maneuvering capability.74 Research and development on multiple
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970.
Technical difficulties, however, stalled the program. CALT renewed
research and development in 1983, shortly after the SDI announcement in
March 1983. The DF-5A, able to strike targets throughout the United
States, was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no
evidence to date that they have been deployed. The U.S. intelligence
community assesses that China could develop a multiple RV system for the
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DF-5 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its
mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles
and would be costly.75
Critical to this effort is the miniaturization of warheads, a possible
objective of tests at Lop Nur over the last few years.76 According to
Chinese missile designers, real and decoy warheads can be mixed using
multiple warhead technology. Real warheads can be coated with radar
absorbing materials in order to weaken radar returns and reduce the
ability of interceptors to discriminate real from decoy warheads.77
2. Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles. CALT also is developing
maneuverable reentry vehicles in order to complicate missile defense
tracking. Missile designers believe maneuvering is not only a means to
complicate ballistic missile defenses, but is essential for terminal
guidance packages. While vehicles can maneuver at any time during
flight, Chinese engineers see most utility in programming a reentry
vehicle to maneuver in its terminal phase, 20-30 seconds before striking its
target. A reentry vehicle traveling a notional range of 10,000 kilometers has
the ability to maneuver within a lateral range of 556-900 kilometers.
Another maneuvering option discussed is to send the warhead up to a
higher altitude after separation from the missile, slowly descending in a
glide for a very long distance, and then finally dive toward the target.
Missile designers have demonstrated a special interest in the speed control
maneuver used in the 1,800-kilometer range Pershing-II.78 Chinese
engineers are addressing problems associated with maintaining accuracy
after exoatmospheric maneuvering.79 Through modeling and simulation,
CASC has determined that maneuvering is a viable means to reduce
land-based lower tier missile defense systems’ probability of kill.80
China allegedly acquired PATRIOT technology to calibrate an auxiliary
propulsion system on the DF-15 reentry vehicle to enable the payload
to outmaneuver a PATRIOT system as it reenters the atmosphere.81 After
computer simulations and modeling exercises, CALT is confident that its
maneuverable theater ballistic missile reentry vehicles can defeat

132

opposing PATRIOT systems.82
3. Hardening. Looking ahead to the potential deployment of boost
phase intercept systems, such as the airborne laser (ABL), CASC analysts
are examining ballistic missile spinning and hardening. spinning their
ballistic missiles is intended to prevent concentration of a high powered
laser on a singles pot.83 Chinese engineers are developing a coating for
ballistic missiles that could complicate use of high power lasers. Using
their own indigenously developed high powered lasers, Chinese
institutes have tested various coating materials to protect the outer shell of
ballistic missiles, a process known as laser cladding (jiguang rongfu).
Laser cladding, together with the spinning of theater ballistic missiles, may
not make ballistic missiles immune to boost phase missile defense systems
but could increase required lasing time, thus reducing the number of
laser shots available per ABL mission.84
OTHER.
In addition to the techniques described above, a range of other technical
and operational countermeasures also are under consideration. These
include: (1) trajectory techniques, (2) longer range development of nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse warheads, (3) indigenous missile defense
development, (4) anti-satellite (ASAT) development, and (5) multi-axis
strikes.
1. Trajectory Techniques. The type of trajectory Second Artillery
engineers select can affect the ability to penetrate missile defense
systems. Types of trajectories include: (1) fractional orbital
bombardment system, (2) depressed trajectories, and (3) lofted
trajectories. China conducted a feasibility study on a fractional orbital
bombardment system (FOBS) in 1966. This system launches a missile into
very low orbit, approximately 160 kilometers above earth. Before
completion of the first orbit, a retro-rocket reduces the speed of the
warhead, which hits the target with only a few minutes warning. Chinese
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engineers explored the potential of launching a missile to a
predesignated point over Antarctica as a means to penetrate the weakest
point in the U.S. Warning network.85 Still viewing a FOBS as an
alternative, Chinese designers continue feasibility studies on fractional
orbiting missiles (bufen guidao daodan). 86
Chinese analysts view depressed trajectories (yadi guidao) as another
option to counter space-based and mid-course missile defense systems.
Chinese engineers note that ICBMs often reach altitudes of 2,000
kilometers on a normal trajectory. However, launching a missile at a
depressed trajectory could allow the missile to achieve only a 100
kilometer altitude, complicating the ability of some space-based systems to
engage the ballistic missile. Testing and modeling has been done on the
DF-3, which normally has a range of 2,780 km and an altitude of 550 km
when flying a nominal trajectory. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3
travels 1,550 km at 100 km altitude.87
Lofted trajectories (tagao dandao) are another option that Chinese
missileers may consider. A longer range ballistic missile does not
necessarily mean the missile will be used at its maxim umeffective
range. A longer range system, fired on a lofted trajectory, can also
serve as a technical countermeasure to missile defenses. Lofted
trajectories can increase reentry speed, thereby complicating intercept
solutions for terminal defense systems or reducing the footprint or
defended area.88
2. EMP warheads. PRC engineers also are conducting feasibility studies
on electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) to overcome defenses. EMP
systems,such as a high powered microwave (HPM) warhead, could negate
space or ground-based sensors that support a missile defense
architecture. PLA writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warhead is a
relatively high priority. HPM devices in particular are viewed as a
“natural enemy” of more technologically advanced militaries and an
“electronic trump card” (dianzi shashou).89 Due to challenges related to
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weaponizing a device with enough power, a first generation Chinese HPM
warhead likely would only be effective against radiating targets within
the immediate area of impact. Radar systems and communications centers
would be the prime candidates. As the technology progresses, however,
HPM warheads could achieve wider effects.90 The developers of the DF-11
SRBM—the 066 Base—have demonstrated the most interest in HPM
warheads.91
In addition to non-nuclear EMP weapons, Taiwan observers are
concerned about the potential use of high altitude EMP (HEMP) bursts
that use an actual nuclear device. Such a device, detonated at an altitude
of 40 kilometers, would avoid casualties on the ground, yet would have
significant effects on the island’s electronic systems. The solution,
according to Taiwan analysts, are missile defenses, such as the seabased mid-course, that can engage the ballistic missile in its ascent
phase and before detonation.92
3. Missile Defense. Beijing has an indigenous missile defense
development program intended to ensure that at least a portion of its
inventory could survive a first strike. China’s research on missile
defenses dates back to the 1960s. Under the 640 Program, the space
and missile industry’s Second Academy, traditionally responsible for
SAM development, set out to field a missile defense system, consisting of a
kinetic kill vehicle, high powered laser, space early warning, and target
discrimination system components. While this program was abandoned
in 1980, engineers associated with this effort are still active.
Preliminary research on missile defenses was resumed in the 1980s, at
least partly funded under the 863 Program.93
The CASC Second Academy and the Shanghai Academy of space flight
Technology are playing a leading role in missile defense research.
Western reporting and Chinese technical journals indicate that the
Central Military Commission has approved funding for a 10-year
developmental program for a missile defense system, to include
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satellites for missile launch warning. The PLA Air Force and CASC
advocate a 15-year, three-phase approach to missile defense. The first step is
to field a “Patriot-like” system, such as the HQ-9, followed by research
and development on an extended range interceptor modeled on the PAC-3
missile; and basic conceptual research on a THAAD-like mid-course
intercept system.94
Chinese engineers are focused on development of infrared and
radio-frequency seekers that could engage both medium and shortrange ballistic missiles. Engineers are developing short and medium wave
infrared band (3-12 microns) focal plane arrays that would be able to
engage reentry vehicles during the mid-course phase of their flight path.95 In
addition to infrared seekers that could be used to counter medium and
short range ballistic missiles, the PRC has stepped up research into
millimeter wave (KA-band) amplifiers similar to those used on the PAC-3
missile. In fact, a special state laboratory on millimeter wave research was
established in Nanjing to help achieve technological breakthroughs.96 One
conceptual design for a lower tier missile defense interceptor adopts an
integrated millimeter wave and infrared seeker assembly.97
There also are indications that Chinese aerospace engineers are
examining the feasibility of space-based early warning. Technical writings
indicate the space industry is working to master specific technologies
associated with missile early warning satellites. The second Artillery has
conducted modeling and simulation of alternative early warning
architectures.98 China has a well-established technology base in infrared
sensors, which, when placed on satellites, can detect a missile almost
immediately after launch by detecting the infrared radiation from its
engine or motor plume.99 In a potentially related program, the China
Academy of Space Technology is developing a satellite bus for an infrared
telescope, which, according to design outlines, will be placed in a
geosychronous orbit shortly after the turn of the century.100
4. Counterspace. Negating U.S. space systems is another approach to

136

countering missile defenses. Chinese research and development on antisatellite technologies has been underway since the 1960s. Technical
literature suggests that a direct ascent ASAT program is underway involving
an assessment of various design proposals for seekers and propulsion
systems. As part of a missile defense countermeasure program, ASAT
operations would be directed against satellites in low earth orbit, such
as the SBIRS-Low system or against the SBIRS-High satellites in highly
elliptical orbits. Technical papers demonstrate some of the greatest obstacles
in developing an active counterspace capability are with development of
a kill vehicle and associated terminal guidance. Modeling has been
carried out on infrared, radar, and impulse radar terminal guidance
systems.101 Harbin Institute of Technology and Beijing University of
Astronautics and Aeronautics, for example, have carried out modeling
and simulation of various space intercept control and terminal guidance
systems. One concept introduces several small solid motors for orbital
control stabilization.102 There also have been unconfirmed reports that the
China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) is developing nanometersized “parasitic satellites” that could function in an ASAT mode.103
Engineers have conducted studies to counter satellite decoys as
well.104 The PRC has stepped up its efforts to distinguish decoys from
real satellites. One study, carried out by the National University of
Defense Technology, determined that this problem could be solved through
use of at least three ground stations using infrared sensors and neural
networks.105 China’s existing space tracking network can detect and track
most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes.106
China’s desire to field a direct ascent ASAT asset may be affiliated with
a program intended to support the launch of small satellite
constellations. A small solid fueled launch vehicle, most likely a
derivative of the DF-21, will be able to place small payloads in orbit at a time
and place of Beijing’s choosing. China intends to field these mobile, solid
fueled launch vehicles by 2005. Reduced size and complexity allows
for faster manufacturing time and production in significant
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numbers.107 Chinese engineers are conducting conceptual studies on a
space based satellite tracking system that would serve as a potentially
important component of any ASAT system.108
Beijing also is investing in the development of high powered lasers
that, under certain conditions, could affect optical components of
satellite systems, such SBIRS-Low. The 1998 Report to Congress on PRC
military Capabilities (pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National
Defense Authorization Act) states “China already may possess the
capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on
satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers. However, given
China’s current interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume
that Beijing would develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in
the future.”109
5. Multi-Axis Strikes. In addition to technical countermeasures, the
PLA is examining operational methodologies intended to penetrate U.S.,
allied, or friendly missile defense systems. The second Artillery and China’s
space and missile industry have conducted modeling and simulation to
test China’s ability to break through the wide range of projected U.S.
Missile defense deployments. Modeling has been carried out that
involves various combinations of surface-to-surface, air-to-surface,
sea-to surface, air-to-air and naval air defense missile systems.110
Among the most important are synchronized, multi-axis strikes as a
fundamental principle of Second Artillery conventional doctrine
(duodian, duofangxiang, tongshi tuji). Associated are deception and
timing measures that could ensure penetration of at least a large
portion of a salvo. These involve coordinated launches from different
launch azimuths and use of infrared “disruption” to confuse DSP
satellites and complicate enemy attack operations. Another
methodology includes closely spaced salvos that could take advantage of
reload time. Launches from different azimuths, combined with use of
infrared radiation “disruption,” could confuse enemy satellite early

138

warning systems and complicate enemy attack operations. Another
concept involves the use of two strike waves, the first “screening” the
second exhausting missile defenses, before they have time to reload.111
Anti-Radiation missile Development. An asymmetrical approach to
countering missile defenses includes attacking critical nodes within the
missile defense system, particularly radar systems. The PRC is
acquiring and/or developing an anti-radiation missile (ARM), such as
the Russian KH-31P, that is intended to negate early warning and fire
control radar systems that are able to detect and/or track ballistic missiles
during various phases of flight.112 There are persistent rumors of PLA
procurement or joint production arrangement on the KH-31P, which
Chinese engineers note was specifically developed to counter the
PATRIOT’s MPQ-5 3 radar, and AEGIS SPY-1D phased array radar.
China’s defense industrial complex, specifically the Third Academy
with support from the Harbin Institute of Technology, is aggressively
pursuing deployment of a long range anti-radiation missile.113
Foreign Cooperation on missile Defense Countermeasures.
There are indications of Russian space Agency assistance in Chinese
development of ballistic missile defense countermeasures, perhaps
dating back to the mid-1990s or earlier. Cooperation between China and
Russia in the field of space and missiles was formalized into a series of
agreements between CASC and the Russian space agencies when
representatives from Chinese and Soviet space industries signed an
initial agreement in Moscow in May 1990 on 10 cooperative
projects.114 The relationship was solidified when CASC and the Russian
Space Agency signed an official protocol for the sharing of space
technology in 1992. This agreement was raised again as a deliverable during
President Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing, but only after the two countries signed a
no-first-use pledge. A follow-on agreement was signed by Chinese and
Russian space officials. The agreement included ten areas of
cooperation, including satellite navigation, space surveillance,
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propulsion, satellite communications, joint design efforts, materials,
intelligence sharing, scientific personnel exchanges, and space systems
testing. Chinese sources indicate cooperation also included countering
U.S. missile defense programs.115
CONCLUSIONS
The United States has expressed its intent to develop defenses
capable of defending against limited missile attacks from a rogue state
or from an accidental or unauthorized launch. U.S. Missile defense
engineers are developing layered defenses, capable of intercepting
missiles of any range at every stage of flight: boost, mid-course, and
terminal. Layered defenses would permit reductions in nuclear forces,
thus contributing to strategic stability. These defenses will be introduced
incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology matures and then
adding new capabilities over time.
Since research on missile defenses began in the 1980s, Beijing has
been concerned about the potential undermining of their limited
nuclear deterrence, and, more recently, their ability to deter and coerce
neighbors such as Taiwan. To ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrent
and for its expanding inventory of conventional SRBMs and MRBMs,
Beijing has implemented numerous measures to counter U.S. missile
defense programs. These measures are targeted against sensors that
support missile defenses and against missile defense interceptors
themselves. Other initiatives include ASAT development as well as an
indigenous missile defense program that could ensure some modicum of
assured retaliation. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the
range of measures underway to undermine U.S. missile defense
programs.
China’s Countermeasure Challenge.
Chinese research and development of missile defense countermeasures
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is extensive and appears relatively sophisticated. However,
countermeasures introduce an added element of complexity into an
already complex system. Despite significant investment, PRC
countermeasures on longer-range ballistic missiles are unlikely to
keep pace with U.S. Technology. With more than 30 years experience, the
United States is the world’s leader in countermeasure technology. Such
expertise naturally is integrated into countering penetration aids.
Chinese engineers will face challenges as they attempt to put into
practice many of the concepts described above. Countermeasures can
be time consuming, and can reduce available space and weight. As a
result, penetration aids could lower performance (i.e., range and
accuracy) or force a reduction in payload (i.e., a trade off between a
decoy or a MIRV).
Simple countermeasures, such as chaff and employment of a limited
number of decoys, likely already have been incorporated into some
missiles, such as the DF-21 MRBM. Integration of more sophisticated
countermeasures, however, such as balloon decoys, fast burn motors,
and boost phase maneuvering are likely to be many years away. Russian
technical assistance may hasten their timeline. Regardless, as new
countermeasures come online over the next 10 years, the United States
should be able to keep pace, particularly given the general requirement
for CALT missile designers to conduct flight tests. The layered defense
approach is perhaps the most effective means to reduce the effectiveness
of missile defense countermeasures.
Nevertheless, the U.S. should hedge against unforeseen breakthroughs in
PRC countermeasure technology. China’s technological progress,
Russian assistance to PRC programs, and Beijing’s propensity to provide
technical assistance to rogue state missile development all require
careful monitoring. Testing of new penetration aids should be easily
observed via national technical means.
It should be noted that among the entire range of U.S. Missile
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defense programs, PRC specialists seem most concerned about the
deployment of SBIRS-Low satellites. Slated for initial deployment
during the latter part of the decade (about the same time as the PRC’s
new generation of solid-fueled extended range ICBMs are fielded),
SBIRS-Low has the potential to undercut an entire category of Chinese
countermeasures. Specialists note that the dual surveillance and tracking
capability of SBIRS-Low (infrared and electro-optical) would reduce the
effectiveness of counter-surveillance measures, such as electronic
countermeasures, radar stealth, and thermal shrouds. Therefore,
greater emphasis must be placed on counter-intercept measures, and a
combination of decoys and thermal shrouds.116
Planned Expansion of PRC Ballistic Missile Forces.
The discussion above focuses on technical and asymmetrical
countermeasures that the PRC may adopt. To augment sophisticated
penetration aids, limited expansion of China’s ballistic missile force is to
be expected, depending on the scope of the U.S. missile defense
architecture. The second artillery’s arsenal of strategic and
conventional ballistic missiles already is expected to grow substantially
through the introduction of more sophisticated silo-based ICBMs, such
as the DF-5A; mobile systems, such as the DF-31 and the longer range
DF-31A; and the JL-2 SL BM. Further expansion, beyond current plans,
is to be anticipated. However, the scope likely would be limited due to
Beijing’s desire to avoid presenting a threatening image to its neighbors
and economic partners around the world.117 If Beijing chooses to expand
its nuclear ballistic missile force, the most likely route would be to
increase production, beyond current plans, of the DF-31 and its longer
range variant.
As discussed above, by 2005, Beijing is expected to have 24 DF-5 ICBMs;
10-20 DF-31 ICBMs that should replace the second Artillery’s approximately
a dozen DF-4 ICBMs; and perhaps the same number of JL-2s, assuming the
Type 94 submarine is produced according to schedule. At least one

142

additional DF-31 brigade (10-20 missiles) could be fielded by 2010.
Initial deployment of the DF-31A could be expected in the 2005-2010
timeframe, with as many as ten DF-31A ICBMs ostensibly being in
operation by the end of the decade. With as many as 100 new ICBMs
entering the PLA’s inventory over the next 10 years, the PRC is in effect
more than doubling its arsenal of nuclear ballistic missiles able to range
targets throughout the United States. This expansion appears to be
taking place independent of U.S. plans to field limited missile defenses.
Upgrading all or a portion of the PRC’s DF-5 force structure with
MIRVs is another potential response should a CMC decision be made to do
so. The specific number of MIRVs per DF-5 cannot be determined at
this time.118 Prospects that a layered missile defense system could include
a boost-phase intercept capability could dampen any incentive to deploy
MIRVs. Boost-phase defenses would destroy the missiles early in flight,
when they are most visible and before they can release their warheads.
Missile Defenses and Beijing’s Six Specious Arguments.
Since the early 1990s, Beijing’s technical and doctrinal responses have
been supported by a coordinated foreign policy and propaganda
campaign to influence international opinion and shape the debate within
the U.S. regarding missile defenses. As its nuclear and conventional
ballistic missile inventory grows, Beijing’s political leadership has
formulated a number of arguments against missile defenses that are based
on half-truths and over-simplifications. First, Beijing argues that missile
defenses will cause an arms race. In fact, in the conventional military
context, arms races generally are caused by one side’s rapid buildup in
offensive capabilities.119 One could argue that an accelerated arms race
has been underway in the Taiwan Strait since the early 1990s.
Undercutting Beijing’s overwhelming offensive advantage through viable
defenses would enhance cross-Strait stability by raising the costs of using
force. Active missile defenses, combined with other approaches, would
reduce the perceived utility of ballistic missiles as Beijing’s preferred tool
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of coercion.
Secondly, Beijing asserts that U.S. Missile defense programs will
violate the Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty. However, at this time,
there is no intention to violate the ABM Treaty, which was a bilateral
agreement between Moscow and Washington to help manage and
stabilize the strategic bilateral relationship. because the ABM Treaty is
an artifact of the Cold war, the treaty needs to be adjusted or eliminated
altogether. A dialogue has been initiated with Moscow to ensure that such a
move would be made with the consent of both parties.
Beijing also posits a misleading argument that missile defenses will
encourage Taiwanese independence sentiment. There are more
important factors besides defenses that fan the flames of Taiwanese
independence. PRC policies that alienate Taiwan are most relevant.
besides, active missile defenses would not encourage independence
sentiment any more than other weapon systems, such as F-16 fighters,
PATRIOT Guidance Enhanced missiles, or PFG-2 frigates. One also could
argue that Taiwan’s indigenous capacity for defense is only a minor
factor influencing public sentiment regarding greater autonomy since,
according to some sources, Taiwan’s domestic polity is largely
uninterested in defense issues.
PRC spokesmen argue that active missile defenses can be used
offensively. Much to the contrary, missile defenses are defensive—they
threaten no one. If anything, building effective defenses will reduce the
value of ballistic missiles, and thus remove incentives for their
development and proliferation. One could argue that converting upper
tier interceptors to surface-to-surface missiles could enable strikes
against targets at long ranges. However, using interceptors in this way
is not cost efficient due to payload limitations. It is cheaper and more
effective to develop a dedicated ballistic missile than to use a missile
defense interceptor.
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A corollary to this argument is that missile defenses can shield
offensive assets, such as ballistic missiles or strike aircraft. This
supposition blurs the distinction between offensive and defensive
action—whether or not a system is offensive or defensive depends upon
the user’s intent, strategy, and doctrine. Beijing also argues that U.S.
provision of missile defenses to Taiwan would transfer technologies
useful to ballistic missile development. This assertion assumes that
Taiwan does not have the indigenous capacity to develop the necessary
technology; would be willing to violate missile Technology Control
Regime-related assurances made to the U.S. government; and would take
the trouble to reverse engineer propulsion, guidance, or other associated
technologies.
Chinese arguments that missile defenses could lead to a militarization of
space have some merit. However, since deployment of the first
reconnaissance and military communications satellites, space has long
been exploited for military purposes. There is a relationship between
missile defense and a SAT interceptors. If supported by a robust search,
acquisition, and tracking network, upper tier mid-course systems
could be used to strike some satellites in low earth orbit. Chinese
observers, such as Du Xiangwan from the China Academy of
Engineering Physics, have noted that intercepting satellites is easier than
engaging reentry vehicles.
Finally, the PRC has argued that provision of active missile
defenses to Taiwan would “violate” the Three Communiqués. The
Three Communiqués are parallel statements of policy that have little
standing in international law. Provision of missile defenses would not
“violate” the 1982 Communiqué any more than other weapon systems. As
Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge pointed out in his August
1982 Congressional testimony, the U.S. agreement to reduce arms sales
to Taiwan was contingent upon Beijing’s peaceful approach to resolving
the Taiwan issue, generally characterized by its military posture directed
against Taiwan. As Holdridge noted in his testimony, a rise in the
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military threat to Taiwan theoretically would be accompanied by a rise in
U.S. security assistance, in accordance with U.S. domestic law under the
Taiwan Relations Act.
Beijing argues that provision of active missile defenses to Taiwan would
revive the U.S.-Taiwan defense alliance, undermining the foundation of
U.S.-PRC relations as spelled out in the 1979 Communiqué. Such an
argument is based on the faulty assumption that a Taiwan missile
defense architecture would require some form of operational
connectivity with U.S. Space-based early warning and command and
control systems. While DSP early warning could enhance the effectiveness
of missile defenses, systems such as THAAD can operate
autonomously against SRBMs. Early warning radar systems can
supplant the need for satellite early warning.
Missile Defense in the Taiwan Strait.
As can be seen from these arguments, China’s opposition to missile
defenses is viewed largely through the cognitive prism of Taiwan.
Ballistic missiles are a political and, increasingly, military trump card
intended to stem political movement in Taiwan toward greater
autonomy. At the same time, China’s strategic nuclear force affects
cost-benefit calculations of regional players, such as the United States and
Japan, as they contemplate intervention. In theory, Washington policy
makers would be less likely to intervene if the risks of escalation were
high. Beijing has a no-first-use policy, but regional actors cannot be
assured that Beijing would not use nuclear weapons to retaliate against
foreign intervention, particularly if that intervention involved strikes
against military targets on the mainland opposite Taiwan.
SRBMs, combined with certain types of countermeasures, present
Taiwan’s missile defense planners with significant challenges. The
potential for large raid sizes; the short flight time of SRBMs (approximately 7
minutes for the 600 kilometer DF-15); and wide range of attack
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azimuths would stress any missile defense architecture.
Despite these challenges, Taiwan’s interest in ballistic missile defenses
can be expected to grow with the threat. A modest missile defense
architecture could reduce the effectiveness of limited PRC use of
ballistic missiles in a coercive air campaign. In addition to land and seabased lower tier systems, the deployment of conventional MRBMs and
extended range SRBMs in significant numbers likely will drive
Taiwan’s interest in sea-based mid-course missile defense and THAAD.
However, to defend against large-scale raids, exclusive reliance on
active missile defenses will be insufficient to offset the overwhelming
advantages Beijing holds with its expanding arsenal of ballistic missiles. As
a result, Taiwan can be expected to adopt asymmetrical approaches to
augment active missile defenses. These include passive defense
measures to complicate targeting and enhancing its ability to sustain or
reconstitute operations after a first strike. Even more important, Taiwan
force planners can be expected to invest in active defense measures,
such as suppression of enemy air defenses and interdiction operations
that would target critical nodes with a conventional ballistic missile
organization.120
The PRC is concerned about U.S. plans to deploy a global missile
defense architecture. PRC observers understand that the United States,
should it so choose, has the ability over the longer term to develop a
robust, layered global missile defense architecture that could challenge
the viability of China’s deterrent. To ensure the viability of its deterrent,
Beijing is in the midst of a long-term program to upgrade its strategic
nuclear force, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. MIRVing and
success in fielding missile defense countermeasures would be factors in
the ultimate size of the force. Beijing has the ability to influence the
nature and scope of future U.S. Missile defense development, as well as
the transfer of those systems to allies and friends such as Taiwan. The
scope of a future U.S. Missile defense architecture has not been
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determined yet. Positive steps that Beijing could take to moderate
development, deployment, and transfer of U.S. Missile defenses include a
reduction in PLA missile deployments opposite Taiwan and
cooperation in limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery.
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CHAPTER 6
CHINESE REACTIONS TO NEW U.S.
INITIATIVES ON MISSILE DEFENSE
Eric A. McVadon

INTRODUCTION
The author of this chapter describes and analyzes Chinese views of
U.S. Missile defense initiatives, based largely on interviews, meetings,
lectures, and conversations with various Chinese officials, People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) officers, think tankers, academics, and other
strategic studies and security specialists in China.1 The core research was
done during 3 weeks on the mainland in July and October 2001, plus other
meetings held and materials obtained in the weeks before and after
those visits. In general, it was not necessary to raise the missile issue with
Chinese interlocutors; there was eagerness among these Chinese contacts to
address the topic, describe Chinese positions, and raise questions. Given
the similarity of many of the responses, it was clear that the topic has
received ample attention, that the same material had been read all over
China, and that there was universal support among officials and
academics for the central objections to U.S. Missile defense initiatives,
albeit with interesting modifications.

PRC VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES IN MID-2001
Some observers in the United States have concluded that 2001 is a bad
year for U.S.-China relations, that Washington’s drive toward missile
defense and more arms for Taiwan, coup led with many other bilateral
strains, has left Beijing unready, even unwilling, to deal with
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Washington. Chinese observers have a different view. Chinese diplomats
in Washington asserted as early as the spring of 2001 that Beijing is, at the
outset of the George W. Bush presidency, exercising restraint and being
accommodating—despite many U.S. administration statements,
including those on missile defense, that might be considered offensive to
China.
The frequently expressed hope was that the anticipated meeting between
Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bush in Beijing, coincident with the AsiaPacific Economic Council (APEC) session in Shanghai in October 2001,
would result in much enhanced understanding and a steadily improving
bilateral relationship. This expectation was particularly evident among
interlocutors in China in July and encompassed a publicly expressed
willingness, even desire, to discuss missile defense issues. This was in
contrast to an earlier Chinese attitude of making righteous public
pronouncements in opposition to missile defense programs but largely
avoiding serious discussion, especially any form of discussion that would
suggest Chinese behavior might be the subject of legitimate concern or
reproach. As a consequence of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon, the Beijing meeting between Bush and
Jiang did not occur, and missile defense was not prominent in their brief
talks in Shanghai on the periphery of the APEC forum.
Amid this alleged Chinese willingness to accommodate2 and to await
patiently the outcome of what is seen as a developing U.S. policy for
China (and, more broadly, for Asia), there were seeming contradictions.
These contradictions prominently included the arrests and trials (and
subsequent deportations) of ethnic Chinese scholars with American
connections, the continuing harsh crackdown on the Falun Gong
movement, the sharp Chinese reaction to the reductions of military-tomilitary contacts initiated by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2001, and
the handling of the April 2001 downing of the U.S. EP-3 surveillance
aircraft. These topics could not be addressed fruitfully by the author in
most open discussions in mid-2001; however, points were made by the
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Chinese, mostly in private discussions, that these should be understood
as exceptional situations and kept in context (the Chinese context, of
course). The Chinese side, they suggested, did not link these events to
the Bush administration policy toward China or missile defense
initiatives; and it was hoped that an American understanding of the
factors involved would ensure that discussions of missile defense issues
would not be prejudiced by these unrelated events.
The implications were that these events reflected three primarily domestic
factors:
1. An obsession with the Taiwan issue that overrides considerations of how it
might affect relations with the United States. The state security organs had
doggedly sunk their teeth into the issue of scholars “misusing” information
about the mainland, especially in such matters as making comparisons
with Taiwan society and the like. In a written response to questions
submitted to Jiang by the New York Times, it was asserted that the scholars
were “members of Taiwan espionage organizations” and had “engaged in
spy activities on many occasions on the mainland of China.”3 Discretion
overrode valor for those Chinese officials who recognized the negative
effects on China of such actions. Moreover, American reactions to the
detentions and trials were not given high priority in evaluating the crusade;
the audience for the actions was the body of ethnic Chinese scholars
abroad who are inclined to undertake such work—and the Chinese
public. As Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, said after meeting with Jiang and other officials at
Beidaihe in August 2001,” They [the Chinese] are sending a not-sosubtle message. You [Americans] have a problem with [Chinese actions
toward] Pakistan, with Iran; we have a problem with [American actions
toward] Taiwan.” Biden said Jiang appeared preoccupied with the fate of the
island Beijing regards as a rebel province.4
2. Paranoia about the Falun Gong on the part of Jiang. Jiang, personally,
was still firmly convinced that the regime was threatened by the Falun Gong
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“cult,” and no one with influence thought it prudent or useful to try to
convince him of the counterproductive character of the actions; moreover,
the campaign to discredit the movement and persuade the Chinese people of
its evil nature was, indeed, succeeding—so why relent now?5
3. Insecurity of Jiang about his future, especially as Chairman of the CMC.
Jiang, although misled by the military as to the antecedent and
proximate causes and circumstances of the collision between the PLA
Navy F-8 and the U.S. Navy EP-3, did not think it prudent to take on the
PLA leadership about the post-accident events or the their anger about the
military relationship machinations by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld. Jiang was reluctant to ignore their ranting against the United
States because this might complicate his expected retention of the position
as Chairman of the Central military Commission after his upcoming
retirement from the positions of President of China and Communist
Party General Secretary. Thus avoiding confrontation with the military
leadership is a major part of Jiang’s effort to ensure that he retains an
influential position and protects his aspiration to gain “paramount leader”
status comparable to that enjoyed by Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. He,
consequently, was not inclined to confront the military, and in both
instances let the PLA have its way.
In short, these events that seemed to be avoidable incidents, almost
gratuitously harming the relationship with the United States, were
characterized by the Chinese as Jiang and others playing primarily to
domestic—not international—audiences. There is another important
aspect to this somewhat oblique explanation of contradictory conduct
offered by Chinese specialists. These complications in the relationship were
not in any way a reaction to U.S. missile defense initiatives, neither those
against long-range nuclear missiles nor short-range conventional
missiles, according to these Chinese sources.

China is the Target of Nuclear missile Defense.
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Chinese specialists suggest that, indeed, their government is taking
a measured, reasonable approach to U.S. missile defense initiatives. They
do, nevertheless, argue, rather righteously (as usual), that U.S. statements
about national missile defenses not being intended for use against
China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force are not credible.
One interlocutor pointed out that China has been a factor in U.S.
concerns about defending itself against or deterring missile attacks since
the middle of the last century. Moreover, most Chinese experts do not
take seriously the expressions of U.S. concerns about missile threats from
the “rogue states,” arguing generally that North Korean missile forces are
not now, and will not become, significant, and that North Korea and
other rogue nations have been and will continue to be deterred by the
overwhelming U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities.
The geography of the proposed defense sites (in Alaska) seems to the
Chinese to be a placement specifically chosen to protect the United States
against China’s long-range missiles—which they term a minimal
deterrent arsenal. Based on the prevalent Chinese assertion that North Korea
is not a real present or potential threat to the United States, the argument
that the placement is to defend against a Pyongyang threat is discounted,
even scorned. The Chinese believe firmly and state publicly what several
hawkish Americans have stated (some more publicly than others):
Regardless of what is said, China is the target of U.S. missile defenses. If the
United States succeeds in developing a small interceptor force,
Washington will inexorably move to a larger, more capable force, they
assert. Less loudly spoken is that Beijing does not trust Washington as a
world player with such a force any more than Washington trusts Beijing
with its small (but probably increasing) and obsolescent (but
modernizing) ICBM arsenal, allegedly useful only as a deterrent.
It all depends on Washington, as the Chinese see it. In the eyes of the Chinese,
much of the to-and-fro on the missile defense issue depends on the
state of the bilateral relationship and the degree of mutual trust, a
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factor that could erode badly, remain stagnant, or improve
significantly. They consider that the quality of the relationship
depends almost wholly on Washington’s thinking and actions. From their
perspective, an important factor is whether Washington has, indeed, made, or
is in the process of making, a fundamental change in its strategic outlook
with respect to China. A prominent Chinese thinker in talks in Washington in
early summer 2001 opined that he thought his government had taken a waitand-see attitude. For him and others, there is the hope that the U.S. adheres to a
one-China policy and that the bilateral relationship returns to a less
bumpy track, but there is no conclusion yet. The apparent warming of
Sino-U.S. relations after September 11 and the cordial, if truncated,
Bush-Jiang meeting in Shanghai, have most Chinese wondering if the
enhanced relationship will persist or return to bickering over the same old
disputes as time passes.
In mid-2001 another Chinese strategist and specialist in American studies
described two schools of thought in China on U.S. Strategy. One is the
conviction that U.S. strategy is “aimed at China.” The other is that U.S.
strategy is more globally directed (aimed at much more than China). He
noted that, predating Bush administration pronouncements, President
William Clinton had stated the U.S. shift to a focus on Asia. These and
other such arguments made by other interlocutors seemed to hold out the
prospect that U.S. policy for China and Asia was not yet in concrete, and that
it was still in the process of formulation, implying an opportunity for
those in Beijing and elsewhere to influence it. This, coup led with the events
in September and October, encourage Beijing’s hopes that, despite U.S.Russian deal-making, it has not been relegated to an altogether passive role
on the missile defense issue.
A well-connected academic remarked that hearing U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell and Rumsfeld talk about issues relating to China or
about which China was concerned was like listening to two governments.
He made this observation on the day that Powell arrived in Beijing in July
2001 to prepare for the meeting between the two presidents, then 3
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months in the future. The Chinese are convinced that they have taken the
rational position, and that it is the Bush administration, in its early
pronouncements about favoring Japan and Taiwan and being firmer on
China, that was producing uncertainty and instability in the bilateral
relationship—and could return to that once Beijing’s support is seen as no
longer needed in the war on terrorism. Furthermore, the Chinese do not
believe that their conduct warrants such harsh treatment and insulting
affronts by Washington. They refuse, for example, to recognize that
Beijing’s firm position on the Taiwan problem including its refusal to
renounce the use of force, plus other issues such as human rights, makes
Washington conclude that Beijing is the culprit.
CHINESE REACTION TO DEFENSES AGAINST ICBMS (NMD)
Although the Bush administration has merged the concepts of
national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) into
the common term missile defense system (MDS)6, China’s reactions can
best be described and analyzed while preserving the distinction of defenses
against ICBMs and defenses against short-range and medium-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs). For the most part, China, while
acknowledging the blurring of the distinction, continues to object to the
two in different ways and on different grounds, and there are also specific
objections to the concept of MDS—the merging of the two concepts into
some sort of layered defense of wide areas.

Measured Chinese Opposition.
Beijing is not ranting about NMD. It is not using alarmist
expressions and is not engaging in name-calling, as it so often does on
other issues—and as it did earlier on this one. There is little, if any, rhetorical
excess, as was the case in the fall of 2000 when the Defense White Paper
described the Taiwan issue as “complicated and grim.” Absent in

174

missile defense discussions are the term shegemonism and power politics,
and the accusations, like those from the White Paper, that “certain big
powers are pursuing ‘neo-interventionism’ [and] neo-gunboat
diplomacy.” In Jiang’s written responses to the New York Times questions
in August 2001, the points on missile defense are only that (1) China does
not favor the proposed U.S. move that it fears would jeopardize strategic
stability, (2)it wishes to discuss solutions that would not harm the security
of any side, and(3) China needs to maintain the effectiveness of its “selfdefense” nuclear force.7

NMD Can be Overwhelmed or Defeated.
That was the tone struck by Chinese interlocutors. In June, a
prominent Chinese think tanker went so far as to suggest (a bit
simplistically) that China could tolerate ten interceptor missiles because
that would not defeat China’s 20 ICBMs and that China could, in any
case, build additional ICBMs in the 10 or more years before such a system
could be deployed—if it works. On the matter of NMD efficacy, many
Chinese specialists think that it will not work and that it certainly will not
work soon. Several referred to NMD as Great Wall or Maginot Line
thinking. A PLA general officer, who is considered a strategic thinker,
commented on the analogy that missile defense is a train that has already
left the station. He said that might be true but that the tracks are not yet
complete; effective missile defense, in his view, simply may not be feasible,
especially in the short term.

NMD Will Cost a Lot and Not Work.
Some put a positive spin (for China) on this argument, suggesting that
China will not follow the Soviet example of reaction to President Ronald
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) but could
easily maintain sufficient missiles to overcome the defenses while the
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United States expends enormous resources on its ineffective obsession.
China, they say, will increase and improve its ICBM arsenal, but U.S.
NMD will not be a central impetus for that undertaking because NMD is not
expected to work very well. Some Chinese go so far as to argue that fewer
resources than planned need now to be expended on ICBM modernization
because NMD, by whatever name, will not be effective, that minor offensive
changes will continue to overcome difficult defensive modifications.
The PLA general officer strategist, when pressed, tempered his
argument a bit. He said that although effective missile defenses may be
infeasible, if the technology is present, they would be built; no American
president could refuse to do so. However, he forecast that NMD could not
be developed before the end of this decade, so China has time to ensure
its nuclear forces are effective. It is, of course, hard to determine if this
theme of NMD ineffectiveness is mouthed in order to discourage its
development or because the Chinese have, indeed, convinced themselves
that it will not work. The latter seems most likely.

No Nuclear Arms Race.
China, it was said, does not want to expend resources on building up a
much larger ICBM force; it wants both economic development and a
deterrent. That combination seems feasible to the Chinese specialists. A
PLA general officer suggested that China’s response would be
proportional and would not result in an arms race or even a priority item in
the Chinese defense budget. China, he said, would do extra things, but
just enough; it would not go overboard. Others said China would not
react strongly to NMD and would not build a large number of missiles.
Nuclear weapons, one civilian specialist argued, are just for deterrence,
not real weapons. China will not waste its resources on a useless
system.
There has a bit of gloating among some of the specialists that the United
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States would likely proceed headlong and spend an enormous amount of
money on a system not likely to work and that, putting a finer point on
earlier arguments, offensive missiles and imaginative penetration
techniques were far easier and cheaper to devise and produce than
defensive missiles and complex target discrimination technologies.
However, none of the interlocutors, even in response to provocative
questioning, took a position that the United States would rue the day it
undertook NMD against the wise and wily Chinese, or anything
resembling that position. Other threats and bluster were not offered. The
tone of the conversations resembled that taken by Sha Zukang, Director
of the Arms Control Department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in
March 2001 when he said that, even if NMD were developed by the United
States, China would not necessarily take radical steps such as
withdrawing from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [implying also
ending its moratorium on nuclear weapon testing], as had been
threatened previously.8

NMD Would Reduce Security.
Instead, the gentler suggestion was made often that the United States
and China might both be less secure as a result of NMD. The general
officer strategist and a civilian specialist in Beijing said China is concerned
about the ramifications for outer space, fearing a U.S. move to put missile
defenses in space would invite others to employ weapons in space or to
react unpredictably to one country’s “weaponizing space.” In the short
term, there would be an increase in the capability of the United States to
defend itself; but in the long term the United States will “repent.” The
general went on to argue that the United States spent many years building a
nonproliferation regime and now seems to be throwing all that away
and inviting proliferation. The crux of his argument was that the
national security of one country cannot be based on increased
insecurity of others, and that absolute security cannot be achieved.
Defenses, he suggested, sometimes invite proliferation rather than stop it.
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As did others, he pointed the finger at countries other than China,
forecasting that, in reacting to U.S. missile defense, China will do just a
few things; others will do much more.
Others elaborated on this theme. An arms control specialist said
some countries would react to NMD by developing an improved
capability to penetrate defenses; others would turn to other methods of
delivery or to alternatives such as biological weapons. He then made a less
familiar argument. He said NMD would lead to a sense of false security. If it
were to work, the United States would feel secure against North Korea,
for example. Yet Washington would, in building missile defenses, not
only have further antagonized Pyongyang but also would have failed to
give the appropriate attention to resolving the underlying problems in
relations with North Korea—and probably further exacerbated them.
To bolster his argument, he said Pyongyang has reacted favorably to
overtures from Beijing and Moscow to curtail its missile program. A
tough message from Washington about missile defense would be
counterproductive, he argued. Almost in passing, he added that all this is
about a country that does not, in the view of China, pose a credible
nuclear missile threat to the United States—a country that wants and
needs better relations with the United States.9
A specialist in Beijing gave it a geopolitical twist. He said that if Bush’s
plan for missile defenses were completed, the world would be divided into
two parts: that covered by MDs, and that left uncovered. That returns us to a
bipolar world. The real security problems in the world are based on lack of
trust. MDs would exacerbate the underlying problem of lack of trust
between various countries and work counter to the concept of confidencebuilding measures (CBMs), he argued.

North Korea No Threat.
As mentioned previously, the Chinese argue frequently and with
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conviction that North Korea is not now, and will not become, a threat to
the United States. As one civilian specialist put it, North Korea’s territory is
too small to develop a nuclear weapon system that would include
launching facilities, force protection, etc. North Korea cannot develop
the technology to get missiles even to the western United States, he
asserted. In any event, North Korea could only launch, not survive; it
would be a real suicide, he said emphatically. Several others pointed out
that North Korea’s failure to initiate military action over half-acentury makes the point that the leaders in Pyongyang are not irrational.
Chinese press this argument about the lack of credible threat from
North Korea in significant measure to support their belief that U.S.
defenses against ICBMs are ultimately intended to negate China’s nuclear
deterrent.

Piling On.
One gains the sense in talking to Chinese specialists on the missile
defense issue that a great deal of time has been spent contriving and
cataloguing arguments against missile defenses, apparently in the belief
that the number of arguments made will count in the debate. As an example,
a think tanker in Beijing said that China is worried about the prospect of an
arms race but not between China and the United States. He feared that,
if the United States builds missile defenses, other countries could build
up their missile forces in response and then later could turn those
missiles on China, or at least those missiles would be a threat to China.
Nevertheless, most of the arguments offered are along similar lines and
often employ precisely the same words and phrases, such as the
comparison of NMD with the Great Wall and the Maginot Line mentioned
previously. At a minimum, one must conclude that the specialists have
all read the same material or heard the same spiel.
The Second-Strike Issue.
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Two quite different views were offered (quite clinically) by two
interlocutors on the issue of Chinese interest in a second-strike
capability (after an initial U.S. nuclear strike on China). A Chinese
strategist speaking (not for attribution) here in the United States said that
China needs a second-strike capability—in addition to the ability to
overwhelm a U.S. defense against ICBMs.10 A Beijing civilian specialist
suggested it was all moot. He argued privately (and gravely) that
Chinese leaders would be unable to find a single major American city
where close relatives of important Chinese leaders do not now live. He
concluded on that basis that there is no realistic utility to China’s ICBMs;
they have only deterrent value, no real value as weapons. This was
offered, not frivolously, but as a serious appraisal. He also noted that the
United States had, for very different reasons, elected not to use nuclear
weapons in Korea in 1953, suggesting that neither country has the stomach
to employ them.

THE ABMTREATY ISSUE
Most of the interlocutors predicted, in one way or another, that
Moscow would not, in the end, stand firmly with China on the matter of
opposition to any meddling with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty
that might permit missile defenses desired by Washington but
prohibited by the treaty. At least as early as June 2001, a prominent
specialist said that he expected Russia to concede its opposition to NMD
and that China should be ready to go its own way. A civilian specialist
in Beijing, noting that Russia must for economic reasons reduce the
size of its nuclear arsenal, said in advance of the July 2001 Putin-Bush
meeting in Genoa that Russia would compromise on the ABM Treaty
issue. He explained further that on a scale of 1-10 Russia was at 10 in its
concern about NMD and 5 about TMD; China was at 5 on NMD and 10 on
TMD. He translated that into an expectation that Moscow would
compromise with Washington and enter into some form of cooperation
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on NMD and warhead numbers.
After Russian President Vladimir Putin stated publicly with Bush in
Genoa in late July 2001 that offensive missiles and missile defense would
be treated as a set, Chinese specialists uniformly took the position that we
were later to hear from Jiang in his New York Times interview: the
matter could be worked. Possibly their concern was less than most
American analysts expected, they expected that Putin had another card up
his sleeve, or Beijing decided to put the best face on their disappointment.
A retired senior PLA officer now with a strategic studies institute told a
small international audience in Hong Kong in very late July 2001 that he
had expected Russia to make a deal with the United States on the matter, or
at least thought it was possible. Not even the Bush-Putin November 2001
meeting on this issue seemed to discourage the Chinese.
A well-connected senior think tanker put it this way: China’s
preference was to stand solid with Russia in opposition to change to the
ABM Treaty that would permit NMD, but China had seen very early the
prospect for change in Russia’s position. He said that there are in this
matter “gray areas.” China, he asserted, could still work with Russia
and talk with the United States. Noting that China’s former principal arms
control official, Sha Zukang, has said he wants to discuss missile defense
with the United States, he said there could be talk on the “merits” of
missile defense and on overall relations; may be there is room for
maneuvering, he ruminated. He concluded with the hope that Jiang and
Bush, in Beijing in October 2001, would discuss the issue and find some
way out. Although that meeting did not take place, it still seems that Beijing
wants to finesse the issue, make the best of it, or at least not to give the
impression that China is panicky over the unfavorable development—whatever
precise form it may take as Bush and Putin continue to talk without a
representative from Beijing present.

CHINA’S VIEWS ON THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD)
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TMD to Protect U.S. Forces and Bases Is Okay.
Ambassador Sha Zukang, who has now left his post as China’s primary
arms control official, has for half a decade voiced his assertion that TMD
intended to shield U.S. forces and bases in Asia were understandable to
Beijing and would not draw a radical reaction from China. He has referred
to this as “pure” TMD, implying apparently that it did not involve Japan
or Taiwan or threaten Chinese strategic missiles. He repeated that
position in March 2001 in response to questioning about U.S. plans to
deploy systems to protect U.S. forces based in Asia. He said, “There is a gray
area here. China is not opposed to [theater missile defense]... To protect troops
and military bases.” Nothing has been heard from a successor on this
issue, affirming or denying the position. This may be in part because of the
uncertainty about where the U.S. TMD program is headed as major changes
are made in the overall U.S. missile defense program and Washington’s
attention and resources are concentrated on the war on terrorism.

For the Republic of Korea (ROK).
Chinese officials and specialists are generally relaxed about TMD
and South Korea because Seoul has, so far, chosen not to participate.
There is satisfaction among the Chinese that part of the reason Seoul does
not want to obtain a TMD system is that Koreans do not want to “poke China
in the eye.” South Koreans have expressed the view that TMD is not an
effective defense against their biggest concern: North Korean artillery and
other forces just north of Seoul, that the North Korean threat may in any case
go away, and that then the ROK would be stuck with a very expensive system
seemingly suitable only to defend against Chinese missiles. Chinese are not
giving much attention yetto the rumblings among some ROK military leaders
that it would be a mistake for them to get left behind in missile defense
technology—technology that many think will be an integral part of any
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modern armed force in coming decades.

For Japan.
China’s objections to TMD for Japan persist. Various concerns are
expressed with various degrees of seriousness.11 The earlier arguments that
TMD would provide a militaristic Japan with the shield behind which it could,
in a matter of months, develop and deploy nuclear missiles is heard
infrequently now. Nevertheless, there remain concerns that the technology
shared with Japan as a result of Japanese participation with the United States
on TMD research and development will aid a future Japanese ballistic missile
program. One specialist pointed out that Japanese Aegis-equipped ships
could be used in the Taiwan Strait, obviously thinking that he had made a
telling point which would cause even Americans to recoil at the very thought
of such a thing. The Chinese have been attentive to the Japanese sending of
destroyers to the Indian Ocean in noncombat support of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. At least in part because of this Chinese angst, Aegis-equipped
ships, although already a part of the Japanese maritime Self-Defense Force,
were not dispatched by Prime minister Junichiro Koizumi.
More generally, the Chinese argue that TMD is yet another American
mistake in dealing with Japan. Beijing argues that Japan is the real future
threat to regional stability and that the United States is aiding the potential
resurgence of Japanese militarism by many of the things it is doing to aid
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The aspect of the U.S.-Japan
alliance that has been seen as controlling Japan or curbing Japanese
militarism has led in the past to Chinese acceptance that the alliance was,
on balance, favorable for China, but TMD is seen as part of a shift toward
the alliance making the JSDF more capable and more likely to threaten
China, even to come to the support of Taiwan in some way in a conflict—
especially one with U.S. involvement.
Some Chinese interlocutors will acknowledge that the real root of their
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concern about TMD for Japan is that the Japanese, while wringing their
hands about North Korean Taepodong missiles, are actually looking
over their shoulders at Chinese missiles. The essence of the concern, then,
is that China wants to be able to hold at risk with its ballistic missiles Japan
and, of course, U.S. bases in Japan and yet does not want to make loud
public pronouncements to that effect. TMD for Japan would spoil that.

For Taiwan.
Beijing continues to express in the strongest term sits opposition to
TMD for Taiwan. It has said it will react harshly to the transfer of missile
defense from the United States to Taiwan. There has been no diminution
of this opposition to providing defenses for Taiwan, even as Beijing has seemed
to take a more measured outlook with respect to NMD. The drum beat has
intensified on the assertion that TMD for Taiwan is bad enough in itself
but that the introduction of real missile defense there will mean far
greater and closer coordination between the armed forces of the United
States and those of Taiwan. That is described as a greater concern by far than
the acquisition of the various TMD systems.
There is also in China now a more intense concern than expressed
previously about the prospect of the transfer of Patriot Advanced
Capability 3 (PAC-3) ground-based air and missile defenses to Taiwan.
This is the most likely real TMD that Taiwan might obtain, although it is
still a rudimentary capability against short-range ballistic missiles.
Previously, Chinese concerns over PAC-3 had been muted in favor of
decrying the prospective transfer of ships equipped with the U.S. Navy Aegis
air and missile defense system, a system that is expected eventually to have a
TMD capability. The Chinese are still more wrought up about Aegis
than PAC-3, but now both are of considerable concern.
A well-informed Chinese think tanker has suggested that the
deployment (already) by China of 300 or more short-range ballistic
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missiles (SRBMs) in Fujian, with about 50 more missiles coming each year,
might be stopped or reversed were Taiwan to accept the one-China principle.
(He went on to say that Beijing could not now make such a move because it
would redound to the benefit of current Taiwan President Chen Shuibian and aid his political party, the hated Democratic Progressive Party
[DPP].13) Furthermore, other Chinese interlocutors now at least accept the
fact that these missiles threatening Taiwan are indeed being deployed by
their military. They now assert that all should understand that the
purpose of these missiles is only for deterrence of a Taiwan move toward
autonomy, not for use as weapons. Previously, even senior PLA officers
have often denied the missile deployments or refused to discuss the
subject. They simply said that every thing concerning Taiwan was purely
an internal affair. It is not that these developments signal that a
solution to the issue is at hand, but at least, when conditions for removing
missiles are raised and the fact of deployments by the hundreds is
acknowledged, the prospects for reasonable discussion and even
negotiation are enhanced.

Might the Door be Open a Crack?
Because of the intertwining of TMD and Taiwan, Beijing’s concerns
about TMD clearly exceed those about NMD. Nonetheless, Chinese
official and unofficial spokesmen, as has been described, have at least
acknowledged that TMD for U.S. forces in Asia is reasonable and that
their SRBMs threatening Taiwan exist and are part of the problem and an
element in its possible solution.
CHINESE REACTIONS TO THE MERGING OF NMD AND TMD INTO
MDS
Chinese Confusion: Real or Feigned?
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There is among Chinese specialists confusion (or professed
confusion) about the Bush administration’s merging of NMD and
TMD. Beyond the uncertainty, acknowledged by Rumsfeld, about just
what the new concept of a missile defense system (MDS) implies,14 the
Chinese ask questions about Japan and Taiwan. Does MDs means that the
Japanese TMD cooperation with the United States would have, as part of
MDS, an NMD component against China’s long-range missiles? Others
raised the issue of whether PAC-3 would then be a part of MDS, thinking
that it was absolute anathema to any logical person to suggest that
Taiwan (which may get PAC-3) could be a part of MDS. Underlying many
of the concerns expressed was the profound worry: beyond the direct
implications for China’s ICBM force, would Taiwan be construed as
part of MDS, meaning an even greater degree of coordination between U.S.
and Taiwan armed forces? It is difficult at this early stage in the “MDS
merger” to ascertain the degree to which the Chinese confusion is real or
whether the MDS matter is being used as a peg on which to hang more Chinese
arguments against missile defenses and to offer up more concerns
about Taiwan.
MDS Could Negate All China’s Ballistic Missile Arsenals.
There is inherent in this inchoate MDS concept the specter of a world
wide system, including sea-based and land-based interceptor missiles of
various sorts and an airborne laser (to kill missiles in their boost-phase
ascent), that would put in jeopardy China’s ICBM deterrent arsenal, its
SRBMs, and even medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Powell’s
visit to Beijing in late July 2001 did not assuage Chinese concerns on this
issue. His arguments that the U.S. missile defense system would be
limited and no threat to Chinese long-range missiles was, for the Chinese,
drowned out by noises from elsewhere outside (but close to) the
administration that send other signals and the silence within the
administration, based on acknowledged uncertainty, about how the
concept will evolve.
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The Taiwan Complication.
A young researcher at a strategic institute in Shanghai summed up the
Chinese view of MDS: the Bush administration’s blurring of NMD and
TMD is apparently a program to cover more countries with a missiledefense blanket. This complicates the Chinese view of missile defense
with respect to Taiwan and gives China more reason to object to any form
of missile defense for Taiwan. This is not a positive development from
the Chinese military view point. Coupled with the announced U.S. focus on
Asia, this will give Chinese hard-liners a stronger argument. As with other
arguments concerning Taiwan, the speaker considered that his point had
been made tellingly when he said even Taiwan might be protected by MDS.

THE CHINESE DESIRE OR WILLINGNESS TO TALK ABOUT MISSILE
DEFENSE ISSUES
For some American observers, it appears that Beijing and Washington
are so firmly entrenched in mutually irreconcilable positions that there
might seem to be no hope for negotiation of a positive outcome or any
other form of resolution. Yet Sha, then head of the arms control
department of the Chinese MFA, in March 2001 agreed to talks on NMD
that he hoped would “narrow... differences,” and he welcomed Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly to Beijing in May. In Kelly’s departure
statement after those talks, he said he had explained the overall American
strategy, and that there was agreement to a continuing dialogue.
Beijing wants Both Economic Progress and Deterrence.
Although this statement by Kelly may have had an understandably
optimistic tilt, there are other positive signs. As is well known, China is
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already testing a modern ICBM, the DF-31, to replace its obsolescent
DF-5A force, but Beijing does not want to expend the resources to build
hundreds of missiles (enough to overcome any NMD envisioned) or to
greatly improve its missiles to make them less vulnerable to intercept. As
alluded to previously, a responsible Chinese specialist on this issue has
suggested that Beijing might be able to tolerate the 10 NMD interceptors
recently mentioned by Rumsfeld, but that China could not tolerate 250
interceptor missiles. According to Chinese sources, when Kelly met Sha,
Sha did not indicate a readiness to compromise so far; however, if
China’s core interest is respected “to some extent,” China may be flexible,
according to this well-informed security specialist. China, it was
suggested, wants both economic development [unfettered by a need for a
large nuclear buildup] and to maintain a deterrent. This speculative
tidbit about possible Chinese compromise is certainly not a breakthrough,
but it does reflect, it seems, a desire by China to talk and offers
Washington a bit of negotiating room.
The talks with Kelly were viewed in China as successful only in that they
held out the promise of further talks. The Chinese were apparently unhappy
at the level of seniority—an assistant secretary rather than the deputy
secretary of state who had visited other Asian countries (and Australia) on the
tour that included Kelly. It was noted that Bush administration very
senior people talk to Russia and other countries, as did the Clinton
administration; but that there had been, as of mid-July 2001, no such talks
with China. An arms control specialist pointed out bluntly that Bush has
personally spoken to other presidents on missile defense(by phone and in
person, he volunteered), but he had not, to that point, spoken to Jiang on that
topic. Yet Powell was in Beijing in late July, he reported that, although
missile defense was a major agenda item for his session with Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan, there had been no in-depth discussion about
missile defense. The Chinese had only “listened and responded with a
question or two.”15
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Chinese Suggestions about Missile-Defense Talks with the United
States.
In any event, the Chinese were, in the weeks preceding the expected
Bush-Jiang October meeting, indicating a readiness to talk and making
suggestions about how that might proceed. They now have the prospect of a
summit in 2002, and the prospect that Sino-U.S. relations may be much
improved over early 2001. The arms control specialist in Beijing explained
what Americans should understand before the United States talks to
China on the missile defense issue. He said that Americans need to
understand more fully the Chinese political situation. Jiang has to
contend with pressure from public opinion. He has to convince the
Chinese people and the Chinese media16 that the United States is not to be
feared.
He then suggested that, in developing an agenda for talks, it is important
for China to know what form of missile defense the United States
contemplates because missile defenses are seen in China as a form of U.S.
hegemony. Next, talks should turn to the threat missiles pose to the United
States and to China and Russia. Options other than missile defenses that
could reduce the threat should be discussed, as well as options with
respect to the issue of the ABM Treaty.17 Then, options for missile defense
systems to be deployed would be appropriately discussed. He added that,
in the Chinese view, there is now no real threat that warrants a national
missile defense.
Viewed cynically, this carefully laid out proposal for an agenda
illustrates that what China, in the view of this well-informed specialist
in Beijing, wants to do is force the United States to describe the concept in
at least some detail, talk about options other than missile defense to cope
with the threat, and then argue that national missile defense is neither
needed nor appropriate and that abandoning the ABM Treaty is unwise.
Another interlocutor suggested that the United States and China
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should begin now to exchange views at other than the very senior level,
that an early diverse dialogue would be beneficial. He said that it is
important to find a way to discuss missile defense issues seriously at
senior levels, expert levels, and in Track 2 (nongovernmental
channels) or other such unofficial venues. His reasoning was that, if
the United States deploys missile defenses, China would have to increase
the number and quality of its nuclear forces. The United States should
use all these diverse opportunities to persuade China that NMD is not
intended against China. [This suggestion by a somewhat senior PLA
reserve officer at a strategic institute is noteworthy primarily because he
was the only specialist who seemed to take seriously the U.S. position
that missile defenses are not ultimately intended to be able to defeat
China’s ICBM force.]

Does China Want to Share in Missile Defense?
On the issue of the Americans possibly offering to share missile
defense technology with China, there were two divergent views: An
arms control specialist at a Beijing institute opined that China may, contrary
to previous positions, be interested in having the United States share missile
defense technology with China. China is concerned that the United States may
react to a Chinese attack on Taiwan with a first strike, and that the United
States could then defeat a Chinese retaliatory strike with its missile defenses.
He rushed to add that he did not consider the scenario realistic, but that such
theoretical scenarios were the stuff of arms control strategic thinking.
The other view was offered by a civilian specialist and former diplomat
associated with the State Council. Chinese officials, he said, think that the
United States is not inclined to share missile-defense technology with China
but believe the United States is more likely to share that technology with
Russia. Moreover, he asserted, the examples of disaster with military
technology transfers from the United States in 1989, after events at
Tiananmen Square, serve as a lesson for Chinese who might consider a
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program of U.S. transfer of important technology. After more than a decade,
the Tiananmen sanctions are still in place. China cannot risk cooperation with
the United States, he stated flatly and without acrimony.
China Wants to be Heard.
An arms control specialist who is currently working on precisely the topic
of how China should react to the Bush administration missile defense issues
made a hopeful observation. He said that, propitiously, there have been no
final decisions yet by the United States on missile defense. He expects [or may
be hopes and is, in effect, making a plea to Americans to whom he talks] the
United States to talk to China and not present China with a fait accompli on
the issue. It is not good, he said plaintively, for Americans to say that missile
defenses will be deployed regardless of the views of others, “no matter
what.” A senior and well-connected figure at a prestigious think tank
summed up China’s reaction to the Bush program saying that China wants to
talk more on missile defense issues and wants the United States to leave
room in its policy formulation for the legitimate concerns of China.
China, he reminded, has small but “legitimate” nuclear forces. If MDS
works and these forces are neutralized, what is China to do? he asked,
apparently rhetorically, seeming to know that there would be no answer
forthcoming.
Nurture the Good or Attack the Bad?
Professor Yang Jiemian at the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies used the analogy of western and Chinese medicines in
explaining his view of how Beijing and Washington approach the missile
defense issue and the root problem of the threat of missile attacks. He
said Western medicine is like missile defense in that it vigorously
attacks a specific aspect of the problem, concentrating potent, even
dangerous, medication or therapy on a certain component of the situation
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that seems to be producing the symptoms. By contrast, Chinese medicine
more broadly attempts to nourish the positive aspects of a situation to
create steady improvements that overcome or resolve the narrow problem and
prevent its recurrence.

Prognosis.
It was made quite clear that a central theme of any discussions the
United States may have with China on missile defenses will be the
Chinese conviction or assertion that such a protective shield, even if
successful technologically and militarily, will ill serve the overarching
security interests of the United States, its allies and friends, and China. If
Washington wishes to respond to that criticism, the reply would probably
begin with an argument that the United States can find a way to have
adequate missile defenses and, at the same time, improve or sustain its
bilateral and multilateral relation ships and demonstrate that it will not
be hegemonic. That argument would almost certainly fall on deaf ears,
because the Chinese have convinced themselves that missile defenses are
“false security,” counterproductive, and even obstacles to resolving
international security problems; many Chinese strategists have also convinced
themselves that the United States increasingly acts in an interventionist and
hegemonic fashion.
Nonetheless, it appears that, if desired by Washington, there is a real
prospect of having meaningful discussions with China on missile defenses
because Beijing is sending the clear signal that it is willing to talk—or at the
very least that it wants to be heard. It will be left to the patience and skill of the
negotiators and to other unpredictable factors whether avenues for progress
and understanding will open during the talks, if they are held, or whether both
sides will simply bog down in their deeply rutted tracks—or may be they
should be termed “preset trajectories.”
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ENDNOTES- CHAPTER 6
1. Although it is not appropriate to mention the individual
interlocutors, spokesmen, and questioners, the organizations
represented in the discussions included: in Beijing, the Division of Arms
Control and Security Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR), the Institute for Strategic Studies at the
PLA National Defense University, the School of International Studies
American Studies Center at Beijing University, and the Institute of
world Development of the State Council of the PRC, Institute of
American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); in
Harbin, the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences; in
Shanghai, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS),
Shanghai Institute for East Asian Studies, and the Shanghai Center for
Rimpac Strategic and International Studies; in Hangzhou, Zhejiang
Academy of Social Science; in Guangzhou, Center for Asia Pacific
Studies (CAPS) and Institute of Southeast Asia Studies of Zhongshan
University, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Jinan University, and
the Institute of International Studies of the Guangzhou Academy of
Social Sciences; in Xiamen, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of
Xiamen University. Additionally, the topic was discussed extensively at
the three-day 2001 Hong Kong Convention of International Studies
sponsored by the International Studies Association (ISA) and the
University of Hong Kong, 26-28 July.
2. There was more than rhetoric to the Chinese assertion that,
despite affronts by the Bush administration, China would turn the other
cheek. For example, Chinese officials announced in early August 2001
that China would buy 36 Boeing 737 jetliners that could be worth up to $2
billion. Martin Fackler, “China Airlines to Buy Boeing Jets,” Associated
Press wire report, August 9, 2001. In contrast to this announcement,
China has in the past made decisions not to buy American commercial
aircraft to demonstrate its annoyance with Washington’s actions on
various matters. China quickly offered its support of the U.S. response to
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the September 2001 terrorist attacks. This likely stemmed from both a
desire to enhance bilateral relations, express outrage at the attacks, and
gain U.S. support (or at least more understanding and acceptance of
China’s problems with terrorism in Xinjiang—where it has long warned
of the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism).
3. "Jiang’s Responses to Questions Submitted Prior to Interview,”
New York Times, August 10, 2001.
4. Jeremy Page, “China’s Jiang Preoccupied with Taiwan—U.S.
Senator,” Reuters wire report, Beijing, August 9, 2001.
5. “Jiang’s Responses to Questions Submitted Prior to Interview.”
Jiang asserted in the written response to a New York Times question that
the Falun Gong did not have the capacity to be a serious threat to China.
In defending his harsh crackdown, he focused on the harm that Falun
Gong does to its followers and Chinese society. The tone and intensity of
the response tends to confirm, despite the defensive words to the
contrary, that Jiang is, indeed, irrationally fearful of the power of the
Falun Gong organization. It also reflects his apparent belief that his
anticult campaign is working, having the desired effect, so that the Chinese
people are convinced the Falun Gong is an evil cult that does harm and
should be eliminated by government action.
6. The abbreviation MDS (missile defense system, implying a
merging by the Bush administration of various elements of missiles
defenses so as to provide layered, wide protection) should not be
confused with the abbreviation GMDS (ground-based mid-course
defense segment), roughly synonymous with the earlier term NMD—
knocking down ICBMs after boost phase and before re-entry, roughly
put. Some, seeing the letters GMDS, have assumed incorrectly that it meant
global missile defense system.
7. Questions are asked about why China is concerned about U.S.
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NMD if it does not intend to launch those missiles against U.S. targets.
Chinese might ask the same question about the United States and its ICBM
arsenal. Most Americans would answer as the Chinese do: we have no
intention of attacking any country with nuclear missiles, but we feel
we must maintain a deterrent force.
8. John Pomfret, “Beijing Eases Stand on Missile Defense,”
Washington Post, March 15, 2000, p. A21.
9. Given the tone of these arguments and private comments offered after
the terrorist attacks, it seems only a matter of time before the Chinese
will, gently or harshly—depending on the state of bilateral relations at
the time, suggest that missiles defenses would not have stopped the
September 11 attacks.
10. With the advent of the mobile, solid-fueled Dongfeng 31 ICBM, and
especially the anticipated longer-range follow-on version, the problem
of survivability of Chinese ICBMs (against a first strike) would seem to be
appreciably lessened. Beijing may feel adequately confident that at least
some of its ICBM arsenal would survive if they are not pinned to a fixed
(and probably known) location. Use of mobile decoys could, of course,
further complicate U.S. targeting.
11. For a detailed examination of China’s objection to ballistic
missile defense for Japan, see the recently published Michael D. Swaine,
et al., Japan and Ballistic missile Defense, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001, pp.
79-83.
12. Neither Aegis-equipped ships nor PAC-3 missiles have yet been
approved by the United States for transfer to Taiwan.
13. The Democratic Progressive Party of President Chen Shui-bian had
traditionally been known as a pro-independence party, although Chen has
not embraced that concept during his time in office.
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14. Vernon Loeb,” Rumsfeld in Moscow for Talks,” Washington Post,
August 13, 2001, p. A9. Rumsfeld acknowledged, as reported in this
article, Russian complaints that they did not understand the kind of
missile system envisioned by the Bush administration and was quoted as
saying, “It’s not knowable, what we’re going to deploy, because we’re in
a testing mode.”
15. U.S. State Department transcript of a press conference held by
Powell on July 29, 2001. The transcript was entitled “Sec. Powell
Outlines Results of visit to Asia-Pacific Region.”
16. He reduced his credibility a bit by explaining how independent
the Chinese media had become.
17. This arms control specialist raised a point that no one else
mentioned. He said that, rather than talk about abrogating or
modifying the ABM Treaty, unidentified Europeans are suggesting that it
would be preferable to try to impose some broad version of restrictions
on missiles, possibly something similar to MTCR. He went on to describe
it rather vaguely as an “international court” on missiles. The idea, it
seemed, would be the establishment of an international body to impose
restrictions or prohibitions on the development and deployment of
missiles. The concept, crudely put, was that, rather than building missile
defenses, missiles would be outlawed.
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CHAPTER 7
EASTASIANREACTIONS TO U.S. MISSILE
DEFENSE: TORN BETWEEN TACIT SUPPORT
AND OVERT OPPOSITION
Taeho Kim
In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States homeland, it is increasingly certain that the George W. Bush
administration’s initial policy priorities and future visions will go
through a reappraisal, readjustment, and reconfirmation. It is also true
that war in Afghanistan, together with the broader international
antiterrorist efforts, has significantly altered the administration’s
working definition of its friends and foes around the world—at least for
the time being. There is also little doubt that antiterrorism will remain a
priority agenda in future U.S. foreign policy.
It is equally likely, however, that given its recent origin and its varying
degrees of significance to other governments, the antiterrorism agenda
will be severely contested by other compelling U.S. priorities and budgetary
concerns that have been put on hold during the war in Afghanistan. The
Bush presidency’s initial policy priorities and future visions, albeit at a
reduced scale and a slower pace, will be back on the front burner sooner
rather than later.
Ranging from future national security threats to the United States
to the future possibility of armed conflict in international politics to U.S.
relationships with such major powers as Russia, China, and Japan,
they—if fully implemented—would have constituted a sharp departure
from those of the William Clinton presidency. In particular, the
administration strongly intended to not only slash the size of its nuclear
arsenal but also develop both defensive and offensive missile systems.
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Thus, missile defense (MD) stands tall as a premier defense issue in
the Bush administration’s larger “military transformation” with the basis
of defense planning now being shifted to a future “capability-based”
approach from the previous “threat-based” one.1 One of the key
questions for U.S. policy makers is how to mesh America’s MD program
with East Asian security—now in the larger context of international
antiterrorist efforts.
In this chapter, I argue that in light of the political sensitivities,
technological challenges, and budgetary constraints associated with
U.S. MD, as well as the diverse defense requirements of major East Asian
states, there is no such thing as a uniform, “one-size-fits-all” approach in
coupling American MD with East Asian security, and that those states, as the
MD issue inches toward the central place in their crowded security agenda,
are highly likely to take a bifurcated and polarized position with some
different nuances and shades—that is, between tacit support and overt
opposition.
At present and for the foreseeable future, no single regional security
issue seems more multifaceted and potentially divisive than MD. It
touches upon a variety of issue areas ranging from regional stability,
power balance among major states, and arms control to U.S. alliance ties.
As such, a great many factors intervene in each state’s calculus before any
actual MD deployment within the region, while an equally great number
of consequences are possible as well. To better understand the complex
calculations the regional states must factor in, it is necessary to identify
and prioritize some major variables that affect the debate and the likely
courses of action by individual regional states. At a minimum, four
major considerations stand out:
• Their primary sources of current and likely future threat and the
relative weight of MD in their security calculus;
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• The evolution of domestic politics and their relationships with the
United States, including an assessment of the latter’s future role in
and commitment to regional security;
• Technological feasibility and budgetary considerations as the MD
plan takes a more concrete shape in the years ahead; and,
• Possible reactions (either positive or negative) by neighboring states,
especially major powers, to their decision to develop and deploy MD.
Among the four, the first factor falls within the realm of reasonable
prediction, as it concerns geography, familiar threats, and the availability
of defense measures. Both lateral and vertical proliferation of missile
and other WMD technologies over the past decades have almost invariably
increased the need to deter this type of security threat. The domestic
variable is far more complex and more uncertain than the first factor and
involves many unknowns and unknowables down the road. The
relationship with the United States, which would normally be treated as
separate from domestic considerations, is often an issue of critical
importance in the vortex of politics in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as
all three depend to a varying extent on the United States for their security.
Regarding the third variable, a thick cloud of technical uncertainties
overshadow the MD architecture, especially national missile defense
(NMD), while Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the so-called economic
powerhouses, now look pale in the face of grim economic prospects. The
regional reactions, of which China’s appears the most important, are likely to
be mixed, complicated, and nested so that they may defy a simple
prediction, even if recent developments and existing trends are
extrapolated.
As befits a premier defense issue in the Bush administration’s
“military transformation,” MDS have attracted enormous attention
within a short period of time on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. While there
has not been a shortage of conference proceedings, edited Volumes, and
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policy papers, they tend to highlight certain aspects of theater missile
defense (TMD ) and /or NMD only.2 This much more brief essay is no
exception. In particular, as other observers have pointed out, the debate
has already incurred diplomatic costs prematurely: Even if program
feasibility has yet to be proven by repeated test results, many observers
have assumed the most effective system.3 I would further argue that
America’s current ad hoc, on- and - off approach to explain its MD
program overseas is not sufficient and has yet to be replaced by a more
frequent and institutionalized one that aims at addressing each state’s
defense requirements, its political as well as technical issues, and
finally, future regional stability and prosperity.
With the above considerations in mind, this chapter throws some
light on each of the four Northeast Asian powers’ perceptions, reactions, and
likely future actions toward missile defense. It is intended to be a think
piece highlighting select aspects of the MD debate in Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea, and North Korea only, as China’s position and its likely
actions are addressed in greater detail by Eric McVadon and Mark Stokes
in this volume and by others.4 As the author is technologically uninitiated,
this chapter will forgo any arcane talk about the world of science except to
invoke the relevant authorities, but will address in some depth South
Korea’s perspectives, which have often attracted scant attention. It concludes
with an assessment of the potential regional consequences of the MD
program and a set of policy proposals that might enhance the prospects
for coupling missile defenses and regional security.
Japan: Limited Research and Development (R&D) Commitment and
Alliance Consideration.
As an island nation, Japan is particularly concerned with a missile
threat. The North Korean missiles, especially their currently deployed
Nodongs, figure prominently in Japan’s security planning. While the
possibility is very low, China’s potential threat to use its medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs)in various contingencies also cannot be ruled
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out. For instance, in the context of an inter-Korean or a cross-Strait
conflict, Japan would remain worried about a potential or actual missile
threat by north Korea and/or China and the collateral cost of being a
host to U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as well as a close ally of the United States.
As compelling as the perceived missile threat is the consideration of
alliance maintenance. Even if Japan’s decision to commit to a limited joint
R&D program on TMD was precipitated by the August 1998 flight-test of the
North Korean Taepodong-1, the American request for Japan’s
participation in MD harkens back to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
program in 1983. As long as Japan regards its alliance relationship with the
United States as vital to its national interest, its limited participation in
MD should be taken as a measure to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance in
the post-Cold war era. Thus, alliance considerations, together with a
potential missile threat, constitute a primary rationale influencing
Japan’s decision to join the R&D program, which is also in line with
Japan’s overall strategic tilt toward the United States in the post-Cold war
era.
At present, Japan participates in a joint R&D program on four
technical areas of the Navy theater-Wide (NTW) missile program, but
has not committed itself to development or deployment of TMD.5 It
currently operates six battalions of 24 enhanced Patriot Advanced
Capability-2 (PAC-2 Plus) fire units, which, under the 1975 agreement
with the United States, are part of Japan’s air-defense role for U.S. Military
installations. As of the end of 2001, Japan is likely to acquire PAC-3 as part
of its force improvement plan and or an up graded PAC-3 Configuration-3
system to fully function as part of a layered TMD architecture. In addition
to the current four Kongo-class AEGIS-equipped destroyers, the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)plans to acquire two additional
ships in the new mid-term Defense Program (2001-05), with the decision
likely in 2003. For reasons related to Japan’s requirements and system
characteristics, other TMD components, such as theater high altitude area
defense (THAAD) and naval air defense (NAD), are not likely to be
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seriously considered.
Before moving beyond the current R&D stage, however, Japanese
policymakers need to pay attention to a host of major domestic and
external factors. First, as the Japanese economy suffers from nearly 0
percent growth for a decade, coupled with growing nonperforming and
underperforming loans and a record-high unemployment rate of 5
percent throughout 2001, the JSDF is doomed to engage in an uphill battle
against the national level social programs and economic restoration
efforts, as well as within its three services.
Second, Japan’s MD debate is subject to well-known bureaucratic
in-fighting and legal constraints. It is the complex and divisive nature of
MD that brings to bear upon the debate the continued competition among
the ideological camps(left vs. right), interest groups (anti-China groups vs.
arms control supporters) and government agencies (Ministry of
Finance vs. Japan Defense Agency). The weakening of the traditional
left and the new “Koizumi factor”—as Japan’s wider security role in the
wake of the war in Afghanistan demonstrates—could make a stronger
case for missile defense, although a fragile political coalition and the
ensuing frequent change of government could steer the debate back into a
more familiar bureaucratic tug- of-war among the ministries concerned
with the issue.6 As Stephen A. Cambone has pointed out in a perceptive
study, the MD program is set to stir domestic debate in Japan as it
touches upon such sensitive issues as the peaceful use of space, the right
of collective defense, and the export of defense-related technologies.7
Third, Chinese reactions will have an important role to play. Japanese
policymakers will remain concerned with the negative impact of its MD
decision on Sino-Japanese relations, even if China’s relations with both
the United States and Japan are likely to be strained for the foreseeable
future regardless. As to the most sensitive issues involving Japan in the eyes
of Beijing—that is, Japan’s potential role in a Taiwan contingency, Japan
has no practical option other than taking an ambiguous stance. For
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this reason, Japan will be very cautious and remain mindful of the socalled “international security situation,” in which the China factor
occupies a central place. Aside from political developments in crossStrait and inter-Korean relations that many American officials and
analysts often believe to be important variables, the positions by Taiwan
and South Korea on TMD acquisition could significantly affect the
Japanese decision as well.
Fourth, even if the PAC-3 low-tier and AEGIS-based NTW upper-tier
systems were eventually to be acquired by Japan, it would leave no role
for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). Not only does the
army still remain the most dominant service in Japan—as well as in
Korea—but inter-service rivalry among the services, with each trying to
secure its respective crown jewels (e.g., tanks, ships, and aircraft), does not
bode well for TMD funding. Under such circumstances a real
opportunity cost exists between major platforms and TMD.
Fifth, and closely related to the fourth factor, interoperability and
command and control problems will arise sooner rather than later. As
the JSDF is not structured to operate under a combined forces command
with the United States, unlike the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)case, it
needs to address such complex questions as the level of interoperability,
surveillance and cueing, adjustments of force structure, and operational
control.
Taken together, these issues confront Japan with diverse challenges,
which it must face before moving beyond the current R&D phase. If
Japan ever takes that course of action, it would transpire in the context of
domestic politics and an external environment characterized by a
dramatic departure from the past patterns. In order to prepare for such an
eventuality, as one Japanese observer noted, a political decision based
on the criticality of the U.S. alliance as well as public education intended
to provide a better understanding of this arcane issue will be a good
beginning.8
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Taiwan: In Search of a Political shield.
A missile threat from mainland China, together with a limited naval
blockade, constitutes a primary source of concern to Taiwan, especially
at the opening stages of a large-scale cross-Strait conflict. besides its
longer-range missile inventory, China is reported to have deployed a
minimum of 150-200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite
Taiwan and doubtless has a capability to significantly increase its
existing missile arsenal.9 Short warning time further complicates any
missile defense scheme by Taiwan.
Even if Taiwan possesses a limited missile defense capability
consisting of three PAC-2/Modified air Defense System (MADS)fire
units with 200 missiles as well as of Tien Kung (Sky Bow) surface-toair missiles (SAMs), it by no means possesses sufficient measures to
counter the large and apparently growing Chinese missile threat. For this
reason, Taiwan has considered other options, such as development of
longer-range missiles that can reach the targets inside the mainland and
has implemented various passive defense measures. None of them are
likely to be very effective against the Chinese missiles, however.
As many observers in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have pointed
out, Taiwan’s search for a missile defense capability centering on the United
States is primarily aimed at securing political, rather than military,
deterrence. As the need to counter the mainland’s threat and to maintain
relations with the United States is a well-established fact of life among
politicians and the general public in Taiwan, it is natural for Taiwan to
consider joining U.S. MD to an extent and in ways that maintain stability in
the Taiwan Strait.
The danger lies, according to Thomas J. Christensen, in the false sense
of safety MD might create for Washington as well as for Taipei. In his
words, “The acquisition of missile defenses thus may perversely make the
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island appear safer than it actually is in the eyes of the American public
and leadership, to the detriment of Taiwan’s security.”10
Furthermore, as a Stimson Center report has persuasively argued,11 any
TMD components transferred to Taiwan that are interoperable and linked
with U.S. forces would not only invite a strong reaction from China, including
tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and in U.S.-China relations, but could actually
send another wrong signal to the Taiwan people, as noted before.
For its part, Taiwan made an official call for common defense against the
growing Chinese missile threat to itself as well as to the United States and
Japan. In a recent interview, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian argued that
“A PRC [missile] threat against Taiwan is something that the United States,
Japan, and Taiwan must jointly deal with through the division of
responsibility and cooperation.”12 In a similar vein, Taiwan’s ministry of
National Defense made clear that if invited it would “seriously” consider
joining U.S. MD.
While Taiwan’s reactions to U.S. MD will very much depend upon the
level of missile and other threats from mainland China, the Chinese
leadership, for its part, remains worried about any possible connection
between U.S. TMD and the Taiwan question. China’s reactions to TMD
transfers to Taiwan will be most serious. As MD would compromise its ability
to coerce Taiwan not to move beyond the limits set by Beijing, the PRC is very
opposed to Taiwan TMD. In particular, as a recent study by the Monterey
Institute of International Studies (MIIS) has pointed out, a TMD linked with
Taiwan—especially the AEGIS-equipped destroyers—would severely impair
China’s ability to deter the United States or the United States and Japan in a
major Taiwan contingency and would constitute a quasi-alliance between
Taiwan and the United States.13 It may thus further reinforce a circle of
containment against China.
In light of both Taiwan’s need for a political shield in the face of a clear
missile threat and of China’s strong reactions against closer ties between
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Taiwan and the United States, any viable future for Taiwan would fall
between the opposite positions. This also points to the fact that any
resolution in cross-Strait relations will and should be of a political, and
hopefully peaceful, nature. However, continued stalemate in the crossStrait talks, coup led with the highly limited scope of the MD debate in
Taiwan,14 would continue to make the issue a dormant yet highly
consequential one in the three-way relationship among Beijing, Taipei,
and Washington.
South Korea: Self-Reliant Now, Linked with the United States Later?
Countering missile threats in South Korea’s overall defense
requirements should be seen in a different context from those of Japan
and Taiwan. For one thing, the kaleidoscopic changes in post-Cold war
global and regional security notwithstanding, the crux of the Korean
security problem has remained remarkably unchanged to date: a landbased military threat from North Korea. Even without a Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical (NBC) capability, North Korea’s conventional
military capability in general and the size, deployment, and equipment of
the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in particular pose a
significant threat to the defense of South Korea. Not only is the NKPA
numerically superior and highly mechanized, but 65 percent of its
offensive elements are currently concentrated within 60 miles north of
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Since Seoul, the South Korean capital and
home of 12 million people, is located less than 30 miles south of the DMZ),
the South Korean forces would have little strategic depth and warning time.
While it is true that the South Korean forces, backed by the United States
forces and by their own industrial infrastructure, do retain a substantial
technological edge, then KPA’s quantitative and geographical
advantages could well lead to unacceptable damage upon the South,
especially upon Seoul.15
Throughout the 1990s, moreover, North Korea’s accumulation of
an NBC capability posed an additional threat to South Korean security.
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North Korea’s consistent efforts to develop various types of missile
systems were manifest in at least three flight tests: the May 1993 test of the
Nodong missile (an improved version of Scud-C) with the range of over
500 miles; the June 1994 test of two 60-mile antiship missiles; and the
well-publicized three-stage Taepodong-1 medium-Range Ballistic missile
(MRBM) in August 1998.16 North Korea is believed to possess 300-500
Scud short-Range Ballistic missiles (SRBMs) of various types and about
100 Nodong MRBMs.
However, most worrisome, especially at the opening phases of war, is the
threat of barrage tactics by North Korea’s 11,500-strong artillery. In
particular, the 240-mm Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) and 170-mm
self-propelled guns, with a range of 65 kilometers and 45 kilometers,
respectively, can literally shower Seoul with thousands of rounds
within a few hours—a fact pointedly made in an apocalyptic statement
in March 1994 by North Korean negotiator Park Young Soo who
threatened his counterpart that, in case of a war, Seoul would become a
“sea of fire.” As an additional reminder of this artillery threat, the
NKPA’s two artillery corps are currently deployed below the
Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Thus, it can be concluded that North Korea’s
missile capability constitutes a significant, but not the primary, threat to
South Korean security.
The relative weight given to missile threats in South Korea’s
overall defense requirements was a major factor in the ROK
government’s March 1999 announcement that it would not participate in a
U.S. TMD system on the ground that “South Korea’s geographical
characteristics and its limited strategic depth as well as our technical
capability and economic conditions would not allow us to join it at this
stage.”17
ROK policymakers are well aware, however, that missile defense is an issue
that could critically affect the health of its alliance relationship with the
United States. Besides its alliance ties, South Korea remains central to an
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overall U.S. MD plan and its regional components: the North Korean
missile as a primary rationale, the mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)mandated deployment of U.S. weapons in and around South Korea, and
the presence of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
It would be an exaggeration to say, however, that in South Korea there
has been an extensive debate on the MD issue at either the public or
government level.18 The government’s position has largely been confined
to that of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), while any in-depth
discussions on the pros and cons of missile defenses in South Korea have
so far been held only by a handful of policy institutes, universities, and
nongoverment organizations (NGOs).19 From those limited debates, a
few emerging perspectives can be discerned that could affect South
Korea’s likely course of action.
First, how could peace and unification, the primary national objective
of South Korea, be reconciled with missile defenses? Would the peace
process on the peninsula be inversely correlated with U.S. missile
defense, as Michael Green and Toby Dalton, among others, have
posited?20 Or would missile defense constitute a part of South Korea’s
preparation for its future security environment regardless?
Second is the possibility for a change of government in the
December 2002 presidential election. Unlike the incumbent
government, which puts a heavy emphasis on reconciliation with North
Korea, Lee Hoei Chang, the current chairman of the opposition Grand
National Party, who was defeated in the 1997 presidential election by a
narrow margin, is known to have a much tougher policy stance toward
North Korea in general and toward the latter’s missile and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) capability in particular.21
It should also be noted parenthetically that much of the confusion in the
ROK’s North Korea policy stems from the tension between a progressive
government and conservative society in South Korea, while the
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opposite—that is, a conservative government and progressive society—
has long been the case in post-war Korean politics.
Third, while the ROK government decided not to join U.S. TMD, it
does not necessarily mean that it will be deprived of any missile
defense capability in the future, a point frequently raised by the
inquisitive media and the critical NGOs.
While it is rare for senior ROK officials to make public statements on
MD, one of the most explicit statements was made by the defense minister
in early 2001, which deserves a long quotation.
The U.S. NMD plan, which is still at a conceptual stage, needs to
cope with technical problems, budget appropriation,
consultations with allies including NATO, and Russian and
Chinese responses and will therefore take some time to be
finalized. The [ROK] government, when the Bush
administration’s NMD plan becomes more concrete, will
cautiously clarify our position after taking a comprehensive
view of our capability and other security considerations.
Regarding TMD, the government is not considering to
participate in it at this stage in light of our geographical
characteristics, economic capability, and the urgency of [our]
responses to North Korea’s long-range artillery and shortrange threats [Scuds?]. Over the longer term, given the current
North Korean missile threat and future battle environment,
we are reviewing to construct a missile defense system suitable
to our own [security] environment.22
Furthermore, the South Korean military is now in the middle of
making five major weapons procurement decisions: the F-X, the AH-X,
the E-X, the SAM-X, and KDX-III.23 Among the five big-ticket items,
totaling over $10 billion ($1 = 1,200 won), the SAM-X, the KDX-III, and
the E-X (Airborne warning and Control System) programs are relevant to
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an MD architecture, even if the eventual form of any ROK missile
defense system is a matter of conjecture at this time.24 For the SAM-X
program the PAC-3 Configuration-3 is a serious contender, while the
KDX-III includes two destroyers with the AEGIS system. As for the remaining
three platforms, it seems safe to say that they are still being contested by
American and European defense bidders.
While the government still insists—only when asked by the inquisitive
Korean and foreign media—on an MD system that fits into South
Korea’s needs, it begs the question of how the ROK would ever acquire
and operate the surveillance, cueing, and Battle management/Command,
Control, and Communications (BM/C3) capability, which immediately
puts a big question mark on its technical feasibility and funding
availability. At present, USFK operates only one battalion of Patriot
missiles with six firing batteries, which can barely defend its key
installations—again a pointed reminder of the ROK government’s future
need for a larger missile-defense system.
Finally, like many other states in the region, South Korea will also
factor in the impact of its MD decision on its larger neighbors, especially
on China. This is quite understandable, as peace and security on the
peninsula is as much an international issue as an inter-Korean one and the
majority of the South Korean public perceives, rightly or wrongly, that China
will play a growing and benign role in peninsular affairs in the
future.25 To make a long story short, however, the China factor, while
important, will not dominate the decision, as a combination of factors
including South Korea’s defense needs, its elite perceptions, and the
emerging strategic configuration in the region all point to the
prolongation of the existing “strategic prioritization” with the United States
in the decades to come.
North Korea: A Matter of Regime Survival.
Being singled out as a primary rationale for U.S. MD, North Korea
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adamantly opposes the plan. North Korea’s visceral reaction to MD,
however, should be seen in the context of its fundamental goal: regime
survival. Its nuclear and missile capability is a multipurpose enabler that
helps to keep the Kim Jong Il regime afloat.26 Militarily, for one thing, it
deters the United States or the ROK-U.S. combined forces from attacking
the North in case of a contingency as its Scuds, nodongs, and possibly
Taepodongs could threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States,
respectively. Diplomatically, for another, its missile capability helps
North Korea to maintain its own leverage and prestige in the international
arena. For still another, its missile capability is a major hard currency
earner in its overall declining outside trade.
For these reasons, while taking a “diplomatic united front” against
U.S. MD with Moscow and Beijing, Pyongyang has offered the most
acerbic phrases in its official Rodong Shinmun, which says that the United
States has intended to “run over the Republic [DPRK] by MD,” “push to
death those who do not surrender,” and “aim at the whole world as its
strategic coordinates.”27 It further argues that the “so-called theory of the
North Korean missile threat is an unashamed casuistry,” and that the
United States is now threatening North Korea by military means and
would launch a preemptive strike at it at the right moment.28
Among a long list of negative impacts of MD unto itself, MD waters
down and may eventually neutralize the utility of North Korea’s nuclear
and missile program as a bargaining chip (if it was ever intended to be
so) in its negotiation with the United States. It is also possible and even
likely, however, that the North Korean leadership has already understood the
fact that despite its repeated hostile rhetoric, TMD/NMD is not an issue to be
bargained away at any price. North Korea’s perspectives and positions on
MD are similar to those of China in that it sees U.S. MD as having a
political motive based on military and technological prowess and that
MD is aimed at “rogue states,” “states of concern,” “missile
proliferators”—in other words, the dislikes of the United States.
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While the Bush administration has confirmed the resumption of
negotiations with Pyongyang, the latter understands full well that unless
its WMD capabilities, missile proliferation, and conventional forces are
addressed, there will be little hope for improved relations between itself and
Washington. Notwithstanding Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s call for a
resumption of U.S.-North Korean talks “any where, at any time,” 29 the
new U.S. administration’s demand for an “improved implementation” of
the 1994 Geneva Agreement, “verifiable constraints” on missile programs
as well as the conventional force issue—which are significantly different
from those of the Perry Process—are seen by North Korea as tantamount
to giving up its trump cards.
North Korea’s possible reactions to U.S. MD deployment and
particularly South Korea’s future involvement in it are by no means
certain. A limited range of options North Korea might take, such as
expansion, improvement, and sophistication of the existing missile
arsenal, development of new types of missiles or countermeasures, and
increased missile sales, would be prohibitively costly and/or
diplomatically unwise. In their stead, North Korea’s short-term solution
is a diplomatic clarion call with China and Russia, while waiting for a
change of atmospherics in a recalcitrant Washington. As long as Seoul
and Tokyo remain vulnerable to its missile and NBC capability, North
Korea may take a coercive option combined with separate negotiations
with the United States and South Korea.
It was, however, in this constricted external environment of North
Korea that the September 11 attacks intervened. For one thing, North Korea
had never held a priority in the Bush administration’s long foreign
policy agenda—at least before September 11. For another, now is not the
time for North Korea to draw world attention by making its time-proven
provocations or incidents, which are nonetheless necessary for a continued
flow of international assistance onto itself.30 For still another, as Russia’s
ostensibly moderate response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty
might indicate, North Korea’s strong opposition to MD may end up
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with a chorus of one—arguably the worst situation in the eyes of
Pyongyang. In short, North Korea’s limited military and diplomatic
options as to MD would likely result in delaying tactics in separate talks
with the United States and with South Korea over the longer term.
Conclusions and Implications for East Asian Security.
In the closing pages of this chapter, it is appropriate to sum up the
findings and arguments with respect to the questions raised at the outset.
First, in light of the varying consequences of U.S. MD on regional security
and of equally diverse reactions to it by individual states, it is critical to
address the specific defense requirements of U.S. regional allies and
friends and their concerns with regard to the MD issue. This is all the more
necessary because—even if U.S. regional allies and friends generally
support the MD program—there will be nuances in policies, shades in
commitment, and delays in implementation in their reactions.
Second, as the highly circumscribed nature of the MD debate in the
three countries—at both public and governmental level—strongly
indicates, more regular and more systematic efforts on the U.S. part are
necessary to explain its MD plan to regional states. Focused discussions
on the different levels of missile threat to individual states and
consideration of their domestic politics—the two most important factors
driving their individual responses to MD—would be a good starting
point. An institutionalized discussion of the MD issue in regular U.S.
defense talks with its allies would be another approach enhancing mutual
understanding on the subject.
This also undergirds the third recommendation, which is that the sooner
the United States copes with the major defense and strategic concerns of
regional states on MD, the easier it will be to tackle the specific technical
and even budgetary issues later. Without a semblance of thought, for
instance, on the future possibility of possessing either individualized
MD assets or those of an integrated Northeast Asian MD system, the
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regional states would continue their own soul-searching with significant
waste of political and budgetary resources likely down the road. For
another, the China factor, and more specifically America’s understanding
with China on the MD issue, should be conveyed to regional states so
as to allay their concerns about China’s potential reactions to the MD
issue and to their respective bilateral ties. This would be particularly
pertinent as China enters the critical period of the generational change
in leadership and of projecting benign images to the outside world.
Fourth, while there is little doubt in America’s need and determination
for a MD plan, a more sensible and more balanced approach is necessary
to cope with other types of international and regional sources of threat.
As the September 11 attacks have vividly shown, a fuller spectrum of threats
to national security is now the order of the day for most nations in the
world. They include, but are not limited to, biological and chemical
attacks, border/homeland infiltration, computer viruses, and
international terrorism.31 In brief, a viable MD program should
complement, not supplant, other compelling defense requirements of a
nation.
Finally, it is trite, but true, to note that MD ultimately intends to
enhance both U.S. security and regional stability. Neither goal should be
pursued at the expense of the other. Nor should the MD issue be taken as a
litmus test for “making or breaking” U.S. bilateral relationships with its
allies and friends in the region. Barring any unforeseen developments or
regional shocks, it is certainly possible for U.S. regional allies and friends
to adjust their respective defense requirements for the sake of regional
stability and prosperity. Whether or not the MD issue will open up a new
possibility for this goal will hinge on a renewed effort and mutual
understanding on both sides of the Asia-Pacific.
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CHAPTER 8
ROUGH BUT READY FORCE PROJECTION:
AN ASSESSMENTOF RECENT PLA TRAINING
Susan M. Puska
Introduction.
Over the last 3 years,1 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
significantly advanced its near-periphery power projection capability
through concerted experimentation and adaptation of modern
warfighting capabilities during threat-based training and exercises
among targeted army, navy, air, and missile forces.2 This experience
base now reaches into all seven of its military Regions (MRs),3 and
includes a growing number of younger, innovative military thinkers and
fighters who are versed in modern operational art.
Against a potential threat that closely resembles the advanced
capabilities of the U.S. military, the PLA has shown a determination,
particularly since Kosovo, to enhance its confidence and competencies
with the means and resources that are presently available. To maximize
what it has now, the PLA has more concertedly used training as the
warfighting laboratory in which to develop creative ways to compensate
for its own relative weaknesses, while it aggressively and innovatively
seeks ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of an advanced, informationdependent opponent.
During 2000-01 training, in particular, the PLA’s warfighting
training aimed at maximizing its offensive and defensive operations within
the PLA’s area of operation, including its maritime periphery, through a
combination of threat-based military training and civilian augmentation.
The author of this chapter examines these developments in terms of
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mobility; joint operations; logistics; missile operations; coastal/maritime
operations; communications, electronic warfare (EW), and Computer
Network Attack (CNA); and special operations. The materials used for
this examination are primarily Chinese national and regional military
newspapers, although some recent journal articles and books have also
been consulted.
Background.
The last 3 years have been a particularly dynamic period in the
modernization of the PLA. The results of experimentation and
innovation during this time have been summed up in the seventh
generation of military training and examination programs, which will
be implemented during 2002.4 These programs will concentrate on
seven areas—ground, naval, and air forces; Second Artillery; scientific
research and test units; reserve units; and the People’s Armed Police.5
During the last 3 years, the scope of military exercises has steadily
increased to include out- of-sector MR forces performing increasingly
complex tasks in parallel and increasingly joint operations. Maritime
(individual and unit) training has been stressed during this time and
culminated in major near periphery exercises during the summers of
2000 and 2001 near Dongshan Island in southern China opposite Taiwan.
Then in the fall, the PLA sought to showcase its accomplishments in
applying science and technology to training up to that point by
conducting concurrent drills and exercises on October 13-16, 2000.6
Foremost among those was a “grand military show” said to be the first
since 1964, which was held near Beijing at the foot of the Yanshan
Mountain.7 Jiang Zemin, as the Central Military Commission (CMC)
Chairman, inspected the Beijing exercise on October 13. This exercise
was said to demonstrate primarily defensive measures to counter
stealth technology, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, precision
guided weapons, and EW. It also employed various concealment and
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deception measures, such as “infrared decoys,” to interfere with enemy
operations and conceal combat operations.8
Concurrently, selected ground units trained in Inner Mongolia,
while naval units conducted training in the Bohai Sea, and Second
Artillery strategic missile forces exercised in Jilin Province in northeast
China.9 Elsewhere in China on October 13, a Chengdu MR unit conducted a
sabotage raid against vital enemy targets, while a naval helicopterborne marine unit attacked an enemy rear command center. PLA
digitized artillery, armored corps, and mechanized infantry
demonstrations were held, while the “first successful” multi-direction
airborne operation (including personnel and gear, rockets, and
vehicles) was conducted against an enemy on the March 10.
Throughout 2000-01, the Nanjing and Guangzhou military Regions
(MRs) led the PLA for their innovations in training and operations. Since
both MRs play key roles in potential force projection against Taiwan, as well
as into the South China Sea, their training appears to have had greater
emphasis and perhaps, resources.
A 2000 assessment of the Guangzhou MR’s training reflects the
progress its units made in training during 2000-01. The report noted that
MR training in 1999 focused on company and battalion level training.
During 2000, it progressed to training in Joint Operations, during which
Army, Navy, and Air Force units fought under high-tech conditions.11
This assessment also observed that achievements in training during
1999 depended on innovations in equipment. In 2000, however, over
one-half of all innovations related to methods of operations, military
theory, and methods of training, accomplishments that depend upon the
ability of personnel to apply concepts and new ideas. While training in
the Guangzhou MR solved “common” problems in 1999, during 2000 the
MR units could solve more complicated and important problems. Further,
most of the 1999 training achievements came from combat units; while in
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2000, the majority of training achievements were in joint logistics and
armament.12
Regarding joint operations, the graduated mobilization response
(GMR) assessment described pre-2000 Service relations in military
exercises as “friendly support” or “guest performances” through
negotiations. By 2000, the training among the Guangzhou MR’s three
Services was assessed as more joint and extended from individual level
training up to operational, tactical, and technical training, and, finally,
to unit training.13
Although the Guangzhou MR and the Nanjing MR training have
been most extensive, improvements in training within the other five MRs,
as well as the Strategic Rocket Forces, have also been significant,
particularly out-of-sector support and support to cross-sea operations,
which have been stressed throughout all seven military regions.
Building on the 2000 priority on “three strikes and three
defense,”14 PLA training and operational priorities during 2001
concentrated on rapid mobility operations,15 including combat use of
helicopters;16 emergency logistics support;17 special operations;18 sea
landing and cross-sea operations;19 maritime denial (anti-submarine
and blockades);20 air combat and support;21 mobile missile operations;
and EW and countermeasures.22 Cover and concealment, psychological
training to counter battle and operational stress, and enhancing
confidence in PLA equipment, operational strategy and doctrine, were
also stressed. Based on Chief of the General Staff General Fu
Quanyou’s direction, the training objective during 2001 was no longer to
simply “fight” a local regional war under high-technological
conditions, but “fight to win” against a qualitatively superior force
that was based on U.S. military capabilities.23
In the General Staff Department (GSD) training plan for 2001 PLA
units were specifically asked to deepen advances in science and
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technology (S&T) training.24 Priority was placed on the following
guidelines and tasks:
• Innovate in light of actual conditions;
• Achieve rapid advancement in fighting capacity;
• Further upgrade the quality of officers and men;
• Apply research results to training;
• Deepen research on military theory;
• Closely study adversary operational concepts, equipment, and
weaponry and develop countermeasures;25
• Accelerate innovation in training;
• Carry out realistic, warlike training;
• Expand the use of computers, simulators, and online training; and,
• Exert greater effort in Joint Operations training.
While the GSD 2001 training plan continued to stress the “three
strikes, three defenses,” night training and physical fitness were also
emphasized. Operationally, the 2001 plan specifically called on units to
make greater efforts to solve problems in the following areas: defense
penetration and counter-penetration; destruction and counterdestruction; sea and air control; and electronic warfare.26
Fu, in an address to an enlarged party committee meeting of the
GSD, stressed that 2001 military work must be based on the basic
requirement to “win in battle.”27 He said the PLA must strengthen
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studies of the international situation, high-tech local war, and the
application of rule of law to military management during 2001. He called
on the PLA to organize and coordinate all efforts between units,
schools, academies, research centers and test units. He urged that the
process of transforming research accomplishments into policies, training,
war-readiness, and combat strength be accelerated. He also stressed the
importance of science and technology to enhance combat capability
throughout the entire Armed Forces. He called on the PLA to enhance
command and control, Joint Operations, and combat effectiveness,
and stressed the importance of training a large number of “new-type”
high-quality military personnel.28 The March 2001 National People’s
Congress added a sense of urgency to the need to modernize the PLA to
conduct “military struggle” as soon as possible.29
Rapid, Long Distance Mobility: Land, Air, and Sea.
Military training conducted during 2000-01 emphasized the need for
rapid mobility across long distances by air, sea, and land. Air movement,
for example, continually stressed long-range air raids and various air
combat missions. In mid-March 2001, a Nanjing air regiment was
highlighted for flying 3,000 km across five provinces to conduct a
surgical raid on enemy radar, guided missiles, and AAA positions,
using live ammunition. The unit was credited with successfully
penetrating enemy electronic interference, radar tracking, and guided
missile attacks.30 In early March, one Second Artillery equipment
inspection regiment (Zhuang Jian Tuan) demonstrated its enhanced rapid
delivery capabilities during an exercise in which units simultaneously
delivered equipment to several launch positions over long distances via
highway and railway networks.31
A Beijing MR motorized infantry brigade held rapid reactions
maneuvers that covered 1,000 km within Inner Mongolia during late 2000.
These maneuvers also stressed information countermeasures, coordinated
operations, field defense, and comprehensive logistics support.32
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Reserve units have also stepped up mobility training. On April 20,
2001, for example, a reserve regiment on Hainan Island held a rapid
mobilization and assembly exercise following the release of the EP-3 crew.
It was reported to be the first ever reserve exercise held between four
provinces and one autonomous region in south China. All preappointed officers, specialized technical soldiers, demobilized
soldiers, squad leaders, and assistants answered the callup within 1 hour
from notification. Among them were 168 reservists working in Haikou,
Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.33
Logistics mobility, which will be essential to support of any force
projection, was also tested. In the Guangzhou MR, for example, mobile
command, control, and logistics support modules were developed. The
Guangzhou MR reportedly invested two million yuan during 2000-01
to reform its command and control and logistics support in the field. At
least one unidentified Guangzhou MR Group Army and division were
equipped with mobile command systems that can be disassembled and
moved within 1 hour. The same unit’s logistics and armament technical
support facilities also were made mobile for field operations. Modular
barracks were developed, which can accommodate ten bunks,
presumably for command and operations personnel.34
Joint Operations: A Work in Progress.
Joint operations continued to develop slowly. The PLA consequently
has not yet realized the full potential of joint operations. Nonetheless,
substantial progress has been made, particularly at the operational level
of each MR.
At least three problems inhibit the PLA’s transformation to joint
operations so far. First, the PLA views “joint” in unique and flexible
terms which allow for independent interpretation that undermines
synergy of effort. Second, there is resistance, perhaps even confusion,
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about what “joint operations” means and why they should be conducted.
Finally, the command and control of the PLA under a MR system and an
Army-dominated General Staff perpetuates combined arms operations,
at best augmented by parallel air, navy, and missile forces operations,
rather than facilitating joint integration. But PLA leaders and defense
intellectuals recognize these problems, and appear committed to
achieving sufficiently joint operations to suit the PLA’s operational
needs.
To address these challenges and enhance understanding of joint
operations within the PLA, military scholars and commanders published
several articles and books on joint operations during 2000 and 2001. Yang
Zhiqi, director of the GSD, military Affairs Department, in late 2000,35
for example, urged the PLA to accelerate changing from a combined
arms command system to a joint operations command system, which is an
essential link to realizing joint operations. He argued that a joint
command system could not be established at the last minute during a
crisis, but must be put in place during peacetime. Although Yang observed
that the PLA has made substantial progress to achieve greater joint
coordination between Services during operational level training, he noted,
all the services tend to fight in different ways once an exercise begins.
Yang attributed this deficiency to a fundamental lack of an
“authoritative” joint command.36
In a National Defense Publication entitled, “New Theory of Joint
Operations,”37 the authors argue that despite similarities in its nature to
combined arms, joint operations represents a great, even radical, change
for the PLA.38 Through joint operations, they wrote, the Armed Forces will
unify combat capabilities through coordination to defeat the enemy.
In December 2000, a symposium entitled “War Patterns and War Theory
in the Early 21st Century” was held in Beijing.40 The meeting was
sponsored by the Beijing Military Region and the Strategic Studies
Department, Academy of military Sciences (AMS). It was attended by
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representatives from the seven military regions, the National Defense
University (NDU), and the Air Force Command Academy. The Beijing
MR Chief of Staff, Yu Chenghai, presided over the meeting, which was
reported to be the first joint activity held between the PLA’s highestlevel strategic studies department and a theater command. The purpose of
the meeting was to promote transformation of military strategic research
into combat strength throughout the Armed Forces. Development trends
in joint operations were among the topics discussed.
On December 29, 2000, the Nanjing Military Region published an
article that also stressed the importance of forming a joint operations
command system.41 The article identified several problems that centered on
command and control. Specifically, it criticized “factionalism”
(parochialism) between Services. The article argued for the need to
establish truly separate units under Joint Operations Groups (JOG), in
order to eliminate command and control interference by the units’ parent
Services. The article stressed that Services should only provide combat
support and coordination to units assigned to a JOG.42 Other writings
discussed the need to significantly reduce the layers of command—
changing from a “tree-type” command structure to a “flat” one.43
Training within all Services of the PLA has stressed joint
operations. Air Force training, for example, increasingly emphasized
joint support to both ground and navy forces. In March 2001, a
Guangzhou Military Region Air Force aviation regiment was high
lighted for its joint operations. This unit is equipped with a “new-type
fighting aircraft” (probably SU-27) to conduct blue water combat
patrols, combat escort missions, and military exercises. The regiment had
recently shifted from technical to tactical training on the new equipment.
It reportedly had achieved an all-weather offensive and defensive flying
capability. Its capabilities included low-altitude and ultra low-altitude
flying, the ability to attack ground targets at great speed, live bomb
operations, deep sea interception, and over-the-horizon air combat
during electronic countermeasures (ECM).44
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During 2000-01, PLA training focused on Taiwan-like scenarios
within all seven military regions. Priority was given to sea-crossings,
island seizures, and special operations behind enemy lines. The threatbased scenarios employed forces that were modeled on the advanced
technology of the U.S. military, including armed helicopters; cruise
missiles; sophisticated reconnaissance; EW capabilities; stealth
technology; and extensive maritime assets.
The intent of this training seems to have been multifold—first, it
gave PLA units experience against a Taiwan and U.S.-type opponent,
which provided a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses
of potential opponents. Second, more realistic training focused on likely
scenarios helps to build confidence in PLA equipment, as well as
defensive and offensive operations. Finally, more realistic training
exposes PLA weaknesses that can be solved or avoided before actual
combat.
Logistics: Flexibility and Forward Support.
Progress in the Joint Logistics System benefited from the stress on
war preparation, which revealed the need for more field logistics support
and mobility. During 2000-01, consolidation of common garrison
functions, such as military hospitals, which have been opened up to
civilians as well as other Services, and consolidation of key commodity
items, such as bulk petroleum, continued. Emergency stockage of
generic, dual-use items were also developed. In some cases, emergency
supplies were integrated into civilian warehouses to provide emergency
and training replenishment to military forces through contracted or
other support arrangements.
During 2000-01 emphasis was placed on components of operational level
logistics, such as field feeding, field medical support, forward
maintenance, and on-site repair and re-supply. Rapid reaction and
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emergency support units were tested to provide multiple types of support to
combat forces in near-combat field conditions. Throughout the Air Force,
Navy, Army, and Second Artillery units, logistics support emphasized
enhancements of core support capabilities. In addition, within the
Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs, civilian augmentation to military logistics
was stressed. This support included the coordinated use of the civilian air,
land, and sea infrastructure; acquisition of maritime vessels; access to
civilian telecommunications; and acquisition of materiel and supplies.
While much of the logistics support is managed by the General
Logistics Department (GLD), the new General Armament Department
(GAD), created in 1998,45 played the central role in ammunition
replenishment and maintenance of weapons and armor. Like Second
Artillery, GAD made a concentrated effort to enhance the quality and
expertise of its personnel through greater cooperation with civilian and
military institutions. In November 2000, General Cao Gangchuan,
Director of GAD, noted that reforms in armament, national defense
science and technology, and industry now are reaching an
unprecedented level in China. He encouraged further reform and
innovation, citing a Party and CMC directive to raise the rate of success in
scientific testing.46
In October 2000, GAD hosted an all-Army symposium at the Armored
Force Engineering Academy, commanded by major General Wang
Hongguang, in Changxindian, Beijing, with the stated purpose of
enhancing comprehensive armament support.47 During October 2000,
GAD initiated a 1-month rotational course, open to the entire PLA
command cadre, to take advantage of peacetime to improve armament
management and raise the level of comprehensive armament support for
wartime. The main focus of this training was on the science of armament
and wartime armament support.48
In 2000, Guangzhou MR set up a “theater command center for
armament support,” which was the first in the PLA.49 The center provides
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mobile command posts for field armament support to the MR, army, and
divisional levels. Additionally, the MR has developed a command
automation system for the Guangzhou war Zone. This system links
information vertically and horizontally between armament and support
units and higher headquarters. It greatly enhances command and
control over ammunition assets, and facilitates decision making and
operational management.50
During February 2001, the GAD convened a symposium in Beijing to
discuss its military training tasks for the year. These included: (1) assess
training achievements and transform these into training capabilities; (2)
strengthen guidance and theoretical studies, and regulate the scientific
development of military training; (3) renew training content, methods
and quality; (4) train high-quality personnel to achieve leap frogging
development in armament; and (5)strengthen infrastructure construction
and maintain the sustained development of military training.51
In the summer of 2000, the Jinan MR conducted an emergency
logistics support drill based on a flood relief scenario.52 Materiel, POL,
transportation, and medical support modules were quickly mobilized.
The support modules were based on warehouses, hospitals, and other
specialized units, and encompassed ordnance, material, POL,
transportation, medical, and maintenance support. During peacetime,
these units are sent on firefighting, flood relief, and other major projects
and operations. The division developed new approaches to conceal supply at
fixed points, maneuver under concealment of smokescreens, and
coordinate logistics support with naval and air units.53
Nanjing MR formed an “Emergency Mobile Logistics Support model”
that met the CMC’s standards to perform combat missions without
personnel and equipment replenishment and pre-battle training (i.e.,
no notice).54 One brigade spent over three million yuan improving its
company-level combat-readiness provisions, standard storage rooms,
field medical kits, combat-readiness coffers, and wartime light sets.
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The brigade developed new equipment, including floating stretchers,
field kitchen containers, and rapid reaction tankers, and participated in
numerous exercises with the Navy, Army, and Air Force units over the
past 3 years.55
Guangzhou MR developed multitube POL tankers for field
refueling that significantly raised field support efficiency. Water
tankers could support up to 20 kitchen units at one time. Field repair
vehicles could perform various emergency repairs. In addition, support
equipment for sea operations was also developed by GMR’s Logistics
Department and an unidentified GMR division.56
Although there has been some emphasis on field medical support, most
medical support improvements, including joint logistics, have focused on
reforms, as well as garrison and near-garrison support. In this regard, the
Guangzhou MR medical training objectives, which varied according to a
unit’s level, may be representative.57 The brigade or regiment focuses on
rapid deployment of a first-aid post. The battalion or company focuses on
rescue of personnel injured on the firing line. Medical units above the
division hospital level focus on treatment of critical cases and research
in traumatology. In recent years the Guangzhou MR has built or
renovated 80 percent of its division hospitals and brigade or regiment
medical teams.58 Emergency support units have been issued “advanced”
field mobile medical equipment, such as field surgery vehicles and
decontamination trucks. The GMR reported that the medical warreadiness of “key units” within “key combat divisions and brigades”
now meets war readiness standards.59
By early October 2000, two-thirds of all PLA hospitals completed
construction of “Project Number 1,” which laid a foundation for an
“informationized” medical service system that can be used by both the
military and civilian medical services.60
The PLA’s first airborne medical teams conducted battle drills during
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the summer of 2000.61 Three planes airdropped medical personnel and
medical supplies onto a captured airfield. The medics boarded air-dropped
vehicles and set up a first aid station. Twenty medics of the First
Airborne Medical Team parachute unit, made up of personnel from
the PLA 457th Hospital, landed by plane. The second medical Unit,
consisting of 50 personnel, arrived by plane and set up a comprehensive
multipurpose medical post. During the exercise, transport aircraft
evacuated critical personnel.62
The Nanjing Military Region’s Fujian Military District also worked
hard to improve its wartime integrated logistics support capabilities during
2000. The military district medical support forces conducted an exercise
during the summer that included an evacuation of casualties brought in
on an unidentified vessel “from distant seas.”
A notable feature of the PLA’s extended logistical system during
2000-01 was the integration of civilian fixed facilities, infrastructure,
personnel, and resources into contingency operations and training.
This support is established through a combination of pre-arranged
contracts, legal confiscation of support and civilians, as well as integration
through local reserve and militia units. The coordination and integration
of civilians and domestic resources provides a “total war” logistical
multiplier to PLA support, especially along China’s coastal region and in
the south west, where this type of support has so far been most emphasized.
The types of civilian resources, including possible fiscal augmentation,
are extensive and continue to develop. In addition to supplies, material,
and personnel, they also include airports, ports, rail networks,
expressways, and bridges that have been adapted to military
specifications and support military missions. For example, the
construction of some high speed roads and bridges was coordinated with
the military to include extra exits and upgraded surfaces to bear the
weight of military vehicles, better withstand air attack, and facilitate
quick rebuild in case of an air attack. In certain areas, such as the
Guangzhou MR, the military works closely with civilian authorities to
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capitalize on civilian assets and ensure these can easily be integrated into
military operations when needed.
With a priority on cross-sea operations and island seizures during
2000-01 training, the use of civilian marine vessels was also tested. In some
cases, maritime exercises were conducted with a mix of civilian vessels that
have been integrated into war planning. Civilian vessels and personnel
even participated in antisubmarine exercises—showing that the use of
civilian assets by the PLA is not limited by either imagination or legal
restrictions.
In July 2000, the Navy held a 17-day, 4,000 nautical miles wartime
shipping drill across the Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China Seas,
using the National Defense Mobilization Ship, Shichang.63 The exercise
was the first successful drill of “wartime emergency mobilization and
drafting of civilian personnel vessels.” The exercise was jointly
organized by the State National Defense Mobilization Committee and
the PLA Navy. Dozens of military and civilians participated from the
State Planning Commission, Finance Ministry, Communications Ministry,
Chinese Academy of Engineering, General Staff Department, and
General Logistics Department. The exercise tested and enhanced the
efficiency of drafting civilian vessels into service in an emergency.64
Reserves and militia also have increasingly facilitated local support
to military exercises and operations. For example, in Zhejiang Province
a militia seaborne refueling unit was set upon April 18, 2001, at the
Zhejiang Petroleum Limited Company in Yuhuan. The unit was made up of
100 militiamen whose mission is to set up permanent refueling points at
ports along the eastern coastline and highways, as well as small mobile
refueling teams on land, to provide POL support during peacetime and
war.65
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Missile Operations: Concealment, Mobility, and Quality.
Missile Operations, which have been a pocket of excellence in the
PLA for several years,66 continued to improve in terms of the quality of
personnel, rapid mobility, concealment and deception, and logistics
support. During 2000-01, Second Artillery pushed enhancements,
particularly to address key problems in rapid mobility and information
countermeasures under high-tech conditions.67
To improve the quality and quantity of its science and technology
personnel, for example, Second Artillery has actively recruited about 2,000
university students in recent years.68 Like other elements of the PLA, it has
sought not only to deepen the quality of its personnel, but also to
encourage innovative high-tech solutions to its training and operations
through closer cooperation with civilian institutions, as well as the
recruitment of civilian-educated specialists. On March 9, 2001, for
example, the second Artillery Engineering Academy signed a
cooperative agreement on research and teaching with Northwest
Industrial University.69
Coastal/Maritime Operations: Key Focus.
With a concerted effort to enhance coastal operations, all Services
emphasized sea-crossing and island seizure training. A Nanjing MR
Group Army held sea training on the southern Fujian Coast during midJuly 2000 that is representative.70 Training included infantry and tanks
seizing beaches, scouts conducting reconnaissance from the sea, artillery
employed on ships, amphibious armored troops seizing beaches and
carrying out fire attacks at sea; and engineers clearing obstacles. The
GA has been engaged in sea training since the beginning of the summer
2000. Mock ups of an amphibious landing field have also been set up in
garrison so that infantry regiments could continue sea training year
round.71
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The Shenyang MR developed amphibious training in early 2000. On
January 22, 2000, the division experimented with live-fire practice from a
freighter, and tested several ways to secure equipment onto vessels
(presumably civilian).72 Between January and July, the division trained in
loading equipment onto vessels, firing armored car guns over water,
striking at aerial targets using ship-borne anti-aircraft artillery, and
striking beach targets with ship-borne artillery.73
In June 2000, a Naval landing Ship Unit that is attached to PLA unit
38091 at Haikou, Hainan Island, conducted training in night landing
operations with troops, armored cars, and amphibious tanks against an
enemy objective.74 Because the unit’s equipment was outdated, it tried to
develop innovative ways to enhance its capabilities and compensate for its
deficiencies. This included training during the heavy fog season (March
through June) in fishing areas and narrow channels. Air defense
training was also stepped up to “take advantage” of heavy air traffic in the
area. During the first half of 2000, the unit conducted 42 single ship drills
and eight formation landing drills, half of which were conducted at night, in
heavy fog, and in other environments resembling realistic warfare
conditions.75
A submarine flotilla that underestimated the capability of the enemy
and failed a training test 2 years before stepped up its study of enemy
capabilities and consequently was able to penetrate an enemy port to
enforce a blockade during a summer 2000 drill.76 The unit has focused its
study on submarine attack of aircraft carrier and destroyer formations,
and submarine coordination with the aviation corps and surface vessels to
penetrate an enemy blockade and lay mines in a port. The unit established
a file on each enemy vessel and adjusted its training to counter enemy
anti-submarine capabilities.77
In August 2000, the Beijing MR reported on an Air Force unit that had
participated in sea operations.78 The unit, which had only trained over
land before, trained for 2 months over water beginning in April 2000.
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During the sea training, special attention was paid to low-altitude
acrobatics, formation and navigation.79
Communications: Connectivity, EW, and CNA.80
The PLA recognizes that it must enhance its command and control,
EW, and counterelectronic warfare capability, as well as its computer
network attack and counterattack capabilities, if it hopes to fight to win a
regional war under high-tech conditions. Consequently, the PLA has
taken increased efforts to boost all of these capabilities. As an example,
Group Army Deputy Commander Zhang Hetian of the Nanjing MR held
network warfare drills81 on July 11, 2000, in which Blue Force (enemy)
reconnaissance and attacks on Red force targets were simulated. The
Group Army achieved an initial network capability at the time of the
exercise, but Zhang noted that some PLA commanders had not yet grasped
the demands of “achieving victory.”
The Lanzhou MR held an Electronic warfare Defense work meeting on
July 3-4, 2000, at a Group Army that had been a pilot for electronic defense
operations during the previous 2 years.82 During the meeting, the MR
reviewed the accomplishments in “three anti’s, one resist” (antireconnaissance, anti-jamming, anti-network attack, and resist
destruction). The ability of commanders and staffs to organize and
direct information/electronic warfare was reportedly significantly
enhanced.83
Beijing MR (BMR) held a major electronic warfare exercise in early
August 2000 in conjunction with a combined arms operation.84 This was
the first time all the new and main battle EW equipment of the ground
forces were brought together, and comprehensive assessments were made
of the combat capability of the equipment systems and units.85 BMR has
also developed online Operational Forces (OPFOR) training for
electronic warfare to enhance training.86
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In the “Southwest 2000” Exercise, two formations separated by 500
km fought against each other in a “virtual reality laboratory” in
Chengdu MR’s first online test of its command and staff. This
developed from online “checks” held during late 1999. Chengdu MR
applied its experiences, which were ahead of other PLA units, to
cooperation with NDU to develop a “Campaign Command Training
model System” that formally went into operation during the Southwest
2000 Exercise.87
NDU experts characterized this as the first true “War Laboratory”
for PLA campaign training. The main characteristics of the exercise
were:
1. Units in five south western provinces and regions were linked by
dozens of local networks and several hundred terminals.
2. Real-time, force-on-force simulation that provided information on
the campaign situation, disposition of orders, and Red Force and Blue
Force postures.
3. The exercises unfolded synchronously in real-time at numerous
campaign units and included sound, image, text, and data online, thanks
to an emergency doubling of the transmission capability. (4) the exercise
led to a significant change in network architecture, re-routing of
transmission routes, renovation of equipment, and breakthroughs in
achieving secure information transmission under dynamic long-range
network characteristics.88
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) of the BMR held an online training exercise
in conjunction with a meeting on headquarters science and technology
training in mid-June 2000.89 This exercise simulated an attack on
Beijing by multiple sorties of enemy aircraft flying at low altitude. The
system greatly reduced training planning and preparation time and can
be used to access information about enemy aircraft and meteorological
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information, as well as draw up plans for integrated simulated training
and joint training with army units.90
Special Operations: Strike Deep Behind Lines.
Special operations forces have concentrated on enhancing basic
skills to conduct operations deep behind enemy lines. The “Cheetahs,” a
model unit commanded by Colonel Liu Youchun, is one example of the
accomplishments in recent Special Operations training.91 The 56294 unit is a
Chengdu MR Special Reconnaissance Dadui that has made notable progress
to develop special operations soldiers. Cheetah soldiers can perform
multiskills including operating light to heavy weapons, basic
knowledge of foreign armies’ weapons, and the ability to operate
transport that ranges from ground, to tank, to helicopter, and to
assault boats.
Shenyang Military Region lauded personnel improvements in one
special operations unit that is commanded by Li Jizhao, and political
commissar, Han Baosheng. The unit expects to train 100 officers in both
command and technical tasks, and develop 100 personnel who are experts in
airborne operations, island-landing and sabotage operations,
psychological warfare, enhanced instructor skills (with the “four
abilities”), and all-round special operations skills.92
One Special Operations Unit that had previously failed a spot
examination in Lanzhou MR was high lighted in the MR newspaper for
passing an inspection without prior notification. No advance information
was provided on the subjects to be tested, which was a change from
previous years. The unit had previously failed some tasks and only
achieved good results in about half of the 23 test subjects. The unit had
consistently performed with excellent results in yearly training.93 The
inspection reinforced the need for units to develop a no notice capability.
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Overall Improvements.
PLA training has become increasingly more sophisticated and
complex, incorporating evolving joint operations and national defense
mobilization. Training within a core of elite and experimental units is
characterized by use of more professional and capable Opposing
Forces (OPFOR);94 near-combat conditions; all-weather and night
operations; sea and island force projection; and long distance
deployments into unfamiliar terrain.95 Acceptance of “failure” (i.e.,
defeat of the Red Force by the Blue Force), as well as more open discussion
of deficiencies has also lead to a more realistic appraisal of strengths and
weaknesses, with the potential for more realistic measures to correct
shortcomings. In addition, training is conducted more frequently
throughout the year, rather than simply relying on end-of-year training.
Greater use of simulation and “online” training are becoming more widespread and sophisticated, providing an augmentation to field training in
everything from command and control, to asymmetrical warfare, to mobile
operations, to nuclear and biological warfare training.96
Conclusion.
The PLA lacks a sufficient budget to support faster and more extensive
military hardware and technology acquisition, and is handicapped by
China’s deep-seated preference for independent domestic capabilities that
can be obtained through reverse engineering, domestic innovation, or
acquisition of technical information. Moreover, China needs to sustain
an export-led economic strategy that could be undermined if the region or
the west were alarmed by China’s military modernization efforts before
China is ready.97 The PLA has been able to make a virtue out of
necessity by focusing on software modernization. Among these are
steps: (1) improving the quality of personnel through educational and
recruiting reforms and initiatives; (2) instituting organizational
changes that will enhance efficiency, reduce wasteful practices,
including corruption, and will ultimately enhance combat force
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capabilities, such as adaptation of joint operations and joint logistics;
(3) selectively adapting relevant foreign military management
practices and modern (specifically information age) asymmetric
strategies; (4) stream lining organizations; and (5) intensively studying
and assessing potential threats, with particular emphasis on the United
States, and more recently on Taiwan’s military capability.
Relying on key units that serve as both the vanguards and testing
grounds for new equipment, structures, techniques, and strategies for
offensive and defensive operations in a high-tech environment, the PLA
has tested a myriad of equipment, made operational improvements, and
innovations to enhance its combat effectiveness in a high-tech
environment. The PLA is poised to capitalize on the lessons learned to
enhance its regular, reserve, and militia units. At the very least, the PLA
now has developed a sound basis for continuing enhancement of the its
force projection capability, and has established a jump off point for
modernization of the entire PLA as resources increase, modern
technology is absorbed, and innovation and adaptation further
develop.98
While hardware and technology acquisition will continue, the
PLA’s recent concentration on modern thinking, innovation, and
experience of leaders and fighters provides a more potent base for
accelerated modernization. The PLA today possesses a rough but ready
force projection capability, one that will continue to steadily improve over
time, which adds greater risks and costs for potential opponents in
China’s near periphery. The modernizing PLA increasingly provides the
Chinese leadership with credible coercive strength—one that can back up the
threat of the use of force and/or selective employment of force to promote
China’s national sovereignty and security interests along its land, air, and
maritime borders.
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CHAPTER 9
LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR PLA AIR FORCE
CAMPAIGNS
Kenneth W. Allen1
Under today’s wartime conditions, aviation troops must be prepared to
deploy quickly across borders to a war zone and be prepared to fight
immediately. Currently, some of China’s war zones do not have many firstline airfields, so the existing airfields must support several types of aircraft.
The PLAAF must also hide its aircraft by dispersing them to field airstrips
and highway landing strips. Therefore, PLAAF logistics troops must have the
capability to support multiple types of aircraft at different types of airfields.2
Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, 1997

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what the People’s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is doing to reform its logistics
systems in order to fight and win high technology wars under modern
conditions, employing all five of its branches. Many of these reforms have
come about as a direct result of contingency planning for a possible war
with the United States over Taiwan, but there forms are applicable to the
PLAAF as a whole.
In the 1990s, the PLAAF began the process of transforming itself
from a force capable of employing single branches (aviation, surface-toair missiles [SAMs], antiaircraft artillery [AAA], radar, and airborne
troops) and single types of aircraft in positional defensive campaigns to
one capable of using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in air
force combined arms, mobile offensive operations campaigns, with
the goal of shifting to operations in joint service campaigns.3 In order to
reach this goal, the PLAAF has had to implement some significant
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changes in its logistics system, which traditionally has not been structured
for supporting mobile, offensive operations. While many of the changes are
still underway, some are still only aspirational.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section I, I will provide the
setting for changes in the PLAAF’s logistics operations by discussing
PLAAF operational theory. In Section II, I will define PLAAF logistics
and provide a brief discussion of the PLAAF logistics structure. In Section
III, I will examine PLAAF logistics theory and what types of training
the PLAAF has conducted to implement this theory. In Section IV, I
will provide some conclusions about changes in the PLAAF’s logistics
system in relation to possible campaign operations against the United
States.
SECTION I: PLAAIR FORCE OPERATIONS THEORY
PLAAF Positional Defense.
The PLAAF basically has two modes of operations—positional and
mobile.4 Traditionally, the PLAAF’s primary mission has been positional air
defense for China’s airfields, national political and economic centers,
heavy troop concentrations, important military facilities, and
transportation systems.5 As a result, most fighter airfields and virtually
all of the PLAAF’s SAMs and AAA are concentrated around China’s
large cities. During the its first 3 decades, the types of weapon systems the
PLAAF had and the location of the airfields made it difficult for the
PLAAF to conduct any other type of operations.
According to Paul Godwin, the PLAAF’s reliance on positional
defense became even more apparent during the late 1970s, when the core
of the PLA’s new strategy of “People’s war Under Modern
Conditions” was forward defense.6 Godwin states,
This strategy meant that China would be defended at selected critical points as
close to its borders as possible to prevent Soviet forces from driving deep into
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China. Positional defense was not the preferred option for China’s military
strategists, who would have preferred a more flexible mobile defense. But, the
superior arms and equipment of Soviet forces conducting joint warfare
granted them such mobility, speed, and destructive power that the PLA’s
operations could not realistically be based on a war of maneuver.

The PLAAF’s Search for a Strategy.
Serious changes in the way the PLA thought about its future took place
between the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam and Deng Xiaoping’s 1985
“strategic decision” that directed the armed forces to change from
preparation for an “early, major, and nuclear war” to preparing for
“local limited wars around China’s borders, including its maritime
territories and claims.” whereas the PLA Navy (PLAN) had
conceptualized a change in its strategy from coastal defense to offshore
defense, the PLAAF entered the second half of the decade still in search of a
strategy.7
The PLAAF’s search was driven, in part, by a desire to seek
independent missions and to try to break away from its near total
submission to the ground forces. This dependence was exemplified in the
early 1980s when the PLA began reorganizing its ground forces into
group armies, and the PLAAF was tasked to provide defense for
group army positions. Specific guidance from the General Staff
Department (GSD) was given that “each branch and unit of the PLAAF must
establish the philosophy that they support the needs of the ground forces
and that the victory is a ground force victory.”8
Wanghai Initiates Shift Toward Simultaneous
Defensive Operations.

Offensive and

Under Wanghai, who became the commander in 1985, the PLAAF began
articulating its views on mobile, offensive operations. First, in a break from
the PLAAF’s focus on positional defensive campaigns, Wang laid out a
program in 1987 that formally set forth the thought (sixiang) of
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“building an air force with simultaneous offensive and defensive
capabilities” (jianli gongfang jianbei xing kongjun).9 Wang emphasized
that the combined arms combat environment of the 1980s required a force
that “could move quickly over long distances, could fight in an
electronic environment, could have the capability to attack an enemy,
and could keep the PLAAF from sustaining complete damage from an
enemy air attack.”
In the late 1980s, the PLA began experimenting with the concept of
rapid-reaction units. In 1990, the PLAAF published an authoritative
book entitled Air Force Operations Research that stated, “The rapidreaction strategy (kuaisu fanying zhanlue)is based on the premise that
China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future,
and the PLA must strike to end the war quickly and meet the political
objectives.”10
Given China’s military limitations compared with those of the Soviets and
Americans, the study advocated the concept of deploying air defense
forces according to the principle of ”front light, rear heavy” along with the
principle of “deploying in three rings.”11 The fixed-base logistics
system that existed at that time met the PLAAF’s requirements for
positional defense.
Using the “front light, rear heavy” concept, the PLAAF stated it
should organize its SAM and AAA troops into a combined high-,
medium- and low-altitude and a far-, medium-, and short-distance air
defense net. The air force would also set up many intercept lines and
organize its aviation troops into a layered intercept, especially along the
enemy’s main routes. In deciding how to deploy its forces, the PLAAF
divided the battle area into three lines, using the front line of enemy
airfields as the baseline. The first line would extend to a radius of 500
kilometers (300 miles) from the baseline, within which the notional enemy
will mainly use its fighters and fighter-bombers. The second line would
extend to 1,000 kilometers (600 miles), where the enemy will primarily
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use its fighter-bombers and bombers. The third line extends beyond 1,000
kilometers, where the enemy would mainly use its long-range strategic
bombers.
Information from The Republic of China 1993-94 National Defense
Report described the situation as follows,12
The deployment of the Air Force is aimed primarily at defending against
Russia and secondarily at defending against the Republic of China and
Vietnam. Their deployment adopts the principle that “a minimum number of
troops are deployed on the front line while the main forces are mobile.”
Currently (1994), within 250 nautical miles (450 kilometers) from Taiwan,
mainland China has 13 airbases capable of accommodating more than 1,000
aircraft. However, there are only about 100 fighters stationed there now. In
the second line, which is 250-500 nautical miles (450-900 kilometers) from
Taiwan, there are more than 20 airbases with over 1,500 [PLAAF and Naval
Aviation] combat aircraft of various types.

The Republic of China 1998 National Defense Report states,13 “At present,
1,300 aircraft are stationed at airbases within 500 nautical miles of Taiwan,
of which 600 have a radius of operation over Taiwan proper.” The 2000
National Defense Report states, “Already deployed within 600 nautical
miles (1,000 kilometers) of the Taiwan proper are about l,000 [PLAAF
and Naval Aviation] planes of various types which could undertake
operational missions at any moment.”14 In December 2000, Taiwan’s
ministry of defense stated, “There were 14 military and civil airfields
within 250 nautical miles of Taiwan. They currently have 121 fighters, but
could accommodate 1,279 fighters, not including SU-27s, on short
notice . . .”15
Looking at a map, the area out to 1,000 kilometers described in
Taiwan’s reports starts at the Shandong Peninsula, arcs halfway
through Hubei and Hunan Provinces, then goes down to the Leizhou
Peninsula, covering almost all of the Nanjing MR and about half of the
Guangzhou MR. According to the Federation of American Scientists’
Map 1, there are 50 airfields within 800 kilometers of Taiwan,
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including 36 military airbases—not all of which are permanently
occupied.16

Source: Federation of American Scientists.

Map 1. Chinese Airfields within 800 Kilometers of Taiwan.
According to Taiwan military officials, since the mid-1990s, the
PLAAF has been deploying small units from designated rapid reaction
units from throughout the PLAAF into some of the bases directly opposite
Taiwan for 6-month familiarization deployments.17 The deployments have
given the PLAAF’s logistics system the opportunity to practice supporting
those forces.
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In using the “light front, heavy rear” concept, the air force believed
it would have to deal with two important problems. The first was that the
PLAAF’s aircraft in the 1980s did not have the capability to fly to the border
from their home bases, loiter for any length of time, conduct an intercept,
and return home again. This problem was exemplified during the 1979
border war with Vietnam. In addition, the PLAAF believed that, during
any sudden attack on China, it must be able to scramble all of its first
line aircraft to meet the attack and prevent the incoming aircraft from
striking any airfields.
The second, and contradictory, problem was that the most likely
anticipated adversaries at that time—the United States and Soviet
Union—had aircraft capable of conducting deep strikes into the heart of
China. Therefore, the PLAAF believed it should station most of its air defense
weapon systems in the second and third lines so they could intercept any
longer-range aircraft as they converged on key targets. Furthermore, the
attacking aircraft would most likely not have the proper escorts at those
distances, and the PLAAF’s early warning radars might be able to give
enough advance notice of an attack for the air defense systems to be
ready.
Several simultaneous forces are pulling on the PLAAF today.
Although current PLAAF writings do not mention the “front light, rear
heavy” concept, the air force still faces the same concerns about air
defense and aircraft survivability at facilities near the coast. They are
being told to prepare for offensive operations, possibly against U.S. forces,
but they are also analyzing the types of operations and weapons,
including long-range cruise missiles used during the Gulf War and
Kosovo conflict that successfully targeted air defense networks and
airfields.18
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Teaching the Theories.
Beginning in the 1990s, the PLAAF began training its mid-level officers
in some of these new theories. According to an article in China’s Air Force
magazine:19
The PLAAF Command College implemented an in-depth teaching reform in 1993 to
change the PLAAF’s operating methodology from employing single branches
and single types of aircraft to using multiple branches and several types of
aircraft in an air force combined arms campaign, with the goal of shifting to
operations in a joint service campaign. Prior to then, the training of
middle-ranking commanders was aimed mainly at directing combat
involving a single branch and single types of aircraft in warfare under
general conditions. Commanders who graduated from such training were
good at the tactical operations of their own types of aircraft and their own
branch, but they did not know much about other types of aircraft or other
branches and services. The PLAAF’s joint operations consisted of aircraft
flying combat air patrols and attack airplanes flying far apart from each
other and not having much to do with each other.

As part of the reforms to produce “transcentury commanders,” the
Command College also began focusing on theories such as joint combat
operations, mobile warfare, information warfare, and electronic
warfare.20 The new combat theory embodied “four changes”:
1. Change from studying air combat under general conditions to
studying air combat under high-tech conditions.
2. Change from stressing air defense to stressing air offense.
3. Change from air combat supported by joint operations with the army to
air combat supported by joint operations of army, navy, and air force.
4. Change from warfare involving a single branch and single type of
aircraft to combined arms warfare involving the multiple branches and types
of aircraft.
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The PLAAF under Liu Shunyao.
Whereas Wanghai initiated the concept of simultaneous offensive and
defensive operations in 1987, it did not receive much publicity until late 1996,
when Chinese leaders, including Central Military Commission (CMC)
Chairman Jiang Zemin and PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao, began to
emphasize the PLAAF’s need to fight offensive battles.21 During 1997, Liu
stated, “The PLAAF must improve its capabilities in actual combat by
highlighting campaign and tactical training.”22 He further emphasized that
campaign training involves air deterrence, air interdiction, air strikes, and
participation in joint exercises.
In the February-March 2000 issue of China’s Air Force magazine, four
authors provided a candid assessment of the PLAAF’s shortcomings and
requirements for it to be able to conduct simultaneous offensive and
defensive operations.23 The article stated, “The PLAAF must change the
direction of its strategic thinking from an emphasis on territorial air defense,
primarily because the concept of modern high-tech war has changed. If the
PLAAF does not change its thinking, then its development will be
constrained and fall behind with the rest of the world’s weak countries.”
The article also stressed that the ability to attack is the PLAAF’s weak link.
This weakness was a direct result of the PLAAF’s past operational thought,
which was reflected in the air force’s flight training program. The authors
stated that if the PLAAF wants to develop a simultaneous offensive and
defensive capability, then reforming the training system is urgent. Some
of the reforms include upgrading the professional military education
(PME) system, overhauling the pilot recruitment and training
requirements, and focusing on realistic flight training.
PLAAF Mobile Operations.
As the PLAAF acquires better weapon systems and contemplates
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using its rapid-reaction units in simultaneous offensive and defensive
operations, it has begun to focus more on mobile operations. In 1997, the
General Logistics Department (GLD) published a series of books on
logistics support of local wars under modern high-tech conditions.
One of those books, Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, provides
valuable information on PLAAF logistics.
The PLAAF Dictionary defines mobile operations as “Aviation troops
seizing the right moment to move to the objective by air, land, or water.
Normally, this entails deploying mobile fendui to concealed locations to
conduct their attack.”24 Although this is the official definition, the
PLAAF’s use of mobile operations is not limited to fendui-size forces,
not is it limited to the aviation forces. Today, all five of its branches
and support units train in mobile operations. According to Logistics
Support for Mobile Operations, the PLAAF has five types of mobile
operations—long-range, air interdiction, support for other services and
branches, airborne supply, and ambush—as described below.25
1. Long-range operations. According to the PLAAF’s view of mobile
operations, bombers and fighter-bomber aircraft are the primary
means for conducting mobile long-range air attack operations.
Normally, these are planned attacks on land or maritime targets by
aircraft carrying specific weapons and supported by all types of escort
aircraft. Therefore, in order for the PLAAF to adopt this method, it must
take into consideration the current condition of its bomber units. When
planning the bomber force’s future attacks, the PLAAF must select the
right forward bases. Therefore, it must strengthen the ability of the
airfields in peacetime to support bomber operations during wartime.
The PLAAF must plan on having its bomber airfields attacked after
the PLAAF’s bombers conduct their attack, so the PLAAF must carefully
select its targets and decide upon pre- and post-attack procedures. Based
on the PLAAF’s bomber and escort aircraft range capabilities, it must
determine the appropriate distance for long-range attacks, so that the
attacking task force will have enough time over the target to accomplish its
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mission and the electronic support aircraft will have enough time to support
them.
2. Air interdiction operations. The PLAAF uses its fighters as the
primary method for air interdiction operations. This method is used
for air superiority, air defense over key points, and air cover missions.
Operations during the Gulf war showed that an attacking force cannot
completely destroy all of the opposing force’s aircraft on the ground, so the
best way to keep your aircraft from being destroyed on the ground is to
conduct air interdiction operations against the attacking force. In future
wars, the PLAAF will adopt the following methods for air interdiction:
concentrate force by stressing quality and combat power to carry out
emergency (ji), difficult (nan), dangerous (xian), and significant (zhong)
missions as the edge of the knife; attack the aircraft that are
supporting the attacking aircraft, such as airborne early warning and
jamming aircraft; attack the enemy at all levels along the entire route as
far out as possible; and pay attention to attacking low and super low
level air targets.
3. Aviation Support for Other Services and Branches. The PLAAF’s
aviation troops will also provide support for the ground and naval
forces, including airborne cover missions, airborne firepower support,
aerial reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures to degrade the
enemy’s overall combat capabilities. This includes the enemy’s
campaign rear air defense system, second echelon units (or campaign
reserve forces), logistics support system, communications system,
helicopters, and massing forces. It also means the PLAAF’s attacking force
must avoid ground or maritime corridors and guarantee friendly ground
and naval forces’ freedom of movement.
4. Airborne drop operations. The PLAAF is responsible for air transport of
supplies, which can be either airdropped by parachute or brought into an
airfield. Since transport planes do not have any air defense capability, it is
important to consider their routes and vulnerability to air attack.
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5. Patrol and ambush operations. The PLAAF uses its aviation, AAA,
and SAM troops as the primary methods for these operations. These
operations require a high degree of independence, use little firepower,
are highly flexible, and usually receive good results. In order to execute
these types of operations, the PLAAF will deploy small aviation
elements or AAA and SAM units to areas where the attacking aircraft
will pass. AAA and SAMs will be effective against low and super low
flying targets, including armed helicopters.
SECTION II: WHAT IS PLA AIR FORCE LOGISTICS?
This section begins the discussion of PLAAF logistics reforms by
first laying out what PLAAF logistics encompasses. Basically, the logistics
system is responsible for providing all the PLAAF’s general purpose
supplies, construction, health services, food, shelter, clothing, fuel, and
transportation, as well as managing its budget and expenditures. The
PLAAF Dictionary defines air force logistics as the overall term for the
logistics structure that supports combat, training, and air forcebuilding.26 PLAAF logistics consists of command, plus finance, health,
armament, fuel, materials, transportation, capital construction, and
airfield management support services. Logistics is organized into four
operational levels—headquarters Air Force, military region air forces
(MRAF ), air corps, and units. The administrative structure consists of a
Logistics Department at headquarters Air Force and each of the MRAF
and air corps headquarters. In addition, each ground unit (nonaviation) division, brigade, and regiment has a logistics Department or
Logistics Division.
The most important logistics organization for operational aviation
units at the division and regiment level is the field station (changzhan),
which is an independent logistics support unit under dual leadership of
the air division and the MRAF headquarters. In the PLAAF, the field
station director serves the same function as a U.S. Air Force(USAF) base
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commander. Prior to February 1970, the field station was called a base,
and had the status of a division.27 Today, it has the status of a regiment.
The field station is responsible for organizing and supplying material and
equipment, and also for providing continuous combined service support
for operations and training. Each airfield housing aircraft assigned to the
division has its own field station. Each airfield generally has 1-2 aircraft
regiments, which determines the field station’s size. For example, a
field station at an airfield supporting two fighter regiments has about 930
personnel, including 170 officers and 760 enlisted troops.28 According to
Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, the field station will be
augmented by additional logistics personnel when necessary.
The PLAAF’s supply depot system is organized into a three-tier
structure—first level depots are located in various military regions but
are subordinate to headquarters Air Force; second level depots are
located in each military region and are subordinate to the MRAF
headquarters; and third level depots are located at and subordinate to
operational units.29 For example, each airfield has a third level depot,
and the second level depots can support the third level depots when
required. In addition, first level depots can either supply the second level
depots or send items directly to the unit if necessary.
The PLAAF Dictionary states that the air force’s strategic and
campaign rear area depots can be divided into composite depots, where
all types of materials are stored, and specialized depots for air materiel,
armament, fuel, vehicles, and quartermaster articles, etc.30
In the past, the PLAAF’s Logistics Department has also been responsible for
some weapon systems maintenance. The PLAAF has always made a clear
distinction between its aviation (aircraft) and air defense forces (AAA,
SAM, and radar troops). This can be seen throughout the entire
PLAAF’s administrative, operational, logistics, maintenance, and
training structure. Whereas the PLAAF has always had a separate first level
department that was responsible for aviation maintenance,31 the
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Logistics Department has been responsible for air defense equipment
maintenance.32 In 1998, the Logistics Department transferred its
second level Air materiel33 Department (hangcaibu) and Armament
Department (junxiebu)to the PLAAF’s Equipment Department. Today, the
Logistics Department is responsible for all general purpose supplies, and the
Equipment Department is responsible for all special purpose supplies and
all weapon systems and equipment maintenance.34
Finally, there are PLAAF academies, schools, and training regiments
and groups to train logistics and nonaviation maintenance personnel.
In addition, the PLAAF has several subordinate research Institutes for
aviation medicine, fuels, clothing, aviation munitions, four stations
(oxygen generation, compressed air, battery charging, and power
supply) equipment, and capital construction.35
Operational and Logistics Command Posts.
The PLAAF has identified several types of operational command posts
(zhihuisuo), some of which are established only during exercises and
wartime campaigns.36 The PLAAF’s logistics system also has a separate
set of command posts, which may or may not coincide with the operational
command posts. According to a report in the South China Morning Post, the
PLAAF built 100 command posts, operational offices, and aviation control
centers between 1994 and 1999.37
Operational Command Posts. Each of the following PLAAF headquarters
have operational command posts:38 headquarters Air Force, MRAF
headquarters; air corps; aviation divisions and regiments; and AAA
and SAM divisions, brigades, and regiments. The Senior staff for each
type generally consists of the following representatives: a commander,
chief duty officer, chief of staff, and logistics support staff officer.
Depending on the organization level, other staff officers include
representatives from the various second level administrative offices
under the four major departments (headquarters, political, logistics,
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and equipment), including operations, intelligence, communications,
confidential (security for classified material), navigation, SAM, AAA,
flight management, weather, radar, political, logistics, and maintenance.
Based on their mission, command posts can be categorized as main
(jiben), alternate (yubei), advance (qianjin), auxiliary (fuzhu), or rear area
(houfang) command posts. Main command posts are permanent command
posts that are normally established at each echelon’s headquarters. During
campaigns, the commander is the Senior officer in the command post.
Alternate command posts are established before the start of a campaign at
headquarters Air Force, each MRAF , and each air corps with the
responsibility of commanding units at the division and below. They are
built at the same time as a main command post but are not used unless
the main command post is no longer functional. Alternate command posts
can also be set up for special purposes or to command lower level units.
Advance command posts are established in the operational area to
assist the main command post in a general command role or to command
air force units that are assisting ground and naval forces. For example,
during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the Guangzhou MRAF
headquarters established an advance command post at an
unidentified location, which worked together with the 7th Air Corps
Headquarters at Nanning as the unified authority for the PLAAF’s
participation.39 An auxiliary command post is created to assist a main
or advance command post in combat areas where command is difficult. In
addition, depending on the type of activity, command posts can either be
fixed or mobile, and depending on their physical location, they can be on
the surface, underground, shipborne, or airborne.
War Zone Joint Logistics Command Posts. According to Logistics Support
for Mobile Operations, the war zone joint logistics structure is the joint
logistics command center for all of the various services and branches, and
is the highest logistics command structure for the campaign.40 Normally, the
war zone logistics organization forms the base, which then incorporates
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people from the participating navy, air force, and second artillery
campaign juntuan logistics organizations, and local command
structures that are supporting the campaign, as well as the appropriate
people from the headquarters, political, and equipment departments.
When necessary, the GLD and the headquarters Navy and air Force
Logistics Departments send representatives to participate. Under
normal circumstances, the war zone deputy commander who is in charge of
rear area logistics work becomes the joint logistics center commander, and
the war zone logistics department director and each of the war zone
service and branch logistics directors are assigned as deputy commanders.
Depending on the mission, the joint logistics command structure can
organize four other types of command posts: rear area basic command
post, rear area reserve command post, advance command post, and a
direction command post. Normally, a rear area basic command post is located
in the rear area where it is safe to conduct complete, unhindered
command of joint logistics for mobile operations.
A rear area reserve command post is established early to take over from
the basic command post if necessary. Normally, the reserve command
post is staffed by the war zone deputy logistics commander, other
required staff officers, and logistics support fendui. The reserve command
post is located to the flank or to the rear of the basic command post.
They maintain a close relationship. In the event that the basic command
post is damaged or is unable to command the logistics units and fendui,
the reserve command post immediately takes charge.
A rear area advance command post is established to strengthen the
logistics command for the primary direction or for the important operations.
When the war zone deploys an advance command post, the war zone
logistics organization must deploy a logistics command team to be part of
the advance command post, or it must establish a rear area advance
command post in front of the basic command post to assist the basic
command post in carrying out its command.
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A rear area direction command post is established to strengthen
logistics command for independent campaign directions. When the war
zone creates a direction command post, the war zone logistics
organization should simultaneously create a direction command post
composed of a logistics deputy commander (unspecified from what
logistics level he comes from) and key staff officers to assist the basic
command post and to command the logistics for that particular direction.
Other personnel for the advance logistics command post can come from
logistics branch departments along the direction, including naval
bases, from the highest campaign juntuan joint logistics organization,
and from the warzone logistics organization.
The GLD stresses that in order to provide the best command, the
command posts must remain survivable, must have good communications,
and must have good camouflage. According to the requirements and
capabilities, logistics mobile command posts can be placed in fast, mobile
vehicles, aircraft (including helicopters), ships, and trains. In order to support
command for technical (maintenance) support units and elements, each level
of war zone logistics organization should also make every effort to create
technical (maintenance) branch command posts.
PLAAF Logistics Command Posts. According to the GLD book, for future
wars, the war zone air force logistics structure must create a “three-tiered
command system” comprised of a war zone air force logistics command post,
air corps and base logistics command posts, and field station basic command
posts or flight logistics support command offices. The war zone air force
logistics command post will be the command coordination center. The GLD
book did not indicate whether this was part of the joint logistics command
center. The air corps or base logistics command post or air force forward
command post is responsible for managing logistics along the direction of the
war, and the field station or flight logistics support office will be responsible
for the lowest level of logistics command tasks.
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The PLAAF stresses that the key to making this system work during a war
is communications along the chain of command, since logistics is the link
between a campaign and the units involved in battles. The brigade and
regiment level is the basis for the budui logistics. Therefore, when lines of
communication are disrupted, logistics along this chain are also disrupted.
SECTION III: PLAAF LOGISTICS THEORY AND TRAINING
PLAAF Logistics Support Theory.
Having looked at the PLAAF’s logistics structure, this section will focus
primarily on logistics support theory and applied training for mobile
operations, which can be utilized in both offensive and defensive campaigns.
The PLAAF has traditionally conducted its combat operations as a series of
air campaigns within the PLA’s overall campaign. The term “air force
campaign” is a general term for all types of air force campaign operations.41
The PLAAF describes an air force campaign as “using from one to several
campaign large formations (zhanyi juntuan) or campaign tactical formations
(zhanyi zhanshu bingtuan) to carry out the integration of a series of battles
(zhandou) according to a unified intention and plan to achieve a specific
strategic or campaign objective in a specified time. An air force campaign is
implemented under the guidance of the national military strategy and the
PLAAF’s strategy.”42
An air force campaign is also described as “a campaign conducted
independently by an air force campaign large formation or with the
coordination of other services and branches. An air force campaign involves
various air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface-to-air battles to achieve specific
military objectives. The campaign determines the battle’s character, goals,
missions, and actions, and directly supports the local and overall war.
PLAAF Logistics Support for the 1979 Vietnam Border Conflict.
The 1979 border conflict with Vietnam was a watershed for the PLAAF,
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whose operational capabilities had deteriorated significantly during the
Cultural Revolution. Although the conflict clearly pointed out that the
PLAAF’s existing aircraft were not capable of projecting force beyond
China’s borders and were not capable of conducting sustained operations, it
did show that the PLAAF’s logistics forces were proficient at implementing
their basic missions. Even though the PLAAF has corrected many of its
deficiencies, a review of the PLAAF’s conduct during the conflict provides
some valuable clues about how the logistics forces might prepare and operate
during the next campaign.
Although the PLAAF deployed over 700 aircraft to the border area,
neither the PLAAF nor the Vietnamese Air Force flew any combat missions
in direct support of their ground troops.44 According to PLAAF statistics,
The air force flew 8,500 sorties, using 3,131 groups of aircraft during the
campaign. Transport aircraft performed a very crucial logistics support
function, flying 228 sorties, carrying 1,465 troops and 151 tons of materiel. The
number of sorties also included a large number of helicopter sorties, including
those used to transport over 600 wounded soldiers from frontline hospitals
to Nanning.45

Several reasons contributed to the lack of Chinese air combat
operations, including the fact that most airfields were not near the
Vietnamese border, the existing aircraft (primarily F-5s, F-6s, and Il-28s)
had short legs and limited loiter time, and the PLAAF did not train for
sustained sorties, especially from airfields other than their home bases.46
Equally important was Beijing’s concern that any PLAAF air involvement
would escalate the conflict, which was planned to last only 45 days.47
Beijing met its goal of “using its aircraft to deter the Vietnamese from
escalating the conflict,” even though 20,000 to 30,000 PLA ground
troops were killed during the 45-day campaign.48
The PLAAF’s logistics forces were thoroughly involved from the time
preparations began in the Guangxi Autonomous Region and Yunnan
Province opposite the Vietnamese border about 45 days prior to the first
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day of operations. The PLAAF’s overall preparations include
destablishing a command structure; preparing airfields to receive
aircraft, AAA, SAMs, and over 20,000 PLAAF troops; and delivering
propaganda designed to get the troops and local populace ready for the
war.
The Guangzhou MRAF commander (and future PLAAF Commander),
Wanghai, was placed in charge of PLAAF troops in the Guangxi
operations area.49 The Kunming MRAF command post director, Hou
Shujun, was placed in charge of PLAAF troops in the Yunnan operations
area.50 Each operations area was further divided into several operational
directions, and a combined command post was established at one
strategically located airfield within each operational direction to
command and coordinate all matters among different branches and
aircraft types within that district. The Guangzhou MRAF headquarters
also established a forward command post at an unidentified location,
which worked closely with the 7th Air Corps at Nanning as the unified
authority for the PLAAF’s participation in the conflict.
Before and during the conflict, the PLAAF’s logistics organizations
had two primary missions—to support housing for those troops already
stationed in Guangxi and to prepare housing, food, water, and
electricity for the incoming troops. These organizations issued about
10,000 mobile beds, over 32,000 meters of water pipe, and 200
kilometers of electric cable; built 43,000 square meters of bamboo sheds;
and repaired over 23,000 square meters of old housing. In addition, the
air force used vehicles and its boat troops to transport mobile housing with
the troops to Tianyang. During the conflict, the Nanning Wuxu field
station dispatched over 16,500 vehicles to provide support for portions of
one aviation regiment and one independent air group.
The logistics organizations also had to acquire and supply enough
fuel for the incoming aircraft. Based on initial estimates of the amount
of fuel required, the PLAAF’s fuel supply was totally inadequate, and
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several depots were almost empty. Therefore, during the preparation
period, fuel depots at all of the region’s airfields were filled. This included
the depot at Tianyang, which relied on water transport for its fuel
supply. Some of the airfields did not have rail spurs, so vehicles had to
bring in all the fuel. In addition, all of the combat readiness tanks
available throughout the MR and some from outside the MR were quickly
transferred to the frontline airfields. These expanded the amount of
aviation fuel by over 50 percent. By the time the conflict began, the amount
of fuel supplied to all the Guangxi airfields was 4.3 times the normal
amount.
Supplying fuel during peacetime in China was difficult enough, but it
proved even more difficult during wartime. because some airfields, such
as Ningming, are close to the border, their fuel storage was partially
underground, and the rail lines supplying the bases were overscheduled. As a
result, the PLAAF was concerned that the Vietnamese might destroy
or disrupt fuel supplies. because of this concern, the PLAAF took
about 45 days to build over 50 kilometers of semipermanent fuel pipes
leading to three different airfields.
Because the air force did not fly any actual combat missions during
the conflict, only about one-fourth of the fuel estimated for combat was
used, and the difficulties with fuel consumption were fewer than
expected. However, several organizational and facilities problems
were high lighted. For example, the fuel depot capacity at the PLAAF’s
airfields was too small, and there was no way to support several types of
aircraft or the sustained combat use of fuel for several batches of
aircraft. In addition, the refueling equipment was deemed backwards
and incompatible—a problem the PLAAF states it grappled with
through most of the 1990s but has now solved for the most part.
What Logistics Changes have Taken place?
As noted earlier, by the early 1990s, the PLAAF had not progressed
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sufficiently toward combined arms training, let alone joint service
training. Because of this, the PLAAF’s logistics system was still not
organized to support mobile operations for long periods of time. By the
late 1990s, however, that situation had begun to change.
The testing ground for the PLAAF’s operational and logistics
concepts has been the advanced training center at Dingxin, Gansu
Province, in the Lanzhou MRAF. In 1958, the PLAAF built a large center
for testing its air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and SAMs in the Gobi Desert
near Dingxin.51 During the mid-1990s, the PLAAF began expanding
this base to include a large tactics training center, where multiple
PLAAF units could practice the tactics developed at the Tactics
Training Center at Cangzhou, Hebei Province, and tested in individual
units throughout the force. The PLAAF also established a smaller-scale
“joint tactical training base” in the Nanjing MRAF in 1995.52 A 1995
Liberation Army Daily article alluded to the Dingxin training center
while describing a large-scale exercise as follows:53
The exercise involved three categories and six types of combat aircraft, including
fighters, attack planes, large transport planes, armed helicopters, and
transport helicopters. Units have made efforts to turn airfield and support
stations from those that provided logistic support for only one category of
combat planes in the past into those that provide support for all categories and
all types of combat planes. Since different categories and different types of
combat planes are to participate in future air battles in one air fleet, units
have worked out different types of support plans, renovated and
transformed existing combat planes’ service equipment and facilities, and
imported advanced foreign logistic support equipment and facilities with
the result that airfield and support stations can now provide logistics
support for different categories and different types of combat planes.

The most important logistics changes have taken place at the field stations,
which have tried to implement three basic changes in order to support
mobile operations. First, the field stations have had to adapt their
organizational structure to support the regiment(s) housed at their airfield
when they deploy to other airfields. Second, the field stations have had
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to organize themselves to support multiple types of aircraft that deploy to
their airfield. For example, in March 2001, several aircraft from a
Guangzhou MRAF bomber division conducted a long-range mobility
exercise, involving “round the clock flying for several thousands of
kilometers, and stops at several unfamiliar airfields.”54 Third, the field
stations have had to prepare to support operations from dispersal airfields
and highwaylanding strips.
To assist the local field stations, the PLAAF is also trying to create
central field stations that act as regional support centers. The goal of
establishing central field stations is to change the current system of
providing support for only one type of aircraft or one branch to a system
that can support multiple types of aircraft and branches, such as AAA,
SAM, and radar units in the area of an airfield. This center will have
additional fuel, ammunition, and supplies for the aircraft.
In order to support aircraft deploying in or out of a permanent
airfield, the PLAAF began establishing in the mid 1990s a rapid-reaction
logistics structure organized of various fendui as follows:55
• Emergency mobile flight support fendui will deploy to field airstrips,
highway landing strips, or to other airfields when needed.
• Emergency mobile transportation fendui, equipped with large fuel
trucks, tow trucks, and container trucks, will deploy to an area quickly
to supply personnel and materiel.
• Emergency field fuel pipe fendui will be responsible for providing
fuel to airfields not serviced by rail.
• Emergency mobile field medical and rescue fendui.
• Emergency mobile repair fendui will be responsible for repairing special
equipment.
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• Emergency mobile airfield repair fendui, consisting of 150 personnel,
will augment the central field station repair runways and do other
required engineering tasks.
• The fendui can either deploy to another base with the aviation unit they
support, or they can deploy to a base that requires additional support for
incoming aircraft. In addition, they can be used to help prepare and support
aircraft dispersing to auxiliary airfields, field strips, or highway landing
strips.
According to a 1995 Liberation Army Daily article, the PLA moved from
the theory phase to testing phase for “group contingency logistics
support” to meet the requirements of local wars under high-tech
conditions.56 The article stated, “The PLAAF had already formed various
mobile support battalions to be transported by air, along with creating
field station contingency support fendui. At that time, over 90 percent of the
personnel had reportedly been placed in service and over 80 percent of
the major required logistic equipment was already available.”
An April 2001 article in Air Force News described several exercises that
the Nanjing MRAF had conducted since 1996.57 Each exercise involved
deploying emergency support teams of 100-300 personnel to unoccupied
airfields to set up support operations for aircraft to perform combat sorties.
During one exercise, four aircraft landed and took off again after 15
minutes of refueling and provisioning of ammunition.
By the end of 2000, the PLAAF felt comfortable enough to begin
expanding the concept to larger units. For example, at the end of 2000 the
Jinan MRAF conducted “the first organic deployment of an entire
aviation division.” According to a PLA Pictorial article,58
A Jinan MRAF aviation division received orders for combat maneuvers and
immediately went into a state of combat readiness. Four hours later, several
transports carrying an advance echelon of officers, men, and all kinds of
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support equipment and supplies left for the war zone. The next day, dozens of
combat aircraft took off and flew across three provinces to the designated
area, where support activities were quickly accomplished and an advance
command post was established. Shortly after landing, the combat aircraft
engaged in exercise training up to 400 kilometers away. Ten days later, the
division returned home.

The Role of Transport Aircraft.
Although the use of civil aircraft is not new to the PLAAF, there are
differing opinions about the PLA’s ability to use civil aircraft, as well as
military aircraft, to transport supplies and personnel during wartime.
Unlike the U.S. military, the PLA transports almost all of its troops,
equipment, and supplies by road or rail. The PLAAF’s transports are
used primarily for VIP support and to support the PLAAF’s 15th
Airborne Army. In June 1989, the PLA used civil aircraft to transport
troops to Beijing prior to the Tiananmen assault. In December 1992, the
PLAAF used three TU-154 transports to ferry over 10,000 troops in and out
of Xinjiang and Tibet during the annual troop rotation.59 The aircraft flew
83 sorties and also carried 153.3 tons of supplies. In 1995, the PLAAF for the
first time ordered that large transport aircraft carry support personnel and
equipment to accompany large deployments of aircraft in emergency
mobile combat support exercises.60 In addition, military officials in New
Delhi reported that the PLA used civil aircraft to ferry troops to Tibet
during a recent exercise.61 According to a 1999 Department of Defense
report, the PLAAF’s current complement of large transport aircraft is
limited to about a dozen Il-76/Candids and about 30 Y-8/Cubs, the
remainder of the transport force consists of smaller aircraft like the An24/Coke, An-26/Curl, and Y-5/Colt.62 Beijing can be expected to
purchase a few additional Russian Il-76s or similarly-sized foreign aircraft.
The ongoing expansion of China’s civil aircraft fleet will also allow the
PLAAF to use the country’s civil airlines to supplement its transport
capability during crises.
In September 2000, Taiwan’s Tung Sen news quoted high level
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Taiwan military sources as saying that the PLA plans to use civil aircraft,
which are capable of transporting 20,000 troops to Taiwan within 24 hours,
to carry out a first-wave assault.63 Regardless of what the PLA does
during peacetime, there are limits to using civil aircraft to ferry troops
into a hostile environment.
Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army’s exercises
have become more sophisticated in scope. For example, analysis of a 75-day
offensive exercise held in April-May 2001 showed that “the PLA now
has the capability to airdrop an organic regiment plus an
accompanying logistics support unit, together with necessary
equipment and supplies, in one airborne operation, and to sustain the
operation with reinforcements in succeeding airdrops less than six hours
later.”64
In July 1999, the Liberation Army Daily provided information about
a large-scale airborne operation in the Dabie Mountains in central
China.65 The article emphasized that the exercise included airdropping
pieces of light artillery, boxes of ammunition, combat vehicles,
communications equipment, and individual air defense missiles.
According to the article, this was the first time heavy equipment and assault
vehicles were para-dropped by the PLA airborne force, marking a
historic leap of the force from sole para-landing operations to combined
arms operations. The reporters stated, “This emergency logistics support
unit, otherwise called an ‘airborne warehouse,’ carrying tens of tons of
war supplies, can be air-dropped at any location according to
operational needs. It can be employed in a concentrated form in one
direction, or separated into small segments and dropped over scattered
locations to provide supplies to the battlefield in many directions.”
Fuel Support.
One of the most important challenges for the field station is
maintaining sufficient materials, especially fuel, on hand before the start
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of a campaign, and then maintaining enough supplies to sustain the
campaign. The PLA states that the cost for fuel per flying hour for the
PLAAF’s “comparatively advanced” aircraft can reach 10,000 renminbi
(USD 1,250).66 Assuming this refers to an F-8, the cost for a regiment of 24
aircraft with each pilot averaging 100 hours per year, and 1.5 pilots per
aircraft, means the regiment’s aircraft would fly 3,600 hours at a cost of
approximately 36 million renminbi (USD 4.52 million) per year. According to the
PLAAF,67
Fuel is 80 percent of the PLAAF’s materiel. Based on PLAAF
statistics, a small scale local war requires 90,000 to 140,000 tons of
aviation fuel. Given this large quantity of usage, it would be difficult
for the PLAAF’s water and ground transportation system to supply
this amount completely today. The best way to solve this problem is to
build a pipeline network, which would be easy to open, could transfer
large quantities of fuel, is easy to hide, and its ability to exist is high.

Given the PLAAF’s historical problems with refueling equipment, in 1999,
the PLAAF reportedly developed and tested a new airfield petroleum, oil,
and lubricant (POL) supply system in the Jinan MR.68 The system is an
emergency mobile refueling device capable of supporting transregional
air operations, and can be quickly deployed to forward airfields. It is
mainly for use on sod airstrips, reserve airfields, and on high way
runways opened for wartime operation. It can also be used on fixed
airfields in case of damage to POL installations or power outages.
During the exercise, the system was brought in and withdrawn after
refueling two warp lanes in 15 minutes. It can simultaneously refuel two
aircraft of any model by gravity or pressure.
The importance of the PLAAF’s emphasis on its fuel supply and
refueling techniques was demonstrated during an exercise in Nanjing in
April 2000. According to a Liberation Army Daily article,
Minister of Defense Chi Haotian observed a PLAAF logistics exercise that
focused on building a field oil depot capable of providing support to
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several hundred planes. The exercise also covered several other logistics tasks,
including cleaning up after an enemy air attack on an airport, restoring the
airport’s support capability, providing mobile combat support by ground
units, implementing camouflage and protection for aircraft, battle positions,
and oil depots.69

Given the PLAAF’s dual concerns of supplying its forces with sufficient material
in a timely manner and protecting its supplies from being destroyed, it states,70
Because the PLAAF’s transportation capability is weak and requirements for
supplying lots of material during wartime is high, the most material should be
stored at the primary war direction rather than secondary war directions.
Fuel and ammunition used during battles are primary targets for the enemy, so
it is not easy to store lots of material together. Therefore, the PLAAF should
use campaign rear area bases as the primary with stores in several places. Airfields
in the focal point direction can store some common use material, but the most
important material should be stored and controlled by the war zone PLAAF
logistics organization or by PLAAF headquarters logistics for emergency
purposes. When necessary, they can be air transported to the combat area
units.

Logistics Support for Combat Sorties.
The PLAAF has established procedures for what it calls the “four flying
phases,” so that all aviation and support units train and fight from the same
sheet of music.71 This is especially important for the logistics system when
aircraft deploy to a new airfield, or the receiving airfield’s field station does
not necessarily have the proper facilities or experience to support the new
type of aircraft or equipment. Therefore, the field station is required to follow
established procedures. According to the PLAAF Dictionary, the four
flying phases are as follows:72
1. Advance preparation phase, which usually takes place the day before a
flight.
2. Direct preparation phase, which occurs the day of the flight.
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3. Flight implementation phase.
4. Flight appraisal phase.
Whereas the commander determines the missions, the political
commissar’s responsibility throughout the four phases is to ensure that the
pilot is trustworthy enough to fly under the particular circumstances. Other
people are responsible for ensuring the pilot has the proper technical
qualifications to perform a particular mission, he is healthy, and the flight
plan conforms with the reality of the pilot’s situation. In addition, others
prepare the aircraft for the mission.
Sortie Generation and Sustainability.
The key to any conflict for the PLAAF is sustained combat, and the
PLAAF has not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained,
high intensity operations. The PLAAF does not have any real world
experience in planning and executing the kind of high intensity air
campaign that has proven so successful in U.S. and allied operations over
the past decade. Although one should not analyze the PLAAF through
mirror imaging, information about U.S. and allied air force activities
during the Gulf war and the Kosovo Conflict provide a measure of combat
sortie generation and sustainability.
During the early stages of the conflict in Kosovo, allied air forces
deployed approximately 400 aircraft to the area.73 By the end of the conflict,
the number of U.S. and NATO combat aircraft participating in strike
delivery rose from 214 to 590 aircraft.
During the 78 days of Operation ALLIED FORCE, U.S. and NATO
aircraft flew a total of 37,465 combat sorties—an average sortiegeneration rate of 486 missions per day.74 Of the total, 14,006 were strike
and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions (10,808 of which
were dedicated strike sorties). According to Pentagon information, 23,000
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bombs and missiles were used. In the early days of the campaign, however,
the sortie rate over Yugoslavia was more like 150 missions per day. The
maximum intensity of operations was reached on day 57, when 1,000 sorties
were flown, 800 of which were combat missions. These figures compare
to 109,876 combat sorties over the 43-day Gulf war, or an average of 2,555
missions per day. Of the total flown in the Gulf, about half were strike
missions, averaging around 1,600 sorties per day. These numbers do not
include noncombat transport support sorties. These figures
demonstrate the capability needed to ramp up and maintain high
intensity operations, orchestrate operations through a unified daily air
tasking order (ATO), and the need to sustain intense air operations when
faced with a determined adversary.75
Weather affected nearly half the sorties during the Gulf war (in a desert
environment), and the air offensive against Yugoslavia ground to a halt for
days on end while targets remained obscured by cloud.76 During the 78day operation, there was at least 50 percent cloud cover for over 70 percent of
the time. The need to minimize civilian casualties demanded visual
identification and the use of precision weapons. Without a reasonably
clear optical path, however, laser-guided bombs could not be employed.
NATO and U.S. forces were also hampered by the political decision
to restrict the operating height of NATO attack aircraft to a baseline of
15,000 feet for much of the 77 while this kept NATO pilots beyond the
range of most Yugoslav hand-held surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems
and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) over Kosovo, it placed what many saw
as highly artificial limits on the freedom of air campaign planners and
strike crews to employ the full range of battlefield air interdiction
techniques for which they had long been trained. It also, on occasion,
challenged the alliance’s ability to identify targets correctly, contributing
to a number of targeting errors. The worst of these was an attack on a
Kosovar Albanian refugee column, when high-flying USAF pilots
apparently mistook tractors and other civilian vehicles for Serbian armor.
These examples indicate that restrictive rules of engagement will most
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likely guide any future air campaign by the U.S. and possibly the PLAAF as
well.
It is clear that the PLAAF has never conducted the high intensity sortie
generation capability the allied forces showed in the 1990s. Based on an
analysis of Chinese literature and interviews in China, it is evident that
PLAAF pilots do not fly as many hours as their western counterparts.
According to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air force officials, the
PLAAF’s flying hours have not changed appreciably over the past 15 years, but
they have changed their training techniques. Since the end of the 1970s,
bomber pilots have consistently flown an average of 80 hours per year;
fighter pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots up to 150
hours.78 This compares to about 215 hours per year for USAF bomber,
fighter, and attack crews. USAF pilots also conduct numerous hours
training on advanced simulators.79
The PLAAF’s official magazine, Zhongguo Kongjun [China’s Air
Force], has provided information on the number of sorties certain
divisions have flown, which gives a glimpse of how the PLAAF as a whole
operates. The 1994-4 issue discusses flight activity by the 39th Air Division
in the Shenyang MR for a 5-year period.80 From 1989-94, the division flew
12,153 sorties in 1,715 changci, equating to 7 sorties per changci.81
A 1995 article in China’s Air Force provided information about a fuels
branch assigned to a PLAAF field station located on the Leizhou
Peninsula. Based on the information contained in the article, the field
station is part of the 2nd Air Division in the Guangzhou MR and supports
a mix of F-6 and F-7 fighters. The gist of the article was that the Leizhou
Peninsula has severe thunderstorms 11 months out of the year, and the fuels
branch conducted its activities safely under difficult weather
conditions. The article touted the fuel branch’s safety record by stating
that it supported 54,506 sorties over the 8-year period during 1987 through
1994, equating to 6,813 sorties per year.82 Based on the author’s calculations
of these types of articles over a 15-year period, an average sortie lasts from
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45-60 minutes. It is not clear from the article whether the field station
supports one or two regiments. Assuming the field station supports one
regiment with a standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E)
of at least 24 aircraft and 1.5 pilots per aircraft (36 pilots), this equates to
190 sorties per pilot per year, or 3.6 sorties per week. If the field station
supports two regiments of 48 aircraft and 72 pilots, this equates to 85
sorties per year or 1.6 sorties per week. If there are more aircraft and pilots
per regiment, then the sortie rate is lower.
According to Air Commodore Ramesh Phadke of the Indian Air
Force,83
Nearly 50 per cent of the PLAAF consists of ageing and difficult-to-maintain
F-6s, while the remaining aircraft belong to the reasonably modern category.
Maintaining operational readiness must be a difficult undertaking. It would
be safe to assume that at the rate of approximately 1.5 pilots per aircraft, the
PLAAF would have to provide a minimum of 120-150 flight hours annually
to 4,500-5,000 of its active duty pilots. Allowing for those employed in staff and
headquarters appointments, it would mean that at least 4,000 pilots would
need regular flying training. A rough calculation would show that to provide
150 hours of flying to 4,000 pilots at 60-70 percent rate of service ability, the
PLAAF fleet would have to fly some 285 to 335 hours per serviceable aircraft per
year, or 24-28 hours per month, which would be a huge task by any standards.

In the past, the PLAAF tried to overcome the individual aircraft sortie
generation gap by having high numbers of aircraft available, such as
when the PLAAF deployed over 700 aircraft near the Vietnam border in
1979. Another reason for low sortie generation rate is that most engines (F6, F-7, and F-8) can only be used from 100 to 300 hours before they are
overhauled, the aircraft availability rate would probably be reduced
considerably during periods of sustained use during a conflict. Although
the engines for the Su-27s and Su-30s are much better, the PLAAF still
faces the airframe serviceability. The PLAAF has facilities to overhaul all
of its F-6s, F-7s, and B-6s, and their engines, but its F-8s must still return to
the Shenyang Aircraft Factory to be overhauled—a process that can take
from 6-12 months per aircraft.84 Until the Shenyang Aircraft Factory has the
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full capability to overhaul the Su-27s and Su-30s, the PLAAF must send these
aircraft back to Komsomolsk to be overhauled. It is not clear what the
overhaul service period for a Su-27 is; however, assuming the original Su-27s
that arrived at the 3rd Air Division in June 1992 have been flown a minimum of
150 hours per year (1.5 pilots at 100 hours each), then those airframes have at
least 1,350 total hours each. The PLAAF must decide whether to fly those
aircraft more or less as time progresses. Flying less means a reduced
readiness capability, but flying more means more time on the airframes
that cuts down the time before they must be overhauled.
The two latest examples of PLAAF sortie generation and massing
aircraft come from the 1996 exercise opposite Taiwan and the sorties flown
in response to President Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” comments in July
1999.
The PLAAF was actively involved during the PLA’s large-scale
exercises opposite Taiwan during March 1996. According to available open
source material, “The exercise included 12,000 PLAAF and 3,000 Naval
Aviation servicemen. More than 280 aircraft deployed to the exercise area
and conducted total 680 sorties, including 82 transport sorties. Over 800
combat aircraft were within a combat readiness of 550 miles or were on
the alert.” Another report stated the PLA deployed fewer than 100
additional aircraft to the 13 Fujian airfields from other bases, raising the
total to only 226 aircraft. Based on a briefing by the U.S. office of Naval
Intelligence, the PLA conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the
exercise.85 Further press reporting stated that the PLAAF deployed aircraft
from its second and third line airfields to first line airfields, where they
conducted their exercise activity. It took about 3.5 hours for the PLAAF
fighters to prepare for takeoff, compared to the 10 hours they had needed
previously. In addition, the PLAAF demonstrated rapid aircraft sortie
regeneration of 40 minutes, which was considerably quicker than the
past.86 What was not indicated in the reporting is the number of sorties
each pilot flew per day and whether they flew every day.
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During July and August 1999, only 12 PLAAF aircraft were airborne
at any time, not all of which were over the Strait, and the PLAAF flew only
about 30 total sorties per day.87 The air environment over the Taiwan Strait
also provides limitations on the number of sorties that can be flown.
Most of the airspace immediately north and south of Taiwan, flying
to/from Taipei and Kaohsiung, is dedicated to civil air routes, and over
1,000 civil air flights fly through Taiwan’s airspace daily.88 Although the
PLAAF did not fly that many sorties in the Strait, Beijing definitely sent a
clear message that the PLAAF could fly in the Strait if it wanted to and
psychologically altered the view of the PLAAF in Taiwan.
The PLAAF has classified its flying regiments into several
categories as an indicator of their combat effectiveness. The highest is
Category-A (jia lei). In 1997, Liu stated that 90.5 percent of the combat
regimens were Category-A and the number of pilots capable of “allweather” combat had reached 76.2 percent, the highest ever. 89 In 1999, Liu
stated that 98 percent of the regiments were Category-A.90
Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, and Dispersal.
Throughout the PLAAF’s writings, there are references to concerns
about secrecy and early detection of its plans for offensive operations,
given today’s intelligence satellite and airborne surveillance collection
capabilities. PLA writers have stated, “Major military operations cannot
escape from such an intelligence net,”91 so conducting frequent
movement and a certain amount of dispersal is an effective concealment
method.92 “Forces should integrate the use of feints, camouflage,
screening, and dispersion to conceal our command, control,
communications, and intelligence systems and to deceive and jam
enemy information reconnaissance.”93
The PLAAF’s logistics forces have the primary responsibility for
implementing most of the camouflage, concealment and deception (CC&D)
measures. While some CC&D and dispersal activities will take place
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during the campaign preparation phase, others will occur during the
execution phase. As a result of the need to conduct undetected
offensive operations, at least during the early stages of a campaign, yet
provide for survivability in a counterattack, the PLAAF’s logistics forces
have invested considerable time and money into passive CC&D measures,
such as building aircraft cave shelters, small hangars, single aircraft
shelters, false targets, and “concealing the real and making the false
obvious.”94 The PLAAF has identified additional measures that must also
be taken to ensure survivability, such as building hardened entrances to
caves, underground command posts, aircraft hangars, and personnel
shelters, as well as fuel, ammunition, materiel, and equipment storage
facilities.95 Other passive CC&D measures have also been tried. For example,
in an October 2000 exercise, a Nanjing MRAF airfield conducted a
complete blackout as their aircraft returned from an air strike.96
The PLAAF has paid particular attention to trying to enhance these
CC&D measures through the use of dispersing its weapon systems and
equipment. The PLAAF states that the key to gaining air superiority is
keeping airfields available for operations. According to Logistics
Support for Mobile Operations,97
The PLAAF must have a network of three types of runways—permanent, field,
and highway. During the first ten days of the Gulf war, 40 percent of the Iraqi
Air Force’s aircraft were destroyed. The majority of the aircraft survived, but
they were notable to take off from their airfields for combat, so it was the same as
not having them at all. Therefore, the best way to deal with this type of situation
is to hide your aircraft and air defense equipment by dispersing them to field
airstrips and highway landing strips from which they can continue to
conduct their combat operations. The dispersal is especially important
because airfield protection is weak. Currently, some war zones do not have
many first-line airfields, so logistics support should be strengthened at firstline airfields to support multiple types of aircraft prior to or returning from a
strike, or aircraft stopping to refuel en route to their home bases. When mobile
operations units are massing and there are not enough airfields, then the
warzone logistics must open up field airstrips and highway landing strips and
support them with emergency logistics support fendui.
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Over the past decade, the PLAAF has tried to increase the number of
airfields, as well as to open up many of its airfields for civil aircraft. A 1996
Xinhua report stated, “The PLAAF had opened 71 military airports and
offered 53 reserve airports to civilian airplanes since 1990.”98 According
to a 1999 South China morning Post article, “The PLAAF built 37 airports
between 1995 and 1999. In addition, more than 100 large weaponry and
equipment warehouses and war-readiness facilities had been enlarged and
renovated.”99 Unfortunately, the article did not provide a list of the airfields
or state whether they were strictly for military use or joint civil-military
use.
In the late 1980s, the PLAAF began practicing dispersing its aircraft
from permanent bases to alternate runways, including highway and sod
landing strips. For example, in September 1989, three F-8 interceptors
from the 1st Air Division at Anshan and one Il-14 transport used the
Shenyang-Dalian highway as a dispersal runway for the first time ever.100 The
F-8s landed singly and took off quickly in a three-ship formation. The
1996-4 issue of China’s Air Force showed several photos of a logistics fuel
team setting up fuel pipes to support a single F-8-2 from the 1st Air
Division landing on the Shenyang-Dalian highway during mobile
operations “for the first time” in May 1996.101
The PLAAF has established set procedures for providing logistics
support for dispersing aircraft. According to Logistics Support for
Mobile Operations, logistics forces will follow a four-step process to
prepare for aircraft to arrive at a field strip or highway landing strip.102 The
first step is the arrival of the advance team, that will coordinate with the
local civilians and militia for securing the area and make an initial check of
the runway, aprons, and facilities. The second step includes the arrival
of the first echelon, which is responsible for setting up the logistics
command post, closing the highway to civilian traffic, inspecting and
clearing the runway and parking apron, assisting maintenance
personnel prepare for flight operations, setting up fuel and
ammunition storage, and organizing housing and health facilities. The
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next step includes opening the air strips and arrival of additional logistics
forces. The final step is arrival of the aircraft and more logistics support
troops.
Although this type of dispersal training was rarely noted in the open
media until the late 1990s, an exercise in April 2000 provides a good
example of recent training.103
At 0615, an unidentified PLAAF airfield in the Jinan MR initiated an
emergency dispersal exercise following a simulated cruise missile
counterattack on the airfield. Given the scenario, the cruise missile
counterattack appears to have occurred while the PLAAF’s aircraft were
returning from an attack. One group of support troops and over 50 special
vehicles, including fuel trucks, power supply trucks, and oxygen trucks,
dispersed to a designated highway landing strip to support the regiment’s
takeoffs and landings. At the same time, a second group of emergency
support personnel begin repairing bombed runways, extinguishing aircraft
fires, giving first aid to injured pilots, and repairing oil pipelines.

Besides using emergency runways for pre- and post attack
dispersal airfields, the PLAAF has also gradually tried to build up the
capability to provide logistics and maintenance support at auxiliary
airfields for more than one type of aircraft over a sustained period of
time. The PLAAF has gradually moved from supporting a few aircraft of a
single type at an airfield for increasingly longer periods of time, to
supporting multiple types. In doing this, they have had to tackle a number
of long-standing problems that undermine support efficiency, including
backward plane refueling technology and backward bomb loading
technology.104
Support for Nonaviation Units.
Although most of the PLAAF’s reporting focuses on its aviation
branch, nonaviation units have also conducted CC&D and dispersal
operations. A September 1999 Liberation Army Daily article described a
North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation radar brigade exercise that most likely
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represents the type of activity the PLAAF’s radar units would
implement during a campaign.105 The article stated, “On receiving orders to
set out, the brigade took only 40 minutes to dismantle its nonmobile
radar station and begin a motorized advance of several hundred
kilometers. On reaching the combat area, the radars were quickly set up to
provide air situation reports to the command post. In addition, decoy
radars and positions were setup at the same time to confuse
reconnaissance planes.” In November 2000, a Beijing MRAF SAM division
equipped with three types of SAMs used “mixed deployment, concealing
the real and displaying the false, and mobile ambush operations” during a
live-fire exercise.106
Unanswered Questions.
There are many questions this chapter was not able to answer due to
the lack of open source information. For example, as someone who has
observed China’s defense industry for decades stated,107
Logistics revolves basically around systems and numbers. What kind of
relationships does the PLAAF have with its suppliers? What do we know about their
supply chain management skills? What do we know about packaging—are
consumables such as ammunition and petroleum, lubricants and oils (POL)
packaged so they can be used right away “out of the box,” or do they require
assembly and/or processing before they can be used? What do we know about
operating standards and rates, including sortie rates, ammunition and fuel
consumption rates, maintenance rates (manhours of maintenance per hour of
flight time), and other crucial logistics metrics?

These are just a few of the basic questions that need to be answered to really
understand what the PLAAF’s logistics capabilities are.
Although little open source information is available about the
PLAAF’s actual supply system, some generalizations can be made by
looking at the way the U.S. military’s logistics system manages similar
responsibilities. The following information is taken from AFSC Pub 1,
The Joint Staff officer’s Guide, 1997.108 “The hundreds of thousands of
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items in the U.S. Federal supply system are categorized into one of 10
broad classes shown below. Deployment planning focuses on very broad
categories, but it does subdivide the 10 classes into a total of just over 40
subclasses. For example, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and
ammo-ground; subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations,
refrigerated rations, non-refrigerated rations, combat rations, and
water.”
• Class 1: Subsistence
• Class 2: Clothing, individual equipment, tools, administrative
supplies
• Class 3: Petroleum, oils, lubricants
• Class 4: Construction materiel
• Class 5: Ammunition
• Class 6: Personal demand items
• Class 7: major end items; racks, pylons, tracked vehicles, etc.
• Class 8: medical materials
• Class 9: Repair parts
• Class 10: material for nonmilitary programs.
The officer’s Guide further states, “Strategic movement of people,
equipment, and supplies is only part of a complex logistics problem,
whereby units must move, supplies must be requisitioned and delivered on
time, combat force loading must be done according to the type of off
loading expected, and there are always competing demands for transport
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resources and support facilities.” Based on the author’s experience with the
PLAAF and aviation ministry in the late 1980s and follow up discussions
with aviation business representatives since then, the PLAAF has moved
closer to a fully automated logistics system, but there are still problems
with standardizing parts to put into the system.
SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS
The bottom line is what the PLAAF’s logistics forces have done to
better prepare the PLAAF to fight against the United States if required to do
so. It is clear that the logistics forces have made adjustments in their
organizational structure and operational methods to support the PLAAF’s
shift toward joint mobile, offensive operations, but they are not there yet.
Over the past 5 decades, the PLAAF has only been involved in three
major external campaigns—the Korean war, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,
and the 1979 Vietnam border conflict.109 During those campaigns, the
PLAAF deployed several hundred aircraft to a handful of airfields near
the border, but their per pilot sortie rate was minimal.
More importantly, none of those campaigns involved enemy attacks
against targets inside China’s borders, so the PLAAF’s aircraft, airfields,
and troops were safe. The PLAAF has studied the Gulf War and Kosovo
conflict and knows that the next war will most likely be completely
different. Their aviation and air defense assets, not only near the front
but also in rear areas, will not be safe from attack by Americans. Stealth
aircraft and long-range cruise missiles. This is why the PLAAF is
concentrating on CC&D and dispersal measures, and why China has placed a
higher emphasis on national military and civil air defense capabilities the
past couple of years.
The current description for PLAAF fighter, bomber, and ground attack
offensive air campaign operations can be summarized as “transregional
rapid mobility integrated long-distance strikes at night in all weather
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conditions from multiple levels and different directions under unknown
conditions. These attacks can be conducted against land or maritime
targets, and the navigation routes can be over land or over water.” Media
reports discussing the PLAAF’s exercises have mentioned all of the above,
but from the PLAAF’s perspective, one of the strongest aspects of its training
program is that during exercises both antagonists are told when a war
begins, but they are not told the other side’s number of sorties, location, or
altitude. Therefore, they must decide how to achieve victory in a
completely unknown environment. An exercise conducted by a Jinan
MRAF fighter regiment indicates the PLAAF’s trend in training for
emergency mobile transregional operations.
According to a November 2000 report in Air Force News,110
A regiment of fighters consisting of over 20 aircraft departed its home base in
the Jinan MR (which includes Shandong and Henan Provinces) on a rainy
night “under concealment” in late October. The aircraft flew to an airfield
south of the Yangzi River (probably in the Nanjing MR), to conduct air
patrols and render air support to the war zone. This emergency combat
mobility drill signified a new breakthrough in its capability for large-fleet,
long-range, all-weather operations at all hours and in all air spaces. The
regiment holds monthly simulated drills of emergency take-off and mobility,
and change of alert conditions. It has switched to unfamiliar field targets
for target practice, and changes ground markers frequently to enhance
aviators’ capabilities for independent navigation and target identification. It
flies frequent low- and ultra-low altitude flights, some oversea areas under
unknown conditions. It also subjects aviators to maximum daily flying time
training. Training for complicated weather conditions is conducted in
minimal weather conditions. On the recent maneuver, the regiment also
practiced electronic countermeasures, penetrating enemy defenses from
different directions, coordinated attacks from high and low altitudes, and
simulated attack over water.

Throughout this chapter, there have been references to the PLAAF’s
requirement during the 1990s to transform itself from a force capable of
employing single branches and single types of aircraft in positional defensive
campaigns to using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in air force
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combined arms, mobile offensive operations campaigns, with the goal of
shifting to operations in joint service campaigns. Within this goal, the
PLAAF’s logistics forces have had to change their operational structure and
methods of operation from supporting single types of aircraft at their home
base to supporting multiple types of aircraft at their home or deployed bases
for short and long periods of time.
Based on the material available to write this report, it appears that the
PLAAF’s logistics system has made progress toward reaching its goal of
supporting mobile forces. Organizationally, it has established emergency
mobile fendui to support deploying aircraft into and out of airfields. These
fendui are also responsible for helping set up mobile operations at field
airstrips and highway landing strips. Although the articles reviewed discuss
the need to preposition adequate material in the campaign areas before a war
breaks out, they did not discuss whether this has actually happened.
From a training perspective, it appears that the PLAAF’s logistics
forces are applying their theory to operational exercises. The exercises
involve repairing damage to airfields after notional enemy attacks,
including runway repairs, taking care of wounded personnel, putting out
fires, and preparing to recover aircraft that are en route home and have
been damaged during their mission. At the same time, the logistics forces have
deployed some fendui to begin preparing the field airstrips or highway
landings trips for recovering aircraft or for generating follow-on combat
sorties.
One of the most important issues that is not clear from the articles
reviewed is how proficient the PLAAF would be during a real conflict,
especially if some of the key first line airfields were destroyed—as the
PLA anticipates will happen in a conflict with the United States.
Would the PLAAF, in fact, be able to conduct combat sorties out of field
airstrips and highway landing strips, or would they merely be somewhere to
disperse the aircraft until they could fly to another operational airfield?
Would the PLAAF opt to move its aircraft further to the rear as its
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airfields began sustaining damage? Will the PLAAF actually be able to
provide logistics support to multiple types of aircraft at a single base?
Many airfields have a single regiment with two types of aircraft (generally F6s and F-7s), or have two regiments with different types of aircraft, such
as one regiment with F-7s and one with F-8s. The field stations are
organized appropriately to support more than one type of aircraft. But how
proficient will the logistics forces at first line airfields be if they have to
support several regiments of different types of aircraft? Although
bombers have conducted exercises where they stopped at multiple
airfields, the media reports did not specify the types of airfields they
transited or the types of support they received.
Two probable weak links for the logistics forces during a campaign will
be communications and transportation. Logistics Support for Mobile
Operations states that “when lines of communication are disrupted, logistics
along this chain are also disrupted. Therefore, the PLAAF needs to establish
an independent command communications network, consisting of radio,
land line, and computers.”111 It is not clear from the media reports or the PLA
books whether this is taking place.
Although the PLAAF has ordered that transport aircraft should be
used to move logistics forces during campaigns, road and rail will still
be the most likely means. A logistics transportation exercise
conducted during summer 2001 in the Guangzhou MRAF emphasized
that the PLAAF is not yet prepared to operate under poor weather
conditions or non-scripted exercises. During his critique, the
Guangzhou MRAF transportation director emphasized “the key is that
training still consists of form without substance, including training for
show to pass the test. Some units were thrown into disorder with just the
slightest change in the predetermined disposition.”112
If the PLAAF does have to engage the United States in battle sometime in
the near future, the keys will be pilot proficiency, sortie generation and
sustainability, adequate logistics support across the board, reliable
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communications and intelligence, and equipment maintenance capabilities.
The PLAAF has made much progress in all of these areas over the past
decade, beginning with establishing the theory, then providing the training to
implement the theory. It is clear, at least from reading PLAAF writings, that
much of what they want to do is still aspirational, but they are definitely
putting the pieces of the administrative and operational structure in place to
accomplish their goals sometime in the future. The PLAAF is also in the
process of acquiring the types of weapon systems that will allow them to
operate from airfields that are farther from the borders and to deploy SAMs
with ranges that can reach out beyond China’s borders. The logistics forces
are also definitely changing accordingly to support these new systems.
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